[ RadSafe ] Re: Radiation Monitoring at Ports, cont'd.

[Dimiter Popoff]

>  Allies in the fight against the establishment? ...

Not really, I'd be more general than that - let's say
allies in the fight for a world based more on knowledge
(thus less tolerant to lies and other unpleasant things).

> Nope we American's must learn the hard way.

You know, actually this is good news. Most societies don't
seem to learn at all - and consequently disappear, perhaps after
spending quite a while in a vegetative state. Evolution knows
its job...

Dimiter

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Dimiter Popoff               Transgalactic Instruments

http://www.tgi-sci.com
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> Date: Mon, 9 May 2005 05:47:03 -0700 (PDT)
> From: Gerry Blackwood <gpblackwood at yahoo.com>
> Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] Re: Radiation Monitoring at Ports, cont'd.
> To: Dimiter Popoff <didi at tgi-sci.com>, Rad Safe <radsafe at radlab.nl>
> 
> " Allies are welcome."
> 
>  Allies in the fight against the establishment? Hell there
> is an army in that fight..... Problem is 99.9% are to low
> on the DC food chain to truely make any difference......
> Nope we American's must learn the hard way. When the second
> shoe drops..... and its not "if" but "when" then maybe 
> just maybe we will get somewhere.... In the meantime do
> not hold your breath......    
> 
> Dimiter Popoff <didi at tgi-sci.com> wrote:
> > And we are going to do what about all of this?
> 
> Well if you expect me to take out of my sleeve the tool it takes
> to defeat the mafiocratic establishment on the spot I'll have
> to disappoint you - I don't think I have it.
> My resources are limited to developing the best technology and
> behaving in a way I would like the rest of the world would
> behave like. Allies are welcome.
> 
> Dimiter
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> Dimiter Popoff Transgalactic Instruments
> 
> http://www.tgi-sci.com
> ------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > Date: Sun, 8 May 2005 07:36:22 -0700 (PDT)
> > From: Gerry Blackwood 
> > Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] Radiation Monitoring at Ports, cont'd.
> > To: Dimiter Popoff , Rad Safe 
> > 
> > And we are going to do what about all of this? All of this has
> > been hashed out back in March of 2002..... and still we did crap.....
> > 
> > Dimiter Popoff wrote:Thanks for posting this article.
> > 
> > It is interesting to see how at least part of the truth makes its way
> > to the public - eventually. The uselessness of the scintillation based
> > portals can't possibly have been unknown when they were bought; this
> > was discussed about two years ago on this list.
> > I am really curious what "prototype building" takes place in Nevada,
> > probably it will take them another 5 years to reinvent the wheel and
> > demonstrate something to match my hi-spec module which has been around
> > already for quite a while... Anyway, I have received no inquiry so far.
> > May be I am wrong. May be they work on "improving" the scintillation
> > based detection systems and the 5 years will go on the discovery
> > that they cannot beat the laws of physics - so the entire effort will
> > be as efficient as the star wars project.
> > I keep on wondering how long it will take until the public realizes
> > how many semiliterate "experts" get wealthy on such programs and
> > (worse) are the main obstacle to achieving success which definitely
> > can be bought at a fraction of the cost.
> > My optimistic (I can't change my nature...) guess is "forever"...
> > 
> > Dimiter
> > 
> > ------------------------------------------------------
> > Dimiter Popoff Transgalactic Instruments
> > 
> > http://www.tgi-sci.com
> > ------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > > From: Cehn at aol.com
> > > Date: Sat, 7 May 2005 14:46:12 EDT
> > > To: radsafe at radlab.nl
> > > Subject: [ RadSafe ] Radiation Monitoring at Ports, cont'd.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > May 8, 2005
> > > U.S. to Spend Billions More to Alter Security Systems
> > > By _ERIC LIPTON_ (http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?ppds=bylL&v1=ERIC 
> > > LIPTON&fdq=19960101&td=sysdate&sort=newest&ac=ERIC LIPTON&inline=nyt-per) , NY 
> > > Times
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > WASHINGTON, May 7 - After spending more than $4.5 billion on screening 
> > > devices to monitor the nation's ports, borders, airports, mail and air, the 
> > > federal government is moving to replace or alter much of the antiterrorism 
> > > equipment, concluding that it is ineffective, unreliable or too expensive to operate. 
> > > Many of the monitoring tools - intended to detect guns, explosives, and 
> > > nuclear and biological weapons - were bought during the blitz in security 
> > > spending after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. 
> > > In its effort to create a virtual shield around America, the Department of 
> > > Homeland Security now plans to spend billions of dollars more. Although some 
> > > changes are being made because of technology that has emerged in the last 
> > > couple of years, many of them are planned because devices currently in use have 
> > > done little to improve the nation's security, according to a review of agency 
> > > documents and interviews with federal officials and outside experts. 
> > > "Everyone was standing in line with their silver bullets to make us more 
> > > secure after Sept. 11," said Randall J. Larsen, a retired Air Force colonel and 
> > > former government adviser on scientific issues. "We bought a lot of stuff off 
> > > the shelf that wasn't effective." 
> > > Among the problems: 
> > > ¶Radiation monitors at ports and borders that cannot differentiate between 
