[ RadSafe ] Davis Besse Engineers Punished for Deception (Book on Nonenforcement/Desuetude)

[EASlavin at aol.com]

Good afternoon:
1. I am working on a book on nonenforcement (desuetude) of worker protection 
laws by USDOL and other agencies over the past 25 years.  It covers 
occupational safety and anti-discrimination laws and long delays in investigations and 
adjudications.
2. Are coverups pandemic in the nuclear industry and rarely punished?  
3. Are "coverup artists" are promoted and praised?  Are whistleblowers  
blacklisted?   Do nuclear powerplant employees fear to raise safety concerns due to 
the high cost of taking a nuclear powerplant off-line (when it makes no money 
for stockholders, but costs them money in refueling and maintenance 
"outages")?  Are nuclear weapons plants concealing problems and retaliating against 
whistleblowers?  Please reply privately, in confidence if you so request, and not 
to the list.  
4. In this Davis-Besse case, the coverup artists won three months delay in 
shutting down the plant, thereby risking public safety and health.  Color them 
"team players."   Is the term "team player" a compliment or a criticism where 
you work? 
5. See below from 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2006/06-001iii.html

(QUOTE)
NRC BARS FOUR INDIVIDUALS FROM NRC-REGULATED WORK BECAUSE OF INACCURATE 
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION
Printable Version


The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued Orders to four
individuals prohibiting their involvement in NRC-regulated
activities because of their roles in providing incomplete and
inaccurate information to the agency on conditions at the Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Plant in 2001. The Davis-Besse plant, located at
Oak Harbor, Ohio, is operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.
In 2001 the NRC directed all holders of operating licenses for
pressurized water reactors, including Davis-Besse, to inspect the
tubes which penetrate the reactor vessel head for possible leakage
by Dec. 31, 2001. FirstEnergy requested that it be permitted to
operate an additional three months before shutting down for the
inspection, and the NRC staff, based on information submitted by
FirstEnergy, permitted the plant to operate until Feb. 16, 2002.

Subsequent examination of the reactor vessel head by FirstEnergy
showed that leakage through the tubes had caused substantial
corrosion damage to the head.

"The four individuals subject to the Orders, including three former
utility managers, engaged in deliberate misconduct by providing
inaccurate and incomplete information about the extent of reactor
vessel head cleaning and inspection," said James Caldwell, NRC
Regional Administrator. "Had the NRC known that the plant was being
operated with leakage through the reactor vessel head, the agency
would have taken immediate action to shut down the plant."

In April 2005 the NRC levied a $5.45 million civil penalty against
FirstEnergy for violations associated with the damage and for
providing incomplete and false information to the agency.
(Reference: NRC News Release 05-070, issued April 21.) The civil
penalty was paid by FirstEnergy on September 14, 2005.

NRC Orders were issued to four individuals no longer employed by
FirstEnergy. Orders prohibiting involvement in NRC-regulated
activities for a period of five years were issued to: David Geisen,
who was Manager of Design Engineering; Dale Miller, who was
Regulatory Affairs Compliance Supervisor; and Steven Moffitt, who
was Technical Services Director. An Order, prohibiting involvement
in NRC-regulated activities for a period of one year was issued to
Prasoon Goyal, who was a Senior Design Engineer at Davis-Besse.

The Orders are effective immediately, and the individuals have 20
days in which to request a hearing.

The NRC previously issued an Order in April 2005 to Andrew
Siemaszko, who was a system engineer at Davis-Besse, which, if
sustained, would prohibit his involvement in NRC-regulated
activities for a five-year period. A hearing on that action is
ongoing. Siemaszko was responsible for ensuring that the reactor
vessel head was cleaned and inspected during a refueling and
maintenance outage in 2000.

In addition to these enforcement actions, the NRC has previously
referred issues related to the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head
damage to the Department of Justice.

The Davis-Besse plant remained shut down for two years to address
equipment and staff performance issues. After extensive inspections
by the NRC of improvements to safety systems and FirstEnergy's
efforts to raise safety consciousness in the plant's management and
staff, the NRC determined that Davis-Besse could be restarted and
operated safely. The NRC also required that the utility undertake
annual independent assessments of important plant activities for
five years.

"Since the plant's restart in March 2004, it has been operated
safely and continues to be operated safely," Caldwell
said. "FirstEnergy's performance at Davis-Besse has been closely
monitored by the NRC inspection staff, including NRC resident
inspectors assigned to that site."

The Orders to the four individuals will be available from the Region
III Office of Public Affairs and on the NRC's web site at:
http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-
do/regulatory/enforcement/current.html#individual.

Individual Actions

David Geisen (IA-05-052)

On January 4, 2006, an immediately effective Order Prohibiting
Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities was issued based on the
individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company (licensee). As the Manager of Design Engineering, the
individual provided incomplete and inaccurate information concerning
the licensee's written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin 2001-
001, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Penetration Nozzles." The Order is effective for 5 years from the
date of issuance of the Order.

Dale Miller (IA-05-053)

On January 4, 2006, an immediately effective Order Prohibiting
Involvement in NRC-Licensed activities was issued based on the
individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company (licensee). As the Compliance Supervisor, the individual
provided incomplete and inaccurate information concerning the
licensee's written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin 2001-
001, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Penetration Nozzles." The Order is effective for 5 years from the
date of issuance of the Order.

Steven Moffitt (IA-05-054)

On January 4, 2006, an immediately effective Order Prohibiting
Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities was issued based on the
individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company (licensee). As the Technical Services Director, the
individual provided incomplete and inaccurate information concerning
the licensee's written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin 2001-
001, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Penetration Nozzles." The Order is effective for 5 years from the
date of issuance of the Order.

Prasoon Goyal (IA-05-055)

On January 4, 2006, an immediately effective Order Prohibiting
Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities was issued based on the
individual's deliberate misconduct while employed at the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company (licensee). As a Senior Engineer, the individual provided
incomplete and inaccurate information concerning the licensee's
written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin 2001-
001, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Penetration Nozzles." The Order is effective for 1 year from the
date of issuance of the Order.

Andrew Siemaszko (IA-05-021)

On April 21, 2005, an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed
activities for five years from the effective date of the Order was
issued to the individual based on his deliberate activities while
employed at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. As a former system
engineer, the individual deliberately provided inaccurate and
incomplete information concerning the description of the efforts and
results associated with removal of boric acid deposits from the
reactor pressure vessel head.
(UNQUOTE)
6.   Is the coverup problem more pronounced in any particular country or 
countries?  In any particular company or companies?
In nuclear powerplants, nuclear weapons plants, DOE and contractor 
facilities, hospitals, medical labs or otherwise?
7.  What do you reckon?   Again, feel free to reply privately, and not 
directly to this list, requesting confidentiality if you would like it
With kindest regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,
Ed Slavin
Box 3084
St. Augustine, FL 32085-3084
904-471-7023
904-471-9918 (fax)