[ RadSafe ] Fw: [DU Information List] Further evidence of enricheduranium in the air in lebanon following the recent conflict

Robert Atkinson robert.atkinson at genetix.com
Wed Nov 22 06:15:25 CST 2006

They don't even believe the Lebanese when they say there was no evidence
uranium weapons. It's also ridiculous that they suggest the use of
enriched uranium to disguise the presence of DU. This implies that DU is
somehow more dangerous than enriched or natural uranium! 


-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl [mailto:radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl] On
Behalf Of Roger Helbig
Sent: 22 November 2006 10:49
To: radsafelist
Subject: [ RadSafe ] Fw: [DU Information List] Further evidence of
enricheduranium in the air in lebanon following the recent conflict

Nothing like an enormous amount of disinformation.  UN, oh they are just
another group of un-believers.  That's this group's attitude.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "davey garland" <thunderelf at yahoo.co.uk>
To: <cndyorks at yahoogroups.com>; <earthfirstalert at yahoogroups.com>;
<pandora-project at yahoogroups.com>; <abolition-caucus at yahoogroups.com>;
<asceptic at tiscali.co.uk>; <du-watch at yahoogroups.com>;
<du-list at yahoogroups.com>; <nucnews at yahoogroups.com>;
<newsmatters at yahoogroups.com>; <vivlerner at gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 11:43 PM
Subject: [DU Information List] Further evidence of enriched uranium in
the air in lebanon following the recent conflict

  See http://www.llrc.org for outline, full  report and pictures.
 Part of the message of this report is that  citizen groups can use
simple, affordable and reliable techniques to monitor for  the presence
of hot radioactive particles in the environment.
  Green Audit recently reported the results of  measurements carried out
on samples from a bomb crater in Khiam Southern  Lebanon. Measurements
made by the Harwell laboratory in  Oxford confirmed the existence of
Enriched  Uranium of activity 180Bq/kg and U238/U235 ratio of 108 in the
sample.  The discovery, which was reported in  'The Independent' of 28th
October, has caused some concern. The  United Nations Environment
Programme UNEP responded that its analyses have  failed to detect
Uranium. The Israel Defence Force has denied using Depleted  Uranium
weapons.  Further evidence  of the widespread existence of enriched
uranium in  Lebanon is now reported in a new paper by  Chris Busby and
Dai Williams which has been accepted by the European Journal of  Biology
and Bioelectromagnetics and is available on the LLRC website
  Since the first analysis of the  Khiam sample (which used Mass
Spectrometry) was reported, Green Audit  commissioned a second analysis
using different techniques. Alpha spectrometry  carried out at the
School of Ocean Sciences University of Wales has confirmed  the presence
of Enriched Uranium but also shown the absence of significant  amounts
of plutonium. In addition, gamma spectroscopy has shown that there is no
Caesium-137 or other gamma emitting isotopes that would be expected if
the  sample originated in spent nuclear fuel.
  There are significant and justified  health concerns about exposure to
the long lived and widely dispersed oxide  particles formed when uranium
weapons are used. 
   In order to examine whether the Khiam  bomb was a local contamination
affair or whether there is more widespread  distribution of uranium,
Green Audit has commissioned an analysis for Uranium  isotopes of a
vehicle air filter taken by Dai Williams from an ambulance in the
suburb of Haret Hreyk in South Beirut. The ambulance was hit on day 16
of the  war but was active until then. The filter was examined using
CR39 alpha tracking  plastic and also sent to the Harwell laboratory for
an analysis of uranium  isotopes and also a routine 45 element analysis.
The filter was dissolved in  acid and examined using ICP Mass
Spectrometry by the Harwell laboratory. Results  confirmed the presence
of enriched uranium. In three separate measurements the  isotopic ratios
U238/U235 found were 113, 123, 133 and total concentration in  the
filter element as supplied was 0.1mg/kg. The lower limit of detection of
the  Harwell measurement system was 0.0002mg/kg U238 and 0.0001mg/kg
 This  concentration is significant given that the dust in the filter
would have had  only two weeks to accumulate and add to earlier dust
from a year's usage in the  engine. In addition, CR39 tracking
techniques suggested the presence of at least  two hot particles in the
filter, the size and activity characteristics of which  are consistent
with Uranium. Although care should be taken in over-interpreting  data
based on only one filter, these results do suggest that there was
widespread dispersion of enriched uranium over Southern  Lebanon. We
suggest that further vehicle filter measurements are made as a matter of
urgency  and that since there are political aspects, the issue is
examined by or overseen  by independent experts. We repeat here our
earlier warning that the detection of  weapons uranium in the
environment is not straightforward and that conventional  Geiger
counters cannot be used. CR39 or sensitive beta scintillation counters
followed by sampling and
 ICPMS is necessary before statements can be made about  the presence or
absence of uranium particles. 
  'Further evidence of enriched uranium in guided  weapons employed by
the Israeli military in Lebanon in July 2006; Ambulance  filter
analysis' Dai Williams and Chris Busby. European Journal of Biology and
Bioelectromagnetics 2006 Vol 2 Issue 1. Published on the website
www.llrc.org with permission of the  Journal.
  The earlier Green Audit report on bomb  crater samples is at
  Independent  report at
  ICP-MS  is "Inductively coupled plasma mass spectroscopy". 
  European Journal of Biology and  Bioelectromagnetics: see
  Critics of Green Audit and LLRC have referred  to the Human Rights
Council report "Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon"
claiming that it indicates  depleted Uranium was not used in Lebanon.
The relevant paragraph appears to be:  
  ii. Depleted uranium
  257. The IDF has within its arsenal of  weapons munitions that can be
equipped with depleted uranium warheads. It is  therefore possible that
depleted uranium (DU) munitions were used by the IDF  during the
conflict. However, the preliminary findings of the Lebanese  National
Council for Scientific Research, which carried out a detailed field
survey of several bomb sites, concluded that there was no indication of
depleted  uranium having been used in the conflict, with the caveat that
some additional  field work was still necessary to draw a final
  We note that we have already  suggested enriched Uranium was deployed
in order to disguise the depleted  Uranium signature; that since no
monitoring methods have been specified either  by UNEP or OHCHR no-one
can be confident that the forms of Uranium produced by  Uranium bombs or
armour piercing rounds would be detected; and that the findings  are
 We have sent you this email circular because  you are on our database
of people who are concerned about low level radiation  and health. If
you do not want to receive information from us please reply,  putting
"remove from LLRC" in the subject line.

  Low Level Radiation Campaign
bramhall at llrc.org
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