[ RadSafe ] US nuclear waste could provide terror target

[Fred Dawson]

NAS report published April 6

Spent Fuel Stored in Pools at Some U.S. Nuclear Power Plants Potentially at 
Risk From Terrorist Attacks; Prompt Measures Needed to Reduce 
Vulnerabilities

Spent nuclear fuel stored in pools at some of the nation's 103 operating 
commercial nuclear reactors may be at risk from terrorist attacks, says a 
new report from the National Academies' Board on Radioactive Waste 
Management. The report calls on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
conduct plant-by-plant analyses to obtain a better understanding of 
potential risks and to ensure that power-plant operators take prompt and 
effective measures to reduce the possible consequences of terrorist attacks.

http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309096472?OpenDocument


WASHINGTON -- Spent nuclear fuel stored in pools at some of the nation's 103 
operating commercial nuclear reactors may be at risk from terrorist attacks, 
says a new report from a committee of the National Academies' Board on 
Radioactive Waste Management. The report calls on the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (USNRC) to conduct additional analyses to obtain a 
better understanding of potential risks and to ensure that power-plant 
operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce the possible 
consequences of such attacks. Because potential threats may differ according 
to a specific plant's design, the committee recommended that plant-by-plant 
vulnerability analyses be performed.

These conclusions were based on a detailed review of security analyses 
performed by the USNRC, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the nuclear 
power industry, and independent experts. The committee noted that many 
security improvements have been instituted at U.S. commercial nuclear power 
plants since the events of Sept. 11, 2001. On several important questions, 
however, it was unable to obtain enough information from the USNRC to assess 
their effectiveness. The committee therefore recommends that an assessment 
of such measures should be undertaken by an organization independent of the 
USNRC and the nuclear industry.

"Within the six-month time frame requested by Congress, our committee of 
technical experts completed a very sound, evidence-based analysis," said 
committee chair Louis J. Lanzerotti, distinguished research professor at the 
New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, and consultant, Bell Labs, 
Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, N.J. "We received input both from 
scientific professionals and the public. Our findings were unanimous. While 
the committee identified several terrorist attack scenarios that could have 
potentially severe consequences if carried out successfully, we also 
identified two relatively simple measures that could be implemented 
immediately at vulnerable plants to greatly reduce the risks."

The committee found that an attack which partially or completely drains a 
plant's spent fuel pool might be capable of starting a high-temperature fire 
that could release large quantities of radioactive material into the 
environment. The committee recommended that two measures be taken promptly 
to reduce the potential for such fires: reconfiguring the position of fuel 
assemblies in the pools to more evenly distribute decay-heat loads, and 
making provisions for water-spray systems to cool the fuel that could 
continue to operate even after the pool or the building in which it is 
housed is damaged.

The first measure could probably be implemented at all plants with minimal 
cost and time, and with little exposure of workers to radiation, the 
committee said. It recommended that the costs and benefits of options for 
implementing the water-spray system should be examined to decide what 
requirements should be imposed. Such systems may not be needed at plants 
where spent fuel pools are located below ground level or are otherwise 
protected from external line-of-sight attacks.

Congress requested the study following conflicting claims in the media about 
the safety and security of spent fuel in storage at commercial nuclear power 
plants, including the risks that spent fuel might be used to construct a 
radiological dispersal device, or "dirty bomb." The committee concluded the 
likelihood that terrorists could steal enough spent nuclear fuel from a 
power plant for use in a dirty bomb is small, given existing security 
measures. Nevertheless, the USNRC should review and upgrade where necessary 
its security requirements for protecting those spent fuel rods not contained 
in fuel assemblies from theft by knowledgeable insiders.

The report being issued today is the public version of a classified report 
delivered to Congress, USNRC, and the Department of Homeland Security in 
July 2004. The National Academies obtained the USNRC's cooperation in 
producing this public report. It contains all of the findings and 
recommendations of the original classified report, but some have been 
slightly reworded. Classified national security information and safeguards 
information have been redacted.

"We believe this report fulfills our responsibility to inform the public and 
elected officials on a critical national security issue," said Bruce 
Alberts, president of the National Academy of Sciences. "It also satisfies a 
second, equally important imperative: to ensure that this report contains no 
information that might inadvertently aid terrorists. We appreciate the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's assistance in confirming that."

As part of the study, the committee was asked to examine the possible 
advantages of dry cask storage over pool storage at commercial power-plant 
sites. The report concludes that pools are necessary to cool spent fuel 
immediately after its removal from a reactor. But dry cask storage has two 
advantages for storing spent fuel older than about five years: It is a 
passive system that relies on air circulation for cooling, and it divides 
the inventory of spent fuel into a number of individual, robust containers, 
each containing only a small amount of the total inventory. The committee 
found that although there are some differences in the robustness of 
different dry cask designs under various terrorist attack scenarios, the 
differences are not large, and relatively simple steps could be taken to 
further reduce potential vulnerabilities.

Once the USNRC completes the recommended plant-specific vulnerability 
analyses, the agency may conclude that earlier movements of spent fuel from 
pools into dry cask storage would be prudent at some plants, the report 
says. The committee was not specifically asked by Congress to recommend 
whether the transfer of spent fuel rods from pools to a system of dry cask 
storage should be accelerated, however. Cost-benefit considerations also 
would be an important part of such decisions.

Finally, the committee observed during the course of its work that current 
classification and security practices appear to be impeding the sharing of 
valuable information between the USNRC and nuclear industry operators, 
negatively impacting constructive feedback and cooperation. The committee 
recommended that the USNRC improve the sharing of pertinent information on 
its security analyses of spent fuel storage with nuclear power plants 
operators and system vendors. More constructive interaction with the public 
and with independent analysts also could increase confidence in USNRC and 
industry decisions and their actions to reduce the vulnerability of spent 
fuel storage to terrorist attacks

This study was sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. The Board on Radioactive Waste Management 
is part of the National Research Council, the principal operating arm of the 
National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. They 
are private, nonprofit institutions that provide science and technology 
advice under a congressional charter. A committee roster follows.
Copies of Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: 
Public Report are available from the National Academies Press; tel. 
202-334-3313 or 1-800-624-6242 or order on the Internet at 
http://www.nap.edu. Reporters may obtain a copy from the Office of News and 
Public Information (contacts listed above).

See also New Scientist report
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7241





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Fred Dawson
New Malden
Surrey. KT3 5BP
England

020 8287 2176