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FW: Dateline NBC TMI story - A different evaluation
Such failures of the vessel and containment are considered in the
probabilistic risk assessment portion of the licensing documentation. This
is to separate it from the design basis portion of the licensing
documentation which is used to address specific regulatory rules. The PRA
assess both equipment failure and human failure in the event progression.
You are required in the probabilistic portion to evaluate the probability of
a (1) core damage event, (2) vessel melt through, and (3) containment
failure events and to determine what design applications could most
significantly modify those probabilities, i.e., if a design change of
$100,000 could reduce the probability of core melt a factor of ten, then you
would do it; whereas a design change of $20,000,000 for a reduction of 4%
would not be done (4% is way below the precision of such calculations).
Even so the regulators have the right to negotiate modifications based upon
such studies (the NRC also does their own study as opposed to relying on
just the utility licensing input).
With respect to the potential for ground water contamination, it is
typically not considered in the design of the reactor building but is
considered in the design of the radwaste building. This is due to the fact
that designing the reactor building for seismic and leakage constraints most
often results in a containment impervious to such melt through leakage to
the ground water. When you think of a reactor building, don't think of the
kind of building you work in, consider 5 meter thick concrete basemats,
reinforcing steel woven so thick you can barely stick your finger between
the bars, one meter concrete floors, steel lined containments so tight that
the allowable leakage area is about that of a 0.5mm pencil lead area,
passive flooding systems, and basaltic concrete designed to withstand melted
steel/corium. These are truly tough buildings, most of which are
underground.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jacobus, John (OD/ORS) [mailto:jacobusj@ors.od.nih.gov]
Sent: Friday, August 17, 2001 5:52 AM
To: Franz Schoenhofer; Ted Rockwell; Michael Stabin;
radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
Subject: RE: Dateline NBC TMI story - A different evaluation
Franz and Ted,
.....
I do not know a lot of nuclear engineers, so again I ask if the idea of a
core meltdown that lead to a failure of the containment vessel and
containment building was considered follow a loss of coolant, AND failure of
the emergency core cooling system. (Gee, that sounds like what happened at
TMI when the control room turned off the emergency fuel pumps.)
.....
-- John
John Jacobus, MS
Certified Health Physicist
3050 Traymore Lane
Bowie, MD 20715-2024
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