From rwhelbig at gmail.com Sat Aug 3 05:50:36 2019 From: rwhelbig at gmail.com (Roger Helbig) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 03:50:36 -0700 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Radioactive Leak in Russia Message-ID: This Guardian link came to my attention in a question on Quora. Do any of you know anything more about this apparent leak of Ruthenium-106? https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/21/russia-radioactivity-986-times-norm-nuclear-accident-claim Thanks. Roger Helbig From rwhelbig at gmail.com Sat Aug 3 06:22:01 2019 From: rwhelbig at gmail.com (Roger Helbig) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 04:22:01 -0700 Subject: [ RadSafe ] What a case of overreaction! In-Reply-To: <0000000000003e9fb1058f3464c8@google.com> References: <0000000000003e9fb1058f3464c8@google.com> Message-ID: https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/baldwin-county-crews-investigate-after-man-loses-uranium-rock-in-yard/93-c59c7f30-4068-4b1a-9d68-46e59a9f1a03 This rock was some form of Uranium containing mineral, not depleted uranium, which only exists in metal, oxide or chemical compound form not in the form of a pebble. Wonder how much this exercise cost. Roger Helbig "depleted uranium" Daily update ⋅ August 3, 2019 NEWS Baldwin County crews investigate after man loses uranium rock in yard 13WMAZ.com ... who described himself as a rock collector said he got a shipment of *depleted* *uranium* the size of a piece of gravel and believed he lost it in his yard. . From ksparth at gmail.com Sat Aug 3 07:52:08 2019 From: ksparth at gmail.com (Parthasarathy K S) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 18:22:08 +0530 Subject: [ RadSafe ] What a case of overreaction! In-Reply-To: References: <0000000000003e9fb1058f3464c8@google.com> Message-ID: Is there a provision for the agencies to ask for an appropriate payment for the "help" given?. I recall attending to a distress call from Mumbai Port during the late 60s when the port crew found that some liquid is dripping out of a transport container carrying a consignment of radium used for brachytherapy. Our assuring them that there is no need to worry about it and the concerned radioactive source is probably the sturdiest avaialble in town and the liquid pouring out is unlikely to be radioactive.The port staff did not accept any reassuarance. They forced us to reach the port nearly 15km away late in the evening with appropriate instruments. Interestingly it was just plain water/ sea water which entered the package when it was stored in the open somewhere during transit Those handling radiation matters will have many such stories to tell. I recall a few incidents which occurred while I was working in the University of Virginia Medical Centre. We were told that a radioactive seed fell out of a patient undergoing radiation treatment. He was resting in his room in the hospital after receiving gold seed implant for treatment of cancer in the floor of his mouth. A nurse saw the seed in his room, collected it and kept it in a lead container and informed the physisict on call. He rushed to the scene of action and to his dismay found that it was a shining plastic bead. We could not find how it appeared in the room. May be, some visitor's shoe must have picked it up from the road. Nothing unusual! So long us people have weird ideas about "radiation" and "radioactivity" such incidents will be aplenty. How are you Roger, a message after a long time! Regards Parthasarathy On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 4:52 PM Roger Helbig wrote: > > https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/baldwin-county-crews-investigate-after-man-loses-uranium-rock-in-yard/93-c59c7f30-4068-4b1a-9d68-46e59a9f1a03 > > > This rock was some form of Uranium containing mineral, not depleted > uranium, which only exists in metal, oxide or chemical compound form not in > the form of a pebble. Wonder how much this exercise cost. > > Roger Helbig > > > "depleted uranium" > Daily update ⋅ August 3, 2019 > NEWS > > Baldwin County crews investigate after man loses uranium rock in yard > < > https://www.google.com/url?rct=j&sa=t&url=https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/baldwin-county-crews-investigate-after-man-loses-uranium-rock-in-yard/93-c59c7f30-4068-4b1a-9d68-46e59a9f1a03&ct=ga&cd=CAEYACoTOTAwNjkwMzA4MTMwNTAwMDUzMDIaMjkzM2JkYTM3MmIzMDRhMjpjb206ZW46VVM&usg=AFQjCNFfTEi3aFS_cr-j-0fOCnVMgeegCg > > > 13WMAZ.com > ... who described himself as a rock collector said he got a shipment of > *depleted* *uranium* the size of a piece of gravel and believed he lost it > in his yard. > . > _______________________________________________ > You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list > > Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood > the RadSafe rules. These can be found at: > http://health.phys.iit.edu/radsaferules.html > > For information on how to subscribe or unsubscribe and other settings > visit: http://health.phys.iit.edu > -- oiytrr From healthphysics at windstream.net Sat Aug 3 13:14:25 2019 From: healthphysics at windstream.net (healthphysics at windstream.net) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:14:25 -0400 Subject: [ RadSafe ] What a case of overreaction! In-Reply-To: References: <0000000000003e9fb1058f3464c8@google.com> Message-ID: <008901d54a27$48e1df80$daa59e80$@windstream.net> So here's the "rest of the story"... I got a text this morning from a friend of mine who was down in Macon, asking me if I'd lost some DU; sent him a text back asking him what was he talking about. He replied that he had seen the news about a lost DU source on the street where I live. I got on the internet and saw the story, and realized it was pretty close to where I live (less than a quarter mile from the end of my driveway). So off I went. I got there about 9, and met up with the EMA director and a couple of environmental rad folks from GA EPD, and offered my assistance. The guy had some type of meter (I'd never seen one like it) that he was using to try and find the source, but thought it was only alpha sensitive and might not be working correctly. They handed me a beta frisker, and I searched and searched and found nothing. I asked the fellow who lost the source how big it was, and he described it as being about an inch square and maybe a quarter inch thick, dark grayish. I heard that he thought he'd lost it between the front door of his house out to where he got in his vehicle. I went back over all that area and found nothing that would be like that. The two GA EPD folks gave up at about that time too, as they searched the house, all around the porch and yard, and the vehicle without any luck. So, one of the EPD folks asked the guy some more questions, and finally seemed to get the straight scoop on what happened. Yes, he'd gotten into the vehicle with it, in his pocket wrapped with a paper towel, and then went to the store, and did something else, and could have lost it there. And, oh, it was about a month ago that this happened! So it sounds to me like he just wanted some help finding his prized DU source that he lost -- somewhere. Don't know how much it cost for the response, but they couldn't charge him enough. Paul Gallager Health Physicist Milledgeville, GA -----Original Message----- From: RadSafe On Behalf Of Roger Helbig Sent: Saturday, August 3, 2019 07:22 To: RADSAFE Subject: [ RadSafe ] What a case of overreaction! https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/baldwin-county-crews-investigate-after-man-loses-uranium-rock-in-yard/93-c59c7f30-4068-4b1a-9d68-46e59a9f1a03 This rock was some form of Uranium containing mineral, not depleted uranium, which only exists in metal, oxide or chemical compound form not in the form of a pebble. Wonder how much this exercise cost. Roger Helbig "depleted uranium" Daily update ⋅ August 3, 2019 NEWS Baldwin County crews investigate after man loses uranium rock in yard 13WMAZ.com ... who described himself as a rock collector said he got a shipment of *depleted* *uranium* the size of a piece of gravel and believed he lost it in his yard. . _______________________________________________ You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood the RadSafe rules. These can be found at: http://health.phys.iit.edu/radsaferules.html For information on how to subscribe or unsubscribe and other settings visit: http://health.phys.iit.edu From franz.schoenhofer at chello.at Sat Aug 3 15:39:16 2019 From: franz.schoenhofer at chello.at (=?utf-8?Q?Franz_Sch=C3=B6nhofer?=) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 22:39:16 +0200 Subject: [ RadSafe ] *** SPAM *** Re: Radioactive Leak in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <82B6A8232F1B477EA8E1EA6F81786062@FranzPC> Spam detection software, running on the system "agni.phys.iit.edu", has identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: Dear Roger, Yes, I as well as many million of persons should know "more" about it. In Austrian papers it was very prominent (not as prominent as the US - China economic quarrels). Especially prominent it was in t [...] Content analysis details: (5.7 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- 0.0 RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL RBL: SORBS: sent directly from dynamic IP address [80.108.238.10 listed in dnsbl.sorbs.net] 3.6 RCVD_IN_PBL RBL: Received via a relay in Spamhaus PBL [80.108.238.10 listed in zen.spamhaus.org] 0.2 STOX_REPLY_TYPE No description available. 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record 0.7 SPF_NEUTRAL SPF: sender does not match SPF record (neutral) 1.3 RDNS_NONE Delivered to internal network by a host with no rDNS 0.0 UNPARSEABLE_RELAY Informational: message has unparseable relay lines From achris1999 at gmail.com Sat Aug 3 15:47:49 2019 From: achris1999 at gmail.com (Chris Alston) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 16:47:49 -0400 Subject: [ RadSafe ] What a case of overreaction! In-Reply-To: <008901d54a27$48e1df80$daa59e80$@windstream.net> References: <0000000000003e9fb1058f3464c8@google.com> <008901d54a27$48e1df80$daa59e80$@windstream.net> Message-ID: <96ABACAA-09FC-4BE1-8B7E-9587D5748348@gmail.com> Paul Thanks for the inside scoop. I have to say, based on this description of the artifact, it could be U-metal. Too bad we don’t have an estimate of its weight. Cheers ca On Aug 3, 2019, at 2:14 PM, healthphysics at windstream.net wrote: > So here's the "rest of the story"... > I got a text this morning from a friend of mine who was down in Macon, asking me if I'd lost some DU; sent him a text back asking him what was he talking about. He replied that he had seen the news about a lost DU source on the street where I live. I got on the internet and saw the story, and realized it was pretty close to where I live (less than a quarter mile from the end of my driveway). So off I went. > I got there about 9, and met up with the EMA director and a couple of environmental rad folks from GA EPD, and offered my assistance. The guy had some type of meter (I'd never seen one like it) that he was using to try and find the source, but thought it was only alpha sensitive and might not be working correctly. They handed me a beta frisker, and I searched and searched and found nothing. I asked the fellow who lost the source how big it was, and he described it as being about an inch square and maybe a quarter inch thick, dark grayish. I heard that he thought he'd lost it between the front door of his house out to where he got in his vehicle. I went back over all that area and found nothing that would be like that. The two GA EPD folks gave up at about that time too, as they searched the house, all around the porch and yard, and the vehicle without any luck. > So, one of the EPD folks asked the guy some more questions, and finally seemed to get the straight scoop on what happened. Yes, he'd gotten into the vehicle with it, in his pocket wrapped with a paper towel, and then went to the store, and did something else, and could have lost it there. And, oh, it was about a month ago that this happened! So it sounds to me like he just wanted some help finding his prized DU source that he lost -- somewhere. > Don't know how much it cost for the response, but they couldn't charge him enough. > Paul Gallager > Health Physicist > Milledgeville, GA > From peter.bossew at reflex.at Mon Aug 5 12:42:22 2019 From: peter.bossew at reflex.at (Peter Bossew) Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 19:42:22 +0200 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Radioactive Leak in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Roger, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvrad.2019.05.004 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1907571116 Best regards, Peter Bossew From franz.schoenhofer at chello.at Tue Aug 6 11:00:52 2019 From: franz.schoenhofer at chello.at (=?utf-8?Q?Franz_Sch=C3=B6nhofer?=) Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 18:00:52 +0200 Subject: [ RadSafe ] *** SPAM *** Re: Radioactive Leak in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <905954117F7E4309945C236776B43080@FranzPC> Spam detection software, running on the system "agni.phys.iit.edu", has identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: Dear Peter, I am delighted that you still work in the radioactivity business. The release in Russia was one of the top topics in Austrian papers - for about three days, then it was replaced by the usual Austrian [...] Content analysis details: (5.7 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- 3.6 RCVD_IN_PBL RBL: Received via a relay in Spamhaus PBL [80.108.238.10 listed in zen.spamhaus.org] 0.0 RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL RBL: SORBS: sent directly from dynamic IP address [80.108.238.10 listed in dnsbl.sorbs.net] 0.2 STOX_REPLY_TYPE No description available. 0.7 SPF_NEUTRAL SPF: sender does not match SPF record (neutral) 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record 0.0 UNPARSEABLE_RELAY Informational: message has unparseable relay lines 1.3 RDNS_NONE Delivered to internal network by a host with no rDNS From franz.schoenhofer at chello.at Sun Aug 11 12:07:58 2019 From: franz.schoenhofer at chello.at (=?utf-8?Q?Franz_Sch=C3=B6nhofer?=) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2019 19:07:58 +0200 Subject: [ RadSafe ] *** SPAM *** Re: What a case of overreaction! In-Reply-To: <96ABACAA-09FC-4BE1-8B7E-9587D5748348@gmail.com> References: <0000000000003e9fb1058f3464c8@google.com> <008901d54a27$48e1df80$daa59e80$@windstream.net> <96ABACAA-09FC-4BE1-8B7E-9587D5748348@gmail.com> Message-ID: Spam detection software, running on the system "agni.phys.iit.edu", has identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: Friends, This is a test! I have sent recently two comments - answers to RADSAFE. Both were returned with the comment "SPAM". They were accompanied by ununderstandable '"bla Bla". First of all I do not [...] Content analysis details: (5.7 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- 0.2 STOX_REPLY_TYPE No description available. 