Nuclear plant emergency plan accountabilities

[sandy_perle@email.fpl.com]

     >Mr. Flood may know what he's talking about...<
     
     Yes, Bob is quite correct with his assessment. Another outfall of the TMI 
     incident was the creation of many organizational structures which are 
     activated after specific EALs are declared, Emergency Activation Levels. 
     There are 4 of these classifications for nuclear power plants; Unusual 
     Event, Alert, Site Area Alert and a General Emergency (which is the most 
     serious, often having to do with degrading plant conditions, breach of 
     primary barriers and the potential for off-site releases of radioactive 
     materials, and potentially high radiation levels, leading to the state and 
     local authorities having to declare protective action recommendations 
     (provided by the utility). As we can all recall, TMI pointed out so very 
     well that in an incident situation, communication (cohesive communication) 
     is critical to collect the data, evaluate it and then create decisions and 
     then implement them. While it is true that a nuclear incident is one that 
     would normally take time to evolve, unlike that incident depicted in The 
     China Syndrome, cool heads are required, brain cells that are able to focus 
     on the incident at hand, and not daydreaming about other distracting 
     events, such as job security or what's for dinner. One could also argue 
     that these same considerations must be mitigated while "operating and 
     maintaining" an operating nuclear unit. Operators must be focusing on 
     operating the plant, maintenance must be focusing on maintaining, 
     inspectors must be inspecting and health physicists must be evaluating to 
     ensure that not only are regulatory requirements being met, but that the 
     health and safety of the public, as well as the plant workers, is being 
     secured.
     
     Back to emergency organizations. There are many structures out in place as 
     an EAL is declared. The on-site facilities are the Control Room, managing 
     the actual actions to mitigate the root cause and consequences of the 
     incident. The OSC (On-site Support Center) where the various emergency 
     teams assemble and from where they are directed to go .. for whatever 
     purpose is deemed necessary, turn a valve, take an exposure reading, etc. 
     Next is the TSC (Technical Support Center) where the technical issues are 
     reviewed and from where communication occurs to the outside world. Last is 
     the EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) where the utility, state, local and 
     NRC come to manage an incident, interact with the TSC and to provide the 
     government organizations with the radiological assessment, providing risk 
     analysis and support to the plant to halt the incidents that are causing 
     the root cause of the incident. All of these facilities are being degraded 
     in effect due to massive layoffs around the nuclear utility in these 
     ongoing downsizing efforts. I and the other staff HPs are located in the 
     EOF. WE perform the off-site dose calculations using sophisticated computer 
     models, manage the movement of the radiation monitoring teams that fan out 
     into the communities depending on where the plume is heading, provide 
     technical briefings to the governmental bodies and the media that 
     congregate at the Emergency News Center, part of the EOF. We in effect 
     provide the information used that determines if the population at large is 
     at risk and whether or not the local authorities need to move people i  
     order to protect them from the "potential" consequences of the site 
     incident. With downsizing these people will not exist. One could say that 
     plant staff will replace these experts. Not going to happen. One, the 
     plants are downsizing as well. They are on-site to bring the unit under 
     control. Two, they don't have the expertise (not a criticism) but true in 
     any event. Three, the EOF is normal located at least 10 miles from the 
     plant, in many cases up to 500 to 100 miles away, and, we have an hour 
     requirement to staff the EOF after declaring a Site Area Alert. So, 
     distance and timing is a factor.
     
     Downsizing affects more than the employee. It has to potential to affect 
     the public at large. AND, just as important, we, the employees, are also 
     members of this public at large.
     
     Hope this post is informative on emergency operations and management of 
     issues. It;s brief, but hits the highlights. All utility employees know 
     this, but the general HP community, outside of the nuclear plant world has 
     no idea of this facet of our jobs. 
     
     Regards to all ... I'm going boating .. going to focus on "fun" today!
     
     
     Sandy Perle
     Supervisor Health Physics
     Florida Power and Light Company
     Nuclear Division
     
     (407) 694-4219 Office
     (407) 694-3706 Fax
     
     sandy_perle@email.fpl.com
     
     HomePage: http://www.lookup.com/homepages/54398/home.html