[ RadSafe ] Proliferation: the case of radioactive isotopes toIran

Robert Atkinson robert.atkinson at genetix.com
Thu Aug 31 02:13:29 CDT 2006


It is interesting that this thread and the original article concentrated
on the use of the moisture density gauges in RDD's. 
There is another proliferation issue, the use of Am-Be as a neutron
source in the trigger of a conventional nuclear device. This and its use
as a reflector are the reasons that Beryllium is controlled as a
"dual-use" product. 

Robert. 

-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl [mailto:radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl] On
Behalf Of Dan W McCarn
Sent: 31 August 2006 04:41
To: 'Gerry Blackwood'; 'Bruce Tefft'; 'Rad Safe'
Subject: RE: [ RadSafe ] Proliferation: the case of radioactive isotopes
toIran

Why are we doing this again?  Iran has scores of much larger sources in
use and many more retired sources. What's the issue?

This is what I wrote before -

Iran is a huge oil producer, and the nature of petroleum exploration /
development entails geophysical borehole logging - always with
gamma-gamma density and neutron porosity tools with sources comparable
to the IAEA Category 2 and 3. I'm sure that they have scores of sources
in the Iranian petroleum industry currently in use, and have retired
scores more. Not to mention large teletherapy sources for cancer
treatment or food preparation / sterilization.

Dan W. McCarn, Geologist
AIPG CPG #10245, Wyoming PG #3031, EurGeol #462 Houston, TX


-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl [mailto:radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl] On
Behalf Of Gerry Blackwood
Sent: Wednesday, August 30, 2006 17:27
To: Bruce Tefft; Rad Safe
Subject: [ RadSafe ] Proliferation: the case of radioactive isotopes to
Iran

Proliferation: the case of radioactive isotopes to Iran
       
 On 22 July, a truck containing 10 lead-lined boxes was intercepted at
the Bulgarian-Romanian border, after Bulgarian scanning detectors
measured radiation 200 times the normal background radiation. The
consignment, destined for Iran, was discovered by the Bulgarian Nuclear
Regulatory Agency (NPA) to contain soil-measuring devices incorporating
the radioisotopes cesium-137 and americium-beryllium. In the light of
the continuing controversy over Iran's record of nondisclosure about its
nuclear activities, questions arise as to the intended purpose of such a
consignment. 


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