0.0 RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL RBL: SORBS: sent directly from dynamic IP address [80.108.238.10 listed in dnsbl.sorbs.net] 3.6 RCVD_IN_PBL RBL: Received via a relay in Spamhaus PBL [80.108.238.10 listed in zen.spamhaus.org] 0.7 SPF_NEUTRAL SPF: sender does not match SPF record (neutral) 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record 0.0 UNPARSEABLE_RELAY Informational: message has unparseable relay lines 1.3 RDNS_NONE Delivered to internal network by a host with no rDNS From sandyfl at cox.net Sun Aug 11 12:19:12 2019 From: sandyfl at cox.net (Sander Perle) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2019 10:19:12 -0700 Subject: [ RadSafe ] *** SPAM *** Re: What a case of overreaction! In-Reply-To: References: <0000000000003e9fb1058f3464c8@google.com> <008901d54a27$48e1df80$daa59e80$@windstream.net> <96ABACAA-09FC-4BE1-8B7E-9587D5748348@gmail.com> Message-ID: Franz, received test message. Regards, Sandy Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 11, 2019, at 10:07, Franz Schönhofer wrote: > > Spam detection software, running on the system "agni.phys.iit.edu", > has identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original > message has been attached to this so you can view it or label > similar future email. If you have any questions, see > the administrator of that system for details. > > Content preview: Friends, This is a test! I have sent recently two comments > - answers to RADSAFE. Both were returned with the comment "SPAM". They were > accompanied by ununderstandable '"bla Bla". First of all I do not [...] > > Content analysis details: (5.7 points, 5.0 required) > > pts rule name description > ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- > 0.2 STOX_REPLY_TYPE No description available. > 0.0 RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL RBL: SORBS: sent directly from dynamic IP > address > [80.108.238.10 listed in dnsbl.sorbs.net] > 3.6 RCVD_IN_PBL RBL: Received via a relay in Spamhaus PBL > [80.108.238.10 listed in zen.spamhaus.org] > 0.7 SPF_NEUTRAL SPF: sender does not match SPF record (neutral) > 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record > 0.0 UNPARSEABLE_RELAY Informational: message has unparseable relay > lines > 1.3 RDNS_NONE Delivered to internal network by a host with no rDNS > > > _______________________________________________ > You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list > > Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood the RadSafe rules. These can be found at: http://health.phys.iit.edu/radsaferules.html > > For information on how to subscribe or unsubscribe and other settings visit: http://health.phys.iit.edu From peter.bossew at reflex.at Mon Aug 12 13:38:31 2019 From: peter.bossew at reflex.at (Peter Bossew) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 20:38:31 +0200 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Burevestnik RTG Message-ID: Dear all: Does anybody have a clue which type of RTG is used in Burevestnik? Best Peter From kronenberg at kernchemie.de Tue Aug 13 03:04:02 2019 From: kronenberg at kernchemie.de (Andreas Kronenberg) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 10:04:02 +0200 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Burevestnik RTG In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: The Russians preferred always nuclear reactors over RTG's (different from the U.S.). All articles concerning Burevestnik assume a nuclear reactor. This would also fit to the iodine pills distributed after the accident. -AK Am 12.08.2019 um 20:38 schrieb Peter Bossew: > Dear all: > > Does anybody have a clue which type of RTG is used in Burevestnik? > > > Best > > Peter > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list > > Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood the RadSafe rules. These can be found at: http://health.phys.iit.edu/radsaferules.html > > For information on how to subscribe or unsubscribe and other settings visit: http://health.phys.iit.edu Dr. Andreas Kronenberg Uran-Institut GmbH Samernsche Str. 34 D-48465 Schüttorf/Grafschaft Bentheim Telefon/Fax: 05923/8014014 Tel.2: 05923/8014015 Mobil: 0157 7367 1552 From achris1999 at gmail.com Thu Aug 15 14:51:48 2019 From: achris1999 at gmail.com (Chris Alston) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2019 15:51:48 -0400 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Question for Legal Eagles + Associates Message-ID: <55E41032-8F95-47A6-9E61-78B48A7BE0F6@gmail.com> Folks Can you elucidate for us the philosophy of regulation underlying the distinction between “limits” and “action levels”? Does it have anything to do with which entities have the primary responsibilities for enforcement, that is, those on the regulatory end of the arena or those on the regulated end? TIA. ca From dkjordan2001 at yahoo.com Thu Aug 15 17:02:02 2019 From: dkjordan2001 at yahoo.com (dkjordan2001 at yahoo.com) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2019 17:02:02 -0500 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Question for Legal Eagles + Associates In-Reply-To: <55E41032-8F95-47A6-9E61-78B48A7BE0F6@gmail.com> References: <55E41032-8F95-47A6-9E61-78B48A7BE0F6@gmail.com> Message-ID: <010101d553b5$1251bbb0$36f53310$@yahoo.com> Good Day Mr. Alston, It was my understanding that action levels were established by regulated entities to ensure they stayed well below regulatory limits. We dealt with a lot of companies that employed large, portable sealed sources. Most of these were Special Form to avoid needing a Type B container to transport. If one of these sources failed a leak test it was no longer Special Form and could not be moved without expensive re-packaging. Several customers established action levels at a fraction of the leak test pass/fail limit so they could move theses sources to their final resting place before they failed the test. Several years ago I heard of a case where an inspector cited a licensee for exceeding their internal action levels in some area, even though they were well within regulatory limits. I do not know how this was resolved but you could check the radsafe archives. -----Original Message----- From: RadSafe On Behalf Of Chris Alston Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2019 2:52 PM To: AMRSO List Cc: medphysusa at lists.wayne.edu; Radsafe List Subject: [ RadSafe ] Question for Legal Eagles + Associates Folks Can you elucidate for us the philosophy of regulation underlying the distinction between “limits” and “action levels”? Does it have anything to do with which entities have the primary responsibilities for enforcement, that is, those on the regulatory end of the arena or those on the regulated end? TIA. ca _______________________________________________ You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood the RadSafe rules. These can be found at: http://health.phys.iit.edu/radsaferules.html For information on how to subscribe or unsubscribe and other settings visit: http://health.phys.iit.edu From sfisher373 at aol.com Fri Aug 16 12:30:19 2019 From: sfisher373 at aol.com (sfisher373 at aol.com) Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 17:30:19 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [ RadSafe ] Action Levels In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <225395194.270384.1565976619183@mail.yahoo.com> Under the CNSC Radiation Protection Regulations, an action level is defined to be "a specific dose of radiation or other parameter that, if reached, may indicate a loss of control of part of the licensee's radiation protection program*, and triggers a requirement for specific action to be taken." *The definition under the Uranium Mines and Mills Regulations is identical with the addition of "or environmental protection program" at this * -----Original Message----- From: radsafe-request To: radsafe Sent: Fri, Aug 16, 2019 12:59 pm Subject: RadSafe Digest, Vol 2510, Issue 1 Send RadSafe mailing list submissions to     radsafe at health.phys.iit.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit     http://health.phys.iit.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/radsafe or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to     radsafe-request at health.phys.iit.edu You can reach the person managing the list at     radsafe-owner at health.phys.iit.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of RadSafe digest..." Important! To keep threads/discussions more easily readable PLEASE observe the following guideline when replying to a message or digest: 1. When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of radsafe digest ..." 2. Do NOT include the entire digest in your reply. Include ONLY the germane sentences to which you're responding. Thanks!