> > > radiation emitted by a nuclear bomb and naturally occurring radiation from 
> > > everyday material like cat litter or ceramic tile. 
> > > ¶Air-monitoring equipment in major cities that is only marginally effective 
> > > because not enough detectors were deployed and were sometimes not properly 
> > > calibrated or installed. They also do not produce results for up to 36 hours - 
> > > long after a biological attack would potentially infect thousands of people. 
> > > ¶Passenger-screening equipment at airports that auditors have found is no 
> > > more likely than before federal screeners took over to detect whether someone is 
> > > trying to carry a weapon or a bomb aboard a plane. 
> > > ¶Postal Service machines that test only a small percentage of mail and look 
> > > for anthrax but no other biological agents. 
> > > *** 
> > > Radiation at Seaports 
> > > One after another, trucks stuffed with cargo like olives from Spain, birdseed 
> > > from Ethiopia, olive oil from France and carpets from India line up at the 
> > > Port Newark Container Terminal, approaching what looks like an E-ZPass toll 
> > > gate. 
> > > In minutes, they will fan out across the nation. But first, they pass through 
> > > the gate, called a radiation portal monitor, which sounds an alarm if it 
> > > detects a nuclear weapon or radioactive material that could be used to make a 
> > > "dirty bomb," a crude nuclear device that causes damage by widely spreading low 
> > > levels of radiation. 
> > > Heralded as "highly sophisticated" when they were introduced, the devices 
> > > have proven to be hardly that. 
> > > The portal-monitor technology has been used for decades by the scrap metal 
> > > industry. Customs officials at Newark have nicknamed the devices "dumb 
> > > sensors," because they cannot discern the source of the radiation. That means benign 
> > > items that naturally emit radioactivity - including cat litter, ceramic tile, 
> > > granite, porcelain toilets, even bananas - can set off the monitors. 
> > > Alarms occurred so frequently when the monitors were first installed that 
> > > customs officials turned down their sensitivity. But that increased the risk 
> > > that a real threat, like the highly enriched uranium used in nuclear bombs, 
> > > could go undetected because it emits only a small amount of radiation or perhaps 
> > > none if it is intentionally shielded. 
> > > "It was certainly a compromise in terms of absolute capacity to detect 
> > > threats," said Mr. Milowic, the customs official. 
> > > The port's follow-up system, handheld devices that are supposed to determine 
> > > what set off an alarm, is also seriously flawed. Tests conducted in 2003 by 
> > > Los Alamos National Laboratory found that the handheld machines, designed to 
> > > be used in labs, produced a false positive or a false negative more than half 
> > > the time. The machines were the least reliable in identifying the most 
> > > dangerous materials, the tests showed. 
> > > The weaknesses of the devices were apparent in Newark one recent morning. A 
> > > truck, whose records said it was carrying brakes from Germany, triggered the 
> > > portal alarm, but the backup device could not identify the radiation source. 
> > > Without being inspected, the truck was sent on its way to Ohio. 
> > > "We agree it is not perfect," said Rich O'Brien, a customs supervisor in 
> > > Newark. But he said his agency needed to move urgently to improve security after 
> > > the 2001 attacks. "The politics stare you in the face, and you got to put 
> > > something out there." 
> > > *** 
> > > At the Nevada Test Site, an outdoor laboratory that is larger than the state 
> > > of Rhode Island, the next generation of monitoring devices is being tested. 
> > > In preparing to spend billions of dollars more on equipment, the Department 
> > > of Homeland Security is moving carefully. In Nevada, contractors are being 
> > > paid to build prototypes of radiation detection devices that are more sensitive 
> > > and selective. Only those getting passing grades will move on to a second 
> > > competition in the New York port. 
> > > Similar competitions are under way elsewhere to evaluate new air-monitoring 
> > > equipment and airport screening devices. That approach contrasts with how the 
> > > federal government typically went about trying to shore up the nation's 
> > > defenses after the 2001 attacks. Government agencies often turned to their most 
> > > familiar contractors, including Northrop Grumman, Boeing and SAIC, a technology 
> > > giant based in San Diego. The agencies bought devices from those companies, 
> > > at times without competitive bidding or comprehensive testing. 
> > > Documents prepared by customs officials in an effort to purchase container 
> > > inspection equipment show that they were so intent on buying an SAIC product, 
> > > even though a competitor had introduced a virtually identical version that was 
> > > less expensive, that they placed the manufacturer's brand name in the 
> > > requests. The agency has bought more than 100 of the machines at $1 million each. 
> > > But the machines often cannot identify the contents of ship containers, 
> > > because many everyday items, including frozen foods, are too dense for the gamma 
> > > ray technology to penetrate. 
> > > *** 
> > > But given the inevitable imperfection of technology and the vast expanse the 
> > > government is trying to secure, some warn of putting too much confidence in 
> > > machines. 
> > > "Technology does not substitute for strategy," said James Jay Carafano, 
> > > senior fellow for homeland security at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative 
> > > think tank. "It's always easier for terrorists to change tactics than it is for 
> > > us to throw up defenses to counter them. The best strategy to deal with 
> > > terrorists is to find them and get them."
> > >