[ RadSafe ] How I Learned Not to Fear the Bomb

[Clayton J Bradt]

Monday, October 20, 2008


By James Kitfield
National Journal

WASHINGTON — Seven years after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
experts and presidential candidates continue to put nuclear terrorism atop
their lists of the gravest threats to the United States.  Yet Brian Michael
Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the RAND Corp., says that the
threat lies more in the realms of Hollywood dramas and terrorist dreams
than in reality.


There has never been an act of nuclear terrorism, he notes, yet the threat
is so potentially catastrophic that it incites fear — and that fear
fulfills a terrorist's primary goal.  National Journal interviewed Jenkins
about his research into nuclear terrorism.


National Journal:  Why did you decide to delve so deeply into the
psychological underpinnings of nuclear terror?


Brian Jenkins:  Well, I couldn't write about the history of nuclear
terrorism, because at least as of yet there hasn't been any.  So that would
have been a very short book.  Nonetheless, the U.S. government has stated
that it is the No. 1 threat to the national security of the United States.
In fact, according to public opinion polls, two out of five Americans
consider it likely that a terrorist will detonate a nuclear bomb in an
American city within the next five years.  That struck me as an astonishing
level of apprehension.


NJ:  To what do you attribute that fear?


Jenkins:  I concluded that there is a difference between nuclear terrorism
and nuclear terror.  Nuclear terrorism is about the possibility that
terrorists will acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon.  Nuclear terror, on
the other hand, concerns our anticipation of such an attack.  It's about
our imagination.  And while there is no history of nuclear terrorism, there
is a rich history of nuclear terror.  It's deeply embedded in our popular
culture and in policy-making circles.


NJ:  So the fear of nuclear terrorism is not new?


Jenkins: Almost as soon as the people involved in the Manhattan Project
tested an actual atomic bomb they started to wonder about the possibility
of someone using it for terrorist purposes.  In the 1970s, some talented
nuclear weapons designers studied the issue of whether someone outside of a
government program could possibly design and build a workable nuclear
weapon.  They concluded it was possible, and then postulated who might do
such a thing — terrorists!  So, in a way, the threat preceded any terrorist
actually thinking about the issue.  To a certain extent, we educated the
terrorists on the subject.


NJ:  Hasn't al-Qaeda, in particular, focused considerable energy on nuclear
weapons?


Jenkins: Yes, because terror is the use of violence to create an atmosphere
of fear that causes people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists,
and they are very good at that.  So in al-Qaeda's media jihad there is a
recurrent theme of nuclear terrorism.  They realize that if they put the
words "terrorism" and "nuclear" in proximity to each other it creates added
fear.  It also excites their constituency, because nothing excites the
powerless more than the idea of ultimate power.


NJ:  Are you saying that al-Qaeda is interested in nuclear weapons only in
the abstract, as a propaganda tool?


Jenkins: No.  Al-Qaeda has actual nuclear ambitions, there is no doubt
about that.  When Osama bin Laden was in Sudan, he tried to acquire some
nuclear material.  The efforts were mostly amateurish, and al-Qaeda was the
victim of some scams.  Qaeda (leaders) also had meetings with some
Pakistani nuclear scientists while in Afghanistan.  So, clearly, they were
thinking about nuclear weapons.  If bin Laden were able to acquire a
nuclear weapon, I also suspect that he would use it.  My larger point is
that al-Qaeda has already become the world's first nonstate nuclear power
without even having nuclear weapons.


NJ:  Do you mean by its ability to incite fear of nuclear terrorism?


Jenkins: Yes, and we contribute to that fear.  The message clearly coming
out of Washington for the last seven years has been a relentless message of
fear.  We've spent the years since 9/11 discussing every conceivable
vulnerability of our society.  We talk about the next catastrophic attack
not as a matter of "if" but "when," implying that it's unavoidable.


NJ:  We've created a perfect incubator for terrorist propaganda?


Jenkins:  Yes, because the whole dynamic lends itself to sensationalism and
overdramatization.  In a sense, terrorism is a form of theater anyway, and
its message is amplified in America's media-drenched society.  I've
actually had government officials say to me, "We'll deal with nuclear
terrorism the way Jack Bauer does on ‘24.’”  And I have to remind them
that, you know, that's a television show.  It's not real life.