_______________________________________________ Today's Topics:   1. Question for Legal Eagles + Associates (Chris Alston)   2. Re: Question for Legal Eagles + Associates       (dkjordan2001 at yahoo.com) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2019 15:51:48 -0400 From: Chris Alston To: AMRSO List Cc: Radsafe List ,     medphysusa at lists.wayne.edu Subject: [ RadSafe ] Question for Legal Eagles + Associates Message-ID: <55E41032-8F95-47A6-9E61-78B48A7BE0F6 at gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Folks Can you elucidate for us the philosophy of regulation underlying the distinction between “limits” and “action levels”?  Does it have anything to do with which entities have the primary responsibilities for enforcement, that is, those on the regulatory end of the arena or those on the regulated end? TIA. ca ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2019 17:02:02 -0500 From: To: "'The International Radiation Protection \(Health Physics\)     Mailing List'" Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] Question for Legal Eagles + Associates Message-ID: <010101d553b5$1251bbb0$36f53310$@yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain;    charset="utf-8" Good Day Mr. Alston, It was my understanding that action levels were established by regulated entities to ensure they stayed well below regulatory limits. We dealt with a lot of companies that employed large, portable sealed sources.  Most of these were Special Form to avoid needing a Type B container to transport.  If one of these sources failed a leak test it was no longer Special Form and could not be moved without expensive re-packaging.  Several customers established action levels at a fraction of the leak test pass/fail limit so they could move theses sources to their final resting place before they failed the test. Several years ago I heard of a case where an inspector cited a licensee for exceeding their internal action levels in some area, even though they were well within regulatory limits.  I do not know how this was resolved but you could check the radsafe archives. -----Original Message----- From: RadSafe On Behalf Of Chris Alston Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2019 2:52 PM To: AMRSO List Cc: medphysusa at lists.wayne.edu; Radsafe List Subject: [ RadSafe ] Question for Legal Eagles + Associates Folks Can you elucidate for us the philosophy of regulation underlying the distinction between “limits” and “action levels”?  Does it have anything to do with which entities have the primary responsibilities for enforcement, that is, those on the regulatory end of the arena or those on the regulated end? TIA. ca _______________________________________________ You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood the RadSafe rules. These can be found at: http://health.phys.iit.edu/radsaferules.html For information on how to subscribe or unsubscribe and other settings visit: http://health.phys.iit.edu ------------------------------ Subject: Digest Footer _______________________________________________ RadSafe mailing list RadSafe at health.phys.iit.edu http://health.phys.iit.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/radsafe ------------------------------ End of RadSafe Digest, Vol 2510, Issue 1 **************************************** From dutchbradt at gmail.com Fri Aug 16 16:06:41 2019 From: dutchbradt at gmail.com (clayton bradt) Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 17:06:41 -0400 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Action levels vs. Limits Message-ID: The difference is essentially as stated. The question of how an inspector could legitimately cite a licensee for violating one of the licensee's own action levels depends upon whether it was comitted to as part of its license. If the licensee commits to such and such an action if a certain action level is crossed, then the licensee is in violation of its license if the the action level was crossed and such and such action was not performed. The licensee is bond by its written commitments even if they are more stringent than the regulations. What the details were in the specific instance of course, determine whether the citation was legitimate or not. Clayton Bradt Prin. Radiophysicist (Ret.) NYS Dept. of Health From nick.tsurikov at gmail.com Fri Aug 16 18:07:40 2019 From: nick.tsurikov at gmail.com (Nick Tsurikov) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2019 07:07:40 +0800 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Action levels vs. Limits In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear all, out of interest, we do have the both the "limits" and "trigger levels" in the "Australian and New Zealand Guidelines for Fresh and Marine Water Quality" The meaning of "limits" is obvious, an additional explanation of what "trigger levels" are is as follows: *Chapter 2* *Trigger values are concentrations that, if exceeded, would indicate a potential environmental problem, and so ‘trigger’ a management response, e.g. further investigation and subsequent refinement of the guidelines according to local conditions.* *Part 2.2.1.4* *Guideline trigger values are concentrations that, if exceeded, will indicate a potential environmental problem, and so ‘trigger’ further investigation. The investigation aims to both assess whether exceedance of a trigger value will result in environmental harm and refine a guideline value, by accounting for environmental factors that can modify the effect of the chemical.* *Part 3.1.1.3* *If data from a test site exceed the trigger value, the decision trees are used to determine if the test values are inappropriately (unnecessarily) ‘triggering’ potential risk and hence management response. For this, ecosystem-specific modifying factors are introduced to assess test data. The decision trees also enable the guideline trigger values to be adjusted and refined.**Part 3.1.5 * *If exceeded, these values trigger the incorporation of additional information or further investigation to determine whether or not a real risk to the ecosystem exists and, where possible, to adjust the trigger values into regional, local or site-specific guidelines.* Kind regards, nick On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 5:07 AM clayton bradt wrote: > The difference is essentially as stated. The question of how an inspector > could legitimately cite a licensee for violating one of the licensee's own > action levels depends upon whether it was comitted to as part of its > license. If the licensee commits to such and such an action if a certain > action level is crossed, then the licensee is in violation of its license > if the the action level was crossed and such and such action was not > performed. The licensee is bond by its written commitments even if they > are more stringent than the regulations. > > What the details were in the specific instance of course, determine whether > the citation was legitimate or not. > > Clayton Bradt > Prin. Radiophysicist (Ret.) > NYS Dept. of Health > _______________________________________________ > You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list > > Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood > the RadSafe rules. These can be found at: > http://health.phys.iit.edu/radsaferules.html > > For information on how to subscribe or unsubscribe and other settings > visit: http://health.phys.iit.edu > From cary.renquist at ezag.com Tue Aug 20 14:06:23 2019 From: cary.renquist at ezag.com (Cary Renquist) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 19:06:23 +0000 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Yet another DIY GM meter project Message-ID: One of the more well-polished GM projects that I have seen: https://hackaday.com/2019/08/19/diy-geiger-counter-is-sure-to-generate-clicks/ Actual project is on Instructables ('nother one for ya, Ted) DIY Geiger Counter With an ESP8266 and a Touchscreen https://www.instructables.com/id/DIY-Geiger-Counter-With-an-ESP8266-and-a-Touchscre/ There are many existing kits and tutorials available online to make your own Geiger Counter, but I wanted to make one that is unique - I designed a GUI display with touch controls so the information is displayed in a pretty way. --- Cary Renquist cary.renquist at ezag.com From rwhelbig at gmail.com Thu Aug 22 04:00:55 2019 From: rwhelbig at gmail.com (Roger Helbig) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 02:00:55 -0700 Subject: [ RadSafe ] =?utf-8?q?Tokyo=E2=80=99s_Fukushima_cesium-enriched_m?