Re: Man Sentenced in radioactive Poisoning Case

["J.J. Rozental" <rozental@unisys.com.br>]

----- Original Message -----
From: carol marcus <csmarcus@ucla.edu>
To: Multiple recipients of list <radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 10, 2000 4:19 PM
Subject: Re: Man Sentenced in radioactive Poisoning Case


Security of sources now is a subject of great concern. For this reason
it was held an International Conference in Dijon, France, titled
International Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security
of Radioactive Materials, Dijon, France 14 - 18 September 1998. One of the
subjects was:
The prevention of theft or any other unauthorized use of radioactive
materials and the measures for detecting and responding to the illicit
trafficking of these materials.
I suggest Radsafers to take a look on the following sites about:
a) Resolution adopted on 25 September 1998 during the 10th plenary meeting
http://www.iaea.org/GC/gc42/resolutions/gc42res12.html
b) MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN NUCLEAR, RADIATION
AND WASTE SAFETY
http://www.iaea.org/GC/gc42/documents/gc42inf15.html
On the other hand the IAEA Safety Fundamentals - Radiation Protection and
the Safety of Radiation Sources - Safety Series 120, 1996 page 13 state:
"A system of source security comprising measures to prevent loss, theft,
damage or unauthorized use of sources is an important aspect of safety."
Principle 9: Operation and use of sources -
The operation and use of sources shall be based upon procedures and
conditions that ensure the safety and security of the source and the
optimization of radiation protection and that take into account the lessons
learned from operational experience.
I also would like to mention that the IAEA Basic Safety Standards, Safety
Series, 115, 1996 mention security of sources, at 2.34 - Sources shall be
kept secure so as to prevent theft or damage and to prevent any unauthorized
legal person from carrying out any of the actions specified in the General
Obligations for practices of the Standards"... please take at look, page 26
and paras. 2.7-2.9
The key word to prevent recurrence and to fix responsibilities among
parties in this singular case was above cited: "lessons learned from
operational experience" - How many similar cases were previously registered
by the radiation protection community? - Very interesting topic to discuss
in any future Symposium.

Jose Julio Rozental
rozental@unisys.com.br
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
I'll be back to Israel next February 22







> Dear Radsafers:
>
> I disagree completely that the University had any blame in this case.  The
> blame goes to the criminal.  If someone picked up a chair and smashed in
> someone's head with it, is the University responsible because chairs were
> not secured against lifting? If someone drives drunk and hurts someone, do
> you blame the car manufacturer? If this graduate student had poisoned her
> with nonradioactive salts of mercury or lead, would the University have
been
> blamed for having these materials in chemistry labs and not searching
fully
> every single person who walked out of the lab each time, 24 hours a day, 7
> days a week?  Is this what you want?   There are far more hazardous
> materials at Brown University than a little P-32.  The only way you can
make
> sure that no criminal can use any of it is to shut down the University.
>
> NRC's disgusting propensity to blame the University (or the NIH in a
similar
> case) merely illustrates a pathological need of the NRC to screw people
for
> the hell of it and publicize overblown radiation hazard. This carefully
> manufactured public fear serves to keep the public hysterical about
> radioactivity and secure NRC's generally worthless and certainly
detrimental
> Materials Program.  A similar incident that occurred at U.C. San Francisco
> many years ago was handled completely differently by intelligent radiation
> protection people at UCSF and the Radiological Health Branch in
Sacramento.
> First, it was handled quietly, with much concern for the victims.
Secondly,
> there was no purposeful public disclosure of inflated radiation doses, as
> committed by the NRC during the NIH affair.  And third, there was no
> obstruction of the radiation safety personnel by the radiation regulator
to
> locate the culprit, as there was by NRC at the NIH.
>
> I strongly recommend that all RSO's and Agreement State radiation
regulators
> ignore NRC's irrational recent cause celebre to secure all radioactive
> material as if it were vats of weapons grade plutonium.  Chances are, if
you
> look around your laboratories at radioactive material in use there, the
lead
> shielding is more of a hazard as a weapon than the radioactive material.
>
> Ciao, Carol
>
> Carol S. Marcus, Ph.D., M.D.
> <csmarcus@ucla.edu>
>
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