Waste Disposal Fill-in-the-Blanks

[JMUCKERHEIDE@delphi.com]

Dave,

I agree with much you say, but it doesn't address my point. I don't mean to
imply that there is a "magic bullet" statement. If that were the case, I would 
not see a need for some real work here. 

> As has been pointed out, one reason for geologic disposal is allowing transport
> processes to delay and reduce concentrations to potential receptors.  Another
> important element is that geologic processes have occured over a long time
> scale and are believed to be predictable for long periods in the future.  Some
> believe that engineered solutions (e.g. waste treatment, HICs, and construction
> practices) can provide adequate protection.  The problem is that these
> processes have not been subject to long-term study to verify these estimates
> for service life.  I've had to replace my 20-year roof . . . .  :-).

First, on this point, the concepts of making wastes "walk-away" safe are not
limited to such simple physical constructs, nor do they have to have integrity 
over long times. 

I referred to the waste package for the geologic disposal concept, and point
to the fact that if we do that we then don't need to go to deep geologic
storage -- I mean something substantial, I don't mean just build a shed around 
it. And it must be monitored for some substantial period (debate <100 or 300
years - that's real debate but must be in the context of real waste decay
numbers, chemistry, etc., and be specific about the monitoring and
verification of stability during and at the end of that period to justify then 
walking away. (So we never blindly do an analysis today that provides
assurance for all time!) 

But, of course it depends on technical honesty in recognizing that trivial
amounts of man-made radionuclides (only those with >30 yr 1/2-life) added to
the environment from some release at some distant constitute no human or
environmental hazard -- and that includes explicit comparison to natural
radionuclides and doses! including natural variation, and even that there are
no consequences from large discharges of such radionuclides from weapons,
facilities, early waste disposal, etc., so there is high confdence that are no 
consequences expected from far lesser releases in the future. (But the
monitoring time will also be a time to confirm such data (if the government
could be enticed to support such research instead of actively suppressing it
-- from the Norm Frigerio's 1973 initial (preliminary) work on radiation vs.
US background that did not get supported to assess the data in detail, to the
closure of the Argonne Center for Human Radiobiology starting in the early 80s 
(no cancer below 1000 rad and the population indicating that it would outlive
its cohort is not consistent with the "scare the public" mode of the
bureaucracy and institutional science). 

> My point on the anecdote about the simplistic analysis is that it was rejected
> by the type of people you hope to influence.  This approach is viewed as a

That's not who I hope to influence!!!  First we need to influence the nuclear
professionals! We need to produce substantial work, with greater commitment to 
a process that produces reasonable calculations and results, and response to
comments and questions and "disbelief" by those who can and must know the
facts.  *We should not be having this "pro and anti" argument in the absense
of these numbers that we should both have good access to, from participation
by HPS and others.*  

When/if we were to put out the statement on releases from the site and the
inventory flowing down the Colorado River, it should be from a basis of solid
work, substantially reviewed, with technical assurance (and should have
specific inventory/exposure/dose comparisons that would stand as solid
analysis in the professional community.  (I could generate some numbers, but I 
push for input from some more substantial effort that would have broader
recognition and more critical review -- and I find it distressing that $$$ can 
be spent for PR and political action when the fundamental data at the heart of 
the issue is not readily, clearly, and unambiguously available.) 

Only then do we reach policy makers and the related technical communities and
affected public (the general public only later) in semi-formal forums on
agreement on what is "known" and unknown, and what the cost of "protection" is 
at the levels of negligible health and safety protection. This is combined
with the record of substantial data that is filed in cases and on terms that
put the bureaucrats, and others who mislead the public to feed public fear, on 
notice that continued ignoring and suppressing actual data on public health
consequences of radiation exposure in making decisions will result in legal
action to overturn such decisions. 

I see NO effort to do that in any reasonable manner, though there may be areas 
I am unaware of. ( If with what we  _know_  about smoking and lung cancer, an
increase of 2.5/100,000 deaths before smoking to about 80/100,000 after
smoking, and the tobacco interests can beat the regulators in rulemakings and
in the courts about the "uncertainties" of the data, it is patently obvious
that a case with totally the opposite actual data can hold the irresponsible
government agencies to task --  if the responsible elements of the
professional interests  _want_  to protect public spending of $Trillion for NO 
(Goldman says "negligible) :-) benefit, plus enabling the application of
radiation and radioactivity much more extensively to benefit society! ) 

> polemic, not an objective analysis.  The Siting Commission members were not
> subject to extraordinary political pressure.  They didn't have to worry about
> reelection or reappointment.  They simply came to a conclusion different than
> you would have (and different from the one I would have, for that matter).  Nor
> were they hoodwinked by anti-nuclear arguements without access to the facts. 
> Chem Nuclear, IDNS, etc. had ample opportunity (several months) to make their
> case about the Martinsville site.  I believe that in order to convince public

I didn't see any reasonable and responsible effort there.  Everything was
played as "realpolitiks"; and I disagree that the commission made a rational
decision divorced from the conflict and debate engendered by the politics.  

They made a rational decision based on a skewed data set that put politics and 
public conflict directly on the balance scale, with $1.98 worth of solid
technical work and dealing directly with the public for every $Million of
contractors, consultants, lawyers, PR hacks, bureaucrats and political
manipulators bleeding the system and causing public outrage. (And you could
still have found a majority of the public supporting site safety?! Imagine if
a real honest technical job were done, instead of 1 witness with a few quick
calcs and probably working from a few hours hired by the lawyers as a
technical witness rather than as an integral part of performing and directing
the work of the staff and contractors to answer the real questions rather than 
a hearing witness, brought in late in the day in hearings that were a charade
of legalistic process. 

That's hardly what's needed. And that's no basis for rejecting the idea of
doing substantial, responsible, work to quantify reality, to engage the
knowledgeable and concerned public to contribute and understand the physical
reality, and to say what is technically defensible rather than what is
"politically acceptable"! 

> officials, a numerical estimate of the radiation dose must be presented, albeit

We don't need to convince "public officials", we need to convince the
technically qualified community, and take that case to the record and the
public, and take the "public officials" to court when they act arbitrarily and 
capriciously.  The courts, especially the Supreme Court, is showing a spark of 
its role in protecting the public from an arbitrary and overweaning
government. Let it play its role rather than us rolling over on the technical
case because of presumptions of what the "officials" will accept. 

> with very wide error bars.  If you can show that the site will satisfy the
> concentration limits at 99% certainty, the decision becomes a little easier.
> 
> Dave Scherer
> 
Regards, Jim