= =?utf-8?q?icroparticle_=28CsMP=29_update?= In-Reply-To: <4114830.151570.0@wordpress.com> References: <4114830.151570.0@wordpress.com> Message-ID: While this appeared in Nuclear-News, it is about actual scientific paper about newly found microparticles after Fukushima's meltdown. I previously had briefly corresponded with one of the authors. Roger Helbig August 17th, 2019 An interesting paper was recently published by a team headed by Dr. Satoshi Utsunomiya of Kyushu University on the subject of Fukushima-derived cesium-enriched microparticles (CsMPs). As many readers will know, several researchers have located and analyzed these microparticles, in which the cesium is often bonded within glass-like silicates and therefore generally significantly less soluble than other Cs chemical species in water, though technically not actually “insoluble.” After an accident like Fukushima, it is much more common to find cesium in water-soluble compounds like cesium hydroxide (CsOH), and predictions about how quickly the cesium will be dispersed through the environment, in soil, in watersheds, taken up by plants and animals, etc, are based primarily on this assumption. The discovery of sparingly-soluble Fukushima-derived cesium microparticles, first documented by Adachi et al in 2013, and since then confirmed by many others, has raised a number of questions. How abundant are they? Does their presence increase health risk to humans? How much do they reveal about the process of the accident itself? From the standpoint of researchers the microparticles are very intriguing. Utsunomiya et al.’s paper is titled “Caesium fallout in Tokyo on 15th March, 2011 is dominated by highly radioactive, caesium-rich microparticles,” and as noted in a recent Scientific American article, it was originally accepted for publication in 2017 by Scientific Reports journal. Weeks before publication, however, Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial Technology Research Institute (TIRI), operated by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, raised objections with Scientific Reports. However no questions about the quality of the science or the validity of the paper’s findings appear to have been brought forward. This in itself was highly irregular. Two years elapsed without resolution, and in March of this year Scientific Reports took the highly unusual step of withdrawing its offer to publish the paper, despite the lack of confirmed evidence that would warrant it. Utsunomiya and several co-authors decided that the best course of action was to place the study in the public domain by publishing it via arXiv, a highly respected pre-print website. The paper is now open and free to download. This study makes a valuable contribution to the body of scientific literature regarding the consequences of the Fukushima disaster in general and CsMPs in particular. I think it was a mistake for Scientific Reports not to publish it two years ago, especially considering the rapid pace of research into these particles and the tremendous interest in them. To summarize the findings briefly, the researchers analyzed air filter samples from March 15, 2011, in Setagaya, Tokyo, when the radioactive plume from Fukushima caused a noticeable peak in airborne radioactivity in the city. The researchers used radiographic imaging (placing the filters on a photographic plate) to identify any highly radioactive spots. Using these images as a guide they were able to isolate seven CsMPs, which they subjected to atomic-scale analysis using high-resolution electron microscopy (HRTEM) to identify their nano-scale structure and chemical composition. Based on these detailed measurements and quantitative analysis, the researchers concluded that 80-89% of the total cesium fallout in Tokyo that day was in the form of highly radioactive microparticles. The second half of the paper is devoted to estimates of how long such particles might be retained in the human lungs if inhaled, based on previous studies that reported the effects of inhalation of non-radioactive atmospheric particles, and some possible physical consequences. The paper is valuable for the quantitative analysis of the Tokyo particles alone, since it is one of few studies that deal with the issue for Tokyo specifically. Research into possible health consequences of the particles, meanwhile, has gained momentum while the paper remained unpublished, using approaches such as stochastic biokinetics, and DNA damage studies. In a recent paper, Utsunomiya and colleagues produced estimates of the rate of dissolution of the particles inside the human lung, in pure water, and in seawater. A working group at the Japan Health Physics Society has also devoted attention to the issue, noting the need for further study of the risk from intake of these particles, particularly to the lung. Likewise, others have been studying the particles to learn about the accident progression and possible consequences for decommissioning. Why did Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial Technology Research Institute object to the paper’s publication? When we first heard that publication of the paper was being held up by Tokyo Metropolitan Government, we thought politically-motivated suppression was a likely explanation. Since then the public has learned that the actual complaint given to Scientific Reports stems from a chain of custody issue of the original air filter samples. We don’t want to speculate further about Tokyo’s motivation, because we have seen no direct evidence yet of political suppression in this case. But based on past occurrences with other government institutions, we would find it plausible. We will let readers know if TIRI responds to our inquiries. We spoke with Dr. Utsunomiya and co-author Dr. Rodney Ewing recently. I was aware of their co-authorship of several strong papers on CsMPs, including Utsunomiya’s plenary talk at the Goldschmidt Conference in Yokohama in 2016, which I attended. I asked how this new arXiv paper fits in with their other papers, and where they think this research is heading next: ________________________________ Satoshi Utsunomiya: Thank you for asking. The Tokyo paper was actually our first paper regarding CsMPs. As I mentioned, the paper was accepted two years ago. There were no previous papers of ours on CsMPs that time. Currently we are working on several topics on CsMPs. I cannot reveal the content yet, as we are thinking about a press release for the next paper. But I think it is important to continue this kind of research, providing some insights for decommissioning at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Azby Brown: I didn’t realize that this was your first paper on the subject. How does it relate to the one presented at the Goldschmidt Conference in Yokohama in 2016? “Cesium-Rich Micro-Particles Unveil the Explosive Events in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.” Didn’t that paper receive a prize? SU: My talk at Goldschmidt briefly covered the story described in the two papers that were accepted for publication at the same time. One was published in Scientific Reports. The other one was not published. There was no prize. It was a plenary talk. AB: I see. I recall that it received a lot of attention. Now it makes more sense to me. Can you tell me a little bit about the specific characteristics and focus of your research, and how it differs from papers like Adachi 2013, Abe 2014, etc? Generally speaking, that is. I’d like to help people