Re: Depleted Uranium "Smuggling" Story Rehash

[Dimiter Popoff <tgi@cit.bg>]

Glen Vickers,



> ... Either their detection process failed, or their known detection 

> capabilities were not set up to detect this quantity and type of material 

> because it was not considered significant.  Which is it?  Just state the facts.  



I would not expect to hear any of that. Frankly, I would expect they have

installed more or less the same $2.8k monitors - which, good as they are - cannot

be expected to do the job of a $280k device, which likely was paid for in this

case as well. Or it is some similar sort of story. After the container

monitoring thread - public paying >$250k of a $280k total - for paperwork

and consulting, getting a $2.8k device, I just don't see why bother looking

for further facts. The media make some noise, more spending is needed

for protection, and guess what, 99% of all cash will go down the throat of 

the current elbowing champion who can sign the spending - and everybody is

happy. Except for the few who still do some real work - oh, do they count?

 Our brave new world...



Dimiter (recently somewhat disillusioned about multiplyiers in use today...)



--------------------------------------------------------------------

Dimiter Popoff

Transgalactic Instruments, Gourko Str. 25 b, 1000 Sofia, Bulgaria

http://transgalactic.freeyellow.com

Phone: 00359/2/9923340



> From: Gv1@AOL.COM

> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2003 17:59:47 EST

> Subject: Re: Depleted Uranium "Smuggling" Story Rehash

> To: radsafe@list.Vanderbilt.Edu

>

>

> While I didn't find the story as exciting as something James Bond would do, 

> their assertion is correct when they say the found it easy to get the material 

> into the country.  Does anyone really believe the screening capabilities at 

> any port are really that good and just because this material was deemed to not 

> be dangerous makes it okay to not detect it?  Every response on this issue was 

> defensive and dismissive of the success of the ABC group.

> 

> Another comment in the story stated the material is "stable or benign".  

> Depleted uranium is nowhere near stable or benign.  Many people used ~600 g slabs 

> of this material which yields approximately 230 mrem/hr beta and ~4 mrem/hr 

> gamma (i.e. various emissions detected >1000 mg/cm2) from all of the daughter 

> products.  How much dose did the ABC crew get the entire time they handled the 

> material.  I bet they'd be suprised...

> 

> There's no sense in being defensive about the issue.  Either increase 

> monitoring capabilities or don't overstate your capabilities.  Any good instrument 

> person will understand that some of the monitoring capabilities (low-level 

> instantaneous detection, infinite distance) desired by the public have some serious 

> limitations.  Either their detection process failed, or their known detection 

> capabilities were not set up to detect this quantity and type of material 

> because it was not considered significant.  Which is it?  Just state the facts.  

> In the many words put forth, there was nothing to state why the port failed to 

> detect the material and this is the most important information of all.  Would 

> you feel comfortable if the post-TMI root cause was approached with this much 

> rigor?

> 

> If the people at the port really think they're that good, then perhaps there 

> is a problem.  I think people should continue to challenge compensatory 

> actions put in place.  It can serve as a learning opportunity by the wise or 

> recognition of the truth by the public.

> 

> Glen Vickers

  

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