NJ:  Why do you think nuclear terrorism connects so powerfully with the
American psyche?


Jenkins:  Because beneath the veneer of our American optimism are layers of
anxiety.  We as a nation have been fascinated with the theme of decline and
doom going back centuries.  We worry about losing our pre-eminent place in
the world.  We worry that our borders cannot protect our culture (against
threats) from without, and (we worry) about subversion from within.  If you
want to write a best-seller, just write a book (such as) The End of Days or
The Late, Great Planet Earth.  For the many biblical literalists among us,
talk of a nuclear apocalypse and Armageddon just confirms their faith.  As
the ultimate doomsday scenario, nuclear terrorism condenses a lot of the
free-floating anxieties in American society.


NJ:  How do you break this chain reaction of fear?


Jenkins:  The first thing we have to do is truly understand the threat.
Nuclear terrorism is a frightening possibility but it is not inevitable or
imminent, and there is no logical progression from truck bombs to nuclear
bombs.  Some of the steps necessary to a sustainable strategy we've already
begun.  We do need better intelligence-sharing internationally and enhanced
homeland security and civil defense, and we need to secure stockpiles of
nuclear materials around the world.


Nations that might consider abetting terrorists in acquiring nuclear
weapons should also be made aware that we will hold them fully responsible
in the event of an attack.  We need to finish the job of eliminating
al-Qaeda, not only to prevent another attack but also to send the message
to others that if you go down this path, we will hunt you down relentlessly
and destroy you.


NJ:  What should political leaders tell the American people?


Jenkins:  Rather than telling Americans constantly to be very afraid, we
should stress that even an event of nuclear terrorism will not bring this
Republic to its knees.  Some will argue that fear is useful in galvanizing
people and concentrating their minds on this threat, but fear is not free.
It creates its own orthodoxy and demands obedience to it.  A frightened
population is intolerant.  It trumpets a kind of "lapel pin" patriotism
rather than the real thing. A frightened population is also prone both to
paralysis — we're doomed! — and to dangerous overreaction.


I believe that fear gets in the way of addressing the issue of nuclear
terrorism in a sustained and sensible way.  Instead of spreading fear, our
leaders should speak to the American traditions of courage, self-reliance,
and resiliency.  Heaven forbid that an act of nuclear terrorism ever
actually occurs, but if it does, we'll get through it.


NJ:  Seven years after the 9/11 attacks, how do you rate the effort to
destroy al-Qaeda?


Jenkins:  On the negative side of the ledger is the fact that al-Qaeda's
top leadership is still intact.  The organization has managed to
reconstitute itself and find sanctuary inside Pakistan.  (Qaeda leaders)
remain committed to large-scale acts of violence, and their narrative still
has considerable traction with angry young Muslim men, whether in Karachi,
Cairo, London or Paris.  Their communications have increased in volume and
are increasingly sophisticated.


NJ:  What about the positive side of the ledger?


Jenkins:  There is no doubt that we have significantly degraded al-Qaeda's
operational capability.  The leadership is in hiding and on the run, and
we've removed some key figures whose talent is not easily replaced.  It's
much more dangerous and risky for al-Qaeda to operate now.  Through an
unprecedented level of cooperation among intelligence and law enforcement
agencies around the world, we have significantly reduced (its) ability to
execute large-scale attacks of the like we saw regularly in the period
between 2001 and 2006.  The inability to pull off those large terrorist
spectaculars that acted as recruiting posters, in turn, has slowed the flow
of new recruits.  Al Qaeda's indiscriminate violence has also provoked a
backlash in the Muslim community, putting (it) on the defensive in places
such as Iraq.


NJ:  What do you consider al-Qaeda's greatest vulnerability?


Jenkins: Irrelevancy.  As the world moves on to new issues, these virtual
jihadists are locked into a closed-loop discourse on the Internet that is
increasingly irrelevant.  They are participating in a fantasy.  That's the
biggest fear of the terrorists:  One day Osama bin Laden will issue his
450th proclamation, and no one will really be listening.
************************************************************************


Clayton J. Bradt
dutchbradt at hughes.net
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