[ RadSafe ] Greenpeace nuclear video
JGinniver at aol.com
JGinniver at aol.com
Tue Jan 17 11:12:37 CST 2006
In a message dated 17/01/2006 10:27:31 GMT Standard Time,
Fred.Dawson199 at mod.uk writes:
Dr Large makes some very
good points that are not easily dismissed.
Hmmm, which points area those?
"Non-stochastic doses are those delivered in one big lump"
"It is the total dose that matters irrespective of time"
"26,453 fuel rods/reactor = 360 tonnes U"?
Actual data is 193 Fuel assemblies containing 264 fuel pins (total 50,952
pins) each Fuel Assembly containing 461.4 kg of Uranium (523.4 kg UO2)
total of approximately 89 tonnes of Uranium in the Sizewell B reactor.
from Nuclear Fact Book, published by G+B Harwood ISBN 3-7186-0273-3
"Chance cannot apply to terrorism"
Does this mean that a terrorist will succeed at every step of the journey?
They will successfully train to pilot the aircraft (one terrorist was
already apprehended attempting to do this)
They will successfully plan the attack in advance in secret.
They will successfully evade the security screening at the airport (airport
screening having been increased significantly since 9/11)
They will overcome the aircrew (cabin procedures and security of the
area having been increased since 9/11)
They will be able to fly the aircraft with no intervention from passengers
or crew. (Once the passengers on Flight 93 were aware that it was likely to
a suicide attack they fought against the terrorists, and while unsuccessful
in gaining control of the aircraft, the terrorists did not complete their
They will successfully guide the aircraft onto the target ensuring that at
least one of the main engines strikes the target building with maximum
There are a long chain of events that must be successfully completed to
have a change of damaging the sensitive areas of the plant.
Only 2 of the four truck bombs shown have any possibility of causing a
radiological release. The only one with the real potential is adjacent to
building, to achieve this the terrorists must have managed to take a truck
full of explosives inside the inner security barrier. Security
have increased significantly on UK nuclear plants since 9/11, not least the
addition of armed officers from the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.
Even DR Large can't make up his mind whether the aero engine turbo shaft
(the only item on an aircraft likely to penetrate significantly into
is 400 to 500 kg as his notes (below the slide) state 300 kg. The speed
stated is 400 knots, I'm not convinced that a terrorist could make an
attack at this speed. the landing speed (required to make an accurate
to the runway) is typically between 200 and 250 knots.
"The calculated impulse loading is 20x the structural strength of typical
commercial structures." Since when is the pre-stressed concrete
building a typical commercial structure.
"(It's) touch and go whether the protective structure surrounding the
reactor plant would survive an aircraft crash" No assessment has been made
loss of energy due to the outer reinforced containment structure before the
major components strike the inner pre-stressed containment structure that
varies between 1 and 1.3m thick and contains approximately 50% more steel
reinforcement than other commercial PWR containment buildings. Even if the
the components managed to penetrate the two reinforced concrete walls,
they still have enough energy to penetrate the 6mm thick welded steel liner
of the containment building?
"Terrorist acts are intelligently driven and not by chance - the defence in
depth stratagem cannot apply". As I've already mentioned above, in order
a terrorist attack to succeed a long chain of activities have to be
successfully carried out, failure of any one of these will affect the
success of the
attack. It is not simply a case that any terrorist attack will succeed and
defence in depth is probably must likely to thwart an attack.
This slide shows values for Long Term Mortality Incidence, Etc - Mean
This appears to be a copy of part of Table 41 from NRPB Report R137.
Firstly there is a typographical error in the table, the numbers evacuated
Column 2 (p=E Expected) should be 2.4E+4, not 2.4E+3 as shown. Secondly
table in the NRPB report has lower, revised values to take into account
factors such as retention of activity in the primary circuit, removal of
from the containment atmosphere, attenuation in leakage paths from
containment. These were not considered in the original report US Reactor
WASH-1400. The revised values were calculated by the CEGB/NNC and
Westinghouse based on further studies reviews.
This table is the worst case table from the report there are 12 differnt
scenarious from UK1 (the example used) to UK12. Dr Large doesn't explain
this is the most appropriate table to use.
Despite all of the graphs, and all of the dose data, there is nothing in
this presentation that shows how a terrorist attack with a large aircraft
succeed in breaching the reactor containment building and causing sufficient
damage within the containment building or nearby buildings to cause a core
meltdown accident which has been used to produce the large releases
for his dose/plume data to be valid. even if one or two (for a large four
engine aircraft) of the shafts from the jet engines did penetrate the double
containment and steel liner, how would they cause sufficient damage within
containment building to cause a core meltdown? Alternatively if they struck
another of the key buildings on site, DR Large hasn't demonstrated that this
would be sufficient to cause a core meltdown either.
P.S if you actually compare the size of the aircraft in the Greenpeace
with the size of the Sizewell A reactor buildings you will discover that it
is nearly twice the size of the world largest passenger aircraft (Airbus
- not yet in service) and approximately 4 times the size of the medium sized
airliner (e.g. Airbus A320) shown in the film. I'm sure this was just an
oversight on the part of Greenpeace and wasn't designed to increase the fear
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