understand the different aspects of the field. SU: Adachi reported the discovery of CsMPs. Abe demonstrated X-ray absorption analysis on the CsMPs. We focused on the nanotexture inside CsMPs. We are particularly interested in the detailed evidence remaining within the microparticle, which can provide useful information on the development of the chemical reactions during the meltdowns, because it is still difficult to directly analyze the materials inside the reactors. We, for the first time, succeeded in performing isotopic analysis on individual CsMPs. More specifically, the occurrence of uranium can directly tell the story of how the fuel melted. Our research has two directions: one is to understand the environmental impact of CsMPs, and the other is to provide useful information on the debris properties to help decommissioning at FDNPP. We are also interested in the implications for health. AB: Can you tell me a little bit about your working relationship? Satoshi went to the US to work in your lab, right Rod? When was that, and what were you working on? Rod Ewing: Satoshi and I have known each other since 2000, when he joined my research group as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Michigan. He was a member of the research group until 2007. We collaborated on a wide range of topics that had to do with radioactive materials, such as the transport of plutonium at the Mayak site in Russia to the identification of uranium phases within C60 cages, so called buckyballs, that were formed and released from coal power plants. Once Satoshi returned to Japan to take his position at Kyushu University, we continued to collaborate, particularly on topics related to Fukushima Daiichi. AB: How did you both get interested in CsMPs? RE: Once discovered, CsMPs were clearly of high interest. They had not been noted in earlier reactor accidents. Satoshi is a master with the transmission electron microscope – exactly the tool/technique needed to study these particles. AB: For people who aren’t familiar with what’s involved in a research experiment like yours, can you describe the overall process? What were the technical challenges? RE: I would just emphasize that it is very difficult to find and characterize these particles. Considering the full literature and efforts by others as well as our team – the results are impressive. It is rare to have both the TEM characterization and the isotopic data. SU: As Rod mentioned, it is difficult to obtain both TEM and isotopic data from a few micron-sized spots. The isolation of CsMPs from soils is a time consuming process. But to date, many scientists have found and isolated CsMPs. The important thing is what information we can obtain from the analysis of CsMPs. We have been taking various approaches to elucidate the properties, environmental impact, and the role in releasing fissile actinides to the environment. ________________________________ As described above, many papers examining various aspects of Fukushima-derived cesium microparticles have been published since they were first identified in 2013. Even so, important aspects remain only partially documented and understood to date. Below is a partial list of relevant publications. Papers mentioned in this article: Caesium fallout in Tokyo on 15th March, 2011 is dominated by highly radioactive, caesium-rich microparticles Utsunomiya, et al., 2019 https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.00212 —————————————————————- Emission of spherical cesium-bearing particles from an early stage of the Fukushima nuclear accident Adachi et al., 2013 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep02554 —————————————————————- Detection of Uranium and Chemical State Analysis of Individual Radioactive Microparticles Emitted from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Using Multiple Synchrotron Radiation X-ray Analyses Abe et al., 2014 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/ac501998d —————————————————————- Dissolution of radioactive, cesium-rich microparticles released from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in simulated lung fluid, pure-water, and seawater Suetake et al., 2019 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chemosphere.2019.05.248 —————————————————————- Development of a stochastic biokinetic method and its application to internal dose estimation for insoluble cesium-bearing particles Manabe & Matsumoto, 2019 https://doi.org/10.1080/00223131.2018.1523756 —————————————————————- DNA damage induction during localized chronic exposure to an insoluble radioactive microparticle Matsuya et al., 2019 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-46874-6 —————————————————————- Provenance of uranium particulate contained within Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 ejecta material Martin et al., 2019 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-10937-z —————————————————————- Internal doses from radionuclides and their health effects following the Fukushima accident Ishikawa et al., 2018 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1361-6498/aadb4c ________________________________ ________________________________ Related papers (by year of publication): Characteristics Of Spherical Cs-Bearing Particles Collected During The Early Stage Of FDNPP Accident Igarashi et al., 2014 http://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/cn224p/Session3/Igarashi.pdf —————————————————————- Radioactive Cs in the severely contaminated soils near the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Kaneko et al., 2015 https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2015.00037 —————————————————————- First successful isolation of radioactive particles from soil near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Satou et al., 2016 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213305416300340 —————————————————————- Internal structure of cesium-bearing radioactive microparticles released from Fukushima nuclear power plant Yamaguchi et al., 2016 http://www.nature.com/articles/srep20548 —————————————————————- Three-Year Retention Of Radioactive Caesium In The Body Of Tepco Workers Involved In The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident Nakano et al., 2016 http://rpd.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/03/14/rpd.ncw036 —————————————————————- Monte Carlo Evaluation of Internal Dose and Distribution Imaging Due to Insoluble Radioactive Cs-Bearing Particles of Water Deposited Inside Lungs via Pulmonary Inhalation Using PHITS Code Combined with Voxel Phantom Data Sakama, M. et al., 2016 http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Radiological%20Issues%20for%20Fukushima%E2%80%99s%20Revitalized%20Future&pages=209-220&publication_year=2016&author=Sakama%2CMinoru&author=Takeda%2CShinsaku&author=Matsumoto%2CErika&author=Harukuni%2CTomoki&author=Ikushima%2CHitoshi&author=Satou%2CYukihiko&author=Sueki%2CKeisuke —————————————————————- Radioactively-hot particles detected in dusts and soils from Northern Japan by combination of gamma spectrometry, autoradiography, and SEM/EDS analysis and implications in radiation risk assessment Kaltofen & Gundersen, 2017 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969717317953?via%3Dihub —————————————————————- Caesium-rich micro-particles: A window into the meltdown events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Furuki et al., 2017 https://www.nature.com/articles/srep42731 —————————————————————- Isotopic signature and nano-texture of cesium-rich micro-particles: Release of uranium and fission products from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Imoto et al., 2017 —————————————————————- Uranium dioxides and debris fragments released to the environment with cesium-rich microparticles from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Ochiai et al., 2018 https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.est.7b06309 —————————————————————- Novel method of quantifying