[ RadSafe ] DHS Exaggerated Nuclear Detector Ability, GAO Says

[Clayton J Bradt]

Thursday, October 30, 2008


DHS Exaggerated Nuclear Detector Ability, GAO Says


The U.S. Government Accountability Office has found that the Homeland
Security Department exaggerated the ability of a new generation of
radiation sensors to detect materials that could be used in a radiological
or nuclear weapon, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Oct. 7).


The yet-unpublished congressional report states that “Phase 3” tests of the
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors were too limited in scope to support
the department’s assertion that the machines can detect dangerous radiation
sources significantly more effectively than sensors already deployed at
U.S. entry points.


"Because the limitations of the Phase 3 test results are not appropriately
stated in the Phase 3 test report, the report does not accurately depict
the results from the tests and could be misleading," the report states.


Congressional investigators determined that the new machines would each
cost roughly $778,000 to purchase and install.  That is a significantly
higher estimate than provided in 2006.


"I'm concerned that the testing for the new detectors remains flawed," said
House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.).
“Until there is objective and concrete evidence that the new machines have
clear benefits over the existing detectors, I cannot support additional
procurements."


However, Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office dismissed
the GAO findings as “misleading and not substantiated.”   In a written
response to the report, the office accused congressional auditors of
failing “to acknowledge the depth and breadth” of the detector tests.


The department said in a statement that the office "is currently
undertaking a comprehensive test and evaluation program on ASP systems and
will use previous test data as well.  The department has been following a
prudent path leading to certification of ASP systems."


Previous GAO reports raising concerns about the detectors led lawmakers to
demand that Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff certify the
effectiveness of the machines prior to their installation.  Chertoff
ordered the DNDO tests partly to support his certification (Robert
O’Harrow, Washington Post, Oct. 30).


Former U.S. nuclear negotiator Robert Gallucci last week described use of
radiation-detection systems at U.S. entry points as a last-resort measure,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science reported (see
related GSN story, today).


"I think it is great to have port monitors," he said, but said the machines
were "largely a CYA exercise."  If detectors identified a weapon being
smuggled into the country, "you're already in a bad place," he said during
an Oct. 20 discussion on nuclear security (American Association for the
Advancement of Science release, Oct. 29).
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I would hate to think that any actual health physicists participated in
this deception.  That would be unprofessional and dishonest.  So would
sitting by silently while these issues were discussed without speaking up.

Clayton J. Bradt
dutchbradt at hughes.net
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