radioactive cesium-rich microparticles (CsMPs) in the environment from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Ikehara et al., 2018 https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.est.7b06693 —————————————————————- Formation of radioactive cesium microparticles originating from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident: characteristics and perspectives Ohnuki, Satou, and Utsunomiya, 2019 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00223131.2019.1595767 https://blog.safecast.org/2019/08/fukushima-cesium-enriched-microparticle-csmp-update/ _______________________________ http://nuclear-news.net/2019/08/22/tokyos-fukushima-cesium-enriched-microparticle-csmp-update/ From rwhelbig at gmail.com Thu Aug 22 07:45:09 2019 From: rwhelbig at gmail.com (Roger Helbig) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 05:45:09 -0700 Subject: [ RadSafe ] Greenpeace Germany says Sports bodies need to make own assessments of Fukushima In-Reply-To: <4114830.151609.0@wordpress.com> References: <4114830.151609.0@wordpress.com> Message-ID: There is major effort going to scare people and athletes away from the Tokyo Olympics now that they are a year away. Do any of our European or more specifically German members know anything about this "Senior Nuclear Specialist" Shaun Burnie with Greenpeace in Germany? Roger Helbig http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190821000749 Sports bodies need to make own assessments of Fukushima: Greenpeace nuclear specialist by dunrenard "The first thing is … don’t trust the Japanese government, educate yourself. If you’re an organizing body, get independent verification and independent information about what the relative radiation levels are, what the risks are,” Burnie said." Nuclear specialist warns of unknown long-term health, environmental risks from Japan’s radioactive water disposal plan Shaun Burnie, senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany, speaks about Tokyo’s plan to discharge a massive amount of radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean during an interview with The Korea Herald at Greenpeace Seoul’s office in central Seoul last week. (Greenpeace Seoul) Aug 21, 2019 With less than a year to go until the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics, concerns are growing over the safety of the baseball and softball venues in disaster-hit Fukushima. Seeking to break away from Japan’s association with high levels of radioactivity, the Abe government has branded the 2020 Olympics the “Recovery Games.” But health and environmental risks from high levels of radiation persist in parts of Fukushima after the 2011 nuclear meltdown. According to Shaun Burnie, a senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany, those visiting Fukushima for the Summer Games next year should take a proactive approach to educating themselves on which areas of Fukushima are affected by radiation and on the impact of exposure to radiation. “In terms of safety, there are certain areas of Fukushima where we would certainly not advise athletes or spectators to spend any time. Those are areas particularly close to the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, including where the torch processions will be taking place,” Burnie said in an interview with The Korea Herald at Greenpeace Seoul’s office in central Seoul last week. “They are areas that are not safe for people to live. If you visit, you need to follow a radiation protocol. It is a bizarre situation that you are having Olympic events where people are concerned about radiation,” he added. While noting that not all parts of Fukushima should be off limits, Burnie said athletes and sports bodies need to seek independent assessments on Fukushima, rather than relying on information provided by the Japanese government. “It’s dangerous to just dismiss the whole of Fukushima as a radioactive disaster zone. It’s much more complex than that. The first thing is … don’t trust the Japanese government, educate yourself. If you’re an organizing body, get independent verification and independent information about what the relative radiation levels are, what the risks are,” Burnie said. As the senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany, Burnie has followed the Japanese government’s handling of the tsunami and earthquake in March 2011 that resulted in the meltdown of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant. In a report published in January, Burnie alleged that Tokyo plans to dispose of some 1 million metric tons of contaminated water by discharging it into the Pacific Ocean after the Summer Olympics. If Japan follows through with the move, radioactive water is expected to be present in Korea’s East Sea a year later. “For the past five years we’ve been accessing the process, the discussions, the documents submitted by Tepco (Tokyo Electric Power Company) … we were reviewing some of Tepco’s data (last year) and we looked at it and went ‘there is something wrong here with Tepco’s processing,’” Burnie said. “It became very clear there has been bad decisions made, not really surprising, by Tepco, by the (Japanese) government over the last five or six years and how to manage the water crisis.” Last year Tepco acknowledged its Advanced Liquid Processing System, or ALPS, had failed to purify contaminated water stored in tanks at the Dai-ichi power plant. A committee under Japan’s Ministry of Economy in 2016 put together five scenarios for the Japanese government to deal with the massive volume of pollutants stored at the Fukushima No. 1 plant. The amount of water stored at the plant is to reach its full capacity of 1.3 million tons by the end of 2020, with about 170 tons accumulating daily. According to Burnie, Tokyo has chosen to discharge the radioactive water instead of acting on any of the other four suggestions because “it is the most cheap and fast.” Besides increased levels of radioactive cesium found in Fukushima and in the East Sea, Burnie warned of “cesium-rich micro particles” extremely small in size and inhaled through breathing. Cesium is one of the largest sources of radioactivity from the 2011 disaster and has a half-life of 30 years. “There is evidence from samples ... some scientific literature has published the results and they found concentrations of these particles in areas 20-30 kilometers from the plant. ... The problem is these particles can be inhaled. Then some of them lodge inside your lung at which point you are getting an internal dose, a very focused, very localized, relatively high-exposure dose to individual cells,” Burnie said. “That’s a real problem because there is very little known about how cesium in that form will affect your long-term health. ... Again, the people most at risk are those returning to live in areas of Fukushima affected by these particles. But the Japanese government has not taken into account in any of its assessments what those risks are,” he added. Stressing that the risks of exposure to radiation should not be exaggerated, Burnie noted there is no safe level of radiation exposure and the long-term effects are unknown. “The effects you will only see over decades. It won’t be instant, it’s not an acute radiation exposure, it’s low-level radiation,” Burnie said. “The country that will be next impacted will be Korea, because it’s the geographically closest. … There is no safe threshold for radiation exposure. … Why should you be exposed when there is a clear alternative, which is you store?” http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190821000749 ________________________________ This post is ad-supported by Motley Fool - I am writing them asking if they know what they are supporting - time that these sites have to stand on their own two feet and not get advertisers who know nothing about what they post there ________________________________ http://nuclear-news.net/2019/08/22/sports-bodies-need-to-make-own-assessments-of-fukushima-greenpeace-nuclear-specialist/ Thanks for flying with WordPress.com From Danny.McClung2 at va.gov Thu Aug 22 12:35:55 2019 From: Danny.McClung2 at va.gov (McClung, Danny) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 17:35:55 +0000 Subject: [ RadSafe ] [EXTERNAL] Greenpeace Germany says Sports bodies need to make own assessments of Fukushima In-Reply-To: References: <4114830.151609.0@wordpress.com> Message-ID: Senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany. How does one qualify for this position? -----Original Message----- From: RadSafe On Behalf Of Roger Helbig Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 8:45 AM To: RADSAFE Subject: [EXTERNAL] [ RadSafe ] Greenpeace Germany says Sports bodies need to make own assessments of Fukushima There is major effort going to scare people and athletes away from the Tokyo Olympics now that they are a year away. Do any of our European or more specifically German members know anything about this "Senior Nuclear Specialist" Shaun Burnie with Greenpeace in Germany? Roger Helbig http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190821000749 Sports bodies need to make own assessments of Fukushima: Greenpeace nuclear specialist by dunrenard "The first thing is … don’t trust the Japanese government, educate yourself. If you’re an organizing body, get independent verification and independent information about what the relative radiation levels are, what the risks are,” Burnie said." Nuclear specialist warns of unknown long-term health, environmental risks from Japan’s radioactive water disposal plan Shaun Burnie, senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany, speaks about Tokyo’s plan to discharge a massive amount of radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean during an interview with The Korea Herald at Greenpeace Seoul’s office in central Seoul last week. (Greenpeace Seoul) Aug 21, 2019 With less than a year to go until the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics, concerns are growing over the safety of the baseball and softball venues in disaster-hit Fukushima. Seeking to break away from Japan’s association with high levels of radioactivity, the Abe government has branded the 2020 Olympics the “Recovery Games.” But health and environmental risks from high levels of radiation persist in parts of Fukushima after the 2011 nuclear meltdown. According to Shaun Burnie, a senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany, those visiting Fukushima for the Summer Games next year should take a proactive approach to educating themselves on which areas of Fukushima are affected by radiation and on the impact of exposure to radiation. “In terms of safety, there are certain areas of Fukushima where we would certainly not advise athletes or spectators to spend any time. Those are areas particularly close to the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, including where the torch processions will be taking place,” Burnie said in an interview with The Korea Herald at Greenpeace Seoul’s office in central Seoul last week. “They are areas that are not safe for people to live. If you visit, you need to follow a radiation protocol. It is a bizarre situation that you are having Olympic events where people are concerned about radiation,” he added. While noting that not all parts of Fukushima should be off limits, Burnie said athletes and sports bodies need to seek independent assessments on Fukushima, rather than relying on information provided by the Japanese government. “It’s dangerous to just dismiss the whole of Fukushima as a radioactive disaster zone. It’s much more complex than that. The first thing is … don’t trust the Japanese government, educate yourself. If you’re an organizing body, get independent verification and independent information about what the relative radiation levels are, what the risks are,” Burnie said. As the senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany, Burnie has followed the Japanese government’s handling of the tsunami and earthquake in March 2011 that resulted in the meltdown of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant. In a report published in January, Burnie alleged that Tokyo plans to dispose of some 1 million metric tons of contaminated water by discharging it into the Pacific Ocean after the Summer Olympics. If Japan follows through with the move, radioactive water is expected to be present in Korea’s East Sea a year later. “For the past five years we’ve been accessing the process, the discussions, the documents submitted by Tepco (Tokyo Electric Power Company) … we were reviewing some of Tepco’s data (last year) and we looked at it and went ‘there is something wrong here with Tepco’s processing,’” Burnie said. “It became very clear there has been bad decisions made, not really surprising, by Tepco, by the (Japanese) government over the last five or six years and how to manage the water crisis.” Last year Tepco acknowledged its Advanced Liquid Processing System, or ALPS, had failed to purify contaminated water stored in tanks at the Dai-ichi power plant. A committee under Japan’s Ministry of Economy in 2016 put together five scenarios for the Japanese government to deal with the massive volume of pollutants stored at the Fukushima No. 1 plant. The amount of water stored at the plant is to reach its full capacity of 1.3 million tons by the end of 2020, with about 170 tons accumulating daily. According to Burnie, Tokyo has chosen to discharge the radioactive water instead of acting on any of the other four suggestions because “it is the most cheap and fast.” Besides increased levels of radioactive cesium found in Fukushima and in the East Sea, Burnie warned of “cesium-rich micro particles” extremely small in size and inhaled through breathing. Cesium is one of the largest sources of radioactivity from the 2011 disaster and has a half-life of 30 years. “There is evidence from samples ... some scientific literature has published the results and they found concentrations of these particles in areas 20-30 kilometers from the plant. ... The problem is these particles can be inhaled. Then some of them lodge inside your lung at which point you are getting an internal dose, a very focused, very localized, relatively high-exposure dose to individual cells,” Burnie said. “That’s a real problem because there is very little known about how cesium in that form will affect your long-term health. ... Again, the people most at risk are those returning to live in areas of Fukushima affected by these particles. But the Japanese government has not taken into account in any of its assessments what those risks are,” he added. Stressing that the risks of exposure to radiation should not be exaggerated, Burnie noted there is no safe level of radiation exposure and the long-term effects are unknown. “The effects you will only see over decades. It won’t be instant, it’s not an acute radiation exposure, it’s low-level radiation,” Burnie said. “The country that will be next impacted will be Korea, because it’s the geographically closest. … There is no safe threshold for radiation exposure. … Why should you be exposed when there is a clear alternative, which is you store?” http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190821000749 ________________________________ This post is ad-supported by Motley Fool - I am writing them asking if they know what they are supporting - time that these sites have to stand on their own two feet and not get advertisers who know nothing about what they post there ________________________________ http://nuclear-news.net/2019/08/22/sports-bodies-need-to-make-own-assessments-of-fukushima-greenpeace-nuclear-specialist/ Thanks for flying with WordPress.com _______________________________________________ You are currently subscribed to the RadSafe mailing list Before posting a message to RadSafe be sure to have read and understood the RadSafe rules. 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