Re: Nuclear Energy: STYLE & SUBSTANCE

[MortGold@aol.com]

>Date: Thu, 05 Sep 96 16:12:57 EST
>From: azapantis@MGDESTMX01.ERIN.GOV.AU
>Subject: Comments on Nuclear Energy

>G'day Radsafers

>This message is directed to people in the Nuke Power Industry.

>I am interested in your comments on the following related to nuclear power.
>In particular, comments with SUBSTANCE which rebutt the assertions made.

I am providing below some perspectives based on a half-century of experience
as a professional engineer with graduate degrees from MIT (and licenses to
practice) in both nuclear and environmental engineering,as well as a
diplomate in radiological engineering.  For background, I have worked both
for goverment (US Public Health Service) and as a consulting engineer for the
past 35 years, recently retired as Sr. VP and Technical Director of a company
now called Halliburton NUS.  I was involved in outlawing shoe-fitting
fluoroscopes and monitoring nuclear weapons tests in the early 1950s, helped
found the consulting firm in the early 60s, have consulted both domestically
and abroad (Brazil, Chile, Sweden, Italy, South Africa, Iran, Japan, Taiwan
among others) on the siting, waste and environmental radiation management
issues for NPPs, waste disposal and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities,
including aerospace nuclear safety aspects of power sources (isotopic and
 reactors).   I've testified
frequently in legal and regulatory proceedings as an "expert" and been
involved (reluctantly) in numerous debates over the years with many of the
prominent "anti's" from Tamplin and Sternglass to Lovins.

In other words, I've been around for a while - and the questions/comments you
posit are quite familiar - but the responses can have no more SUBSTANCE than
the original assertions - which are the typical sweeping, non-specific
allegations posed by the "anti's" since 1967 - and to which no satisfactorily
SUBSTANTIVE answers can ever be provided because of the narrow frame of
reference -- solely nuclear power plants.  As I suggest below, try answering
these comments with SUBSTANCE as they apply to ANY high-technology facility
which uses or manufactures toxic or hazardous substances.

>1. No satisfactory method has been found to halt nuclear proliferation or
>prevent diversion of nuclear material by subversive or terrorist elements.

I would take issue with the premise of the assertion, although, like a number
of other sweeping generalities, it is essentially impossible to respond to in
absolute (or SUBSTANTIVE) terms.   What is a "satisfactory method" and to
whom must it be "satisfactory"?   What are the criteria by which such
"satisfaction" is to be determined?  How does one define "nuclear
proliferation" -- is it the development of a base of knowledge and
infrastructure adequate to produce the materials but without a "demonstrated"
capability (e.g., presumably South Africa, Israel and probably many other
developed and developing nations), or does it require that demonstration
(i.e., India's) to qualify, or a full weapon-testing program (like France's
or the US's)?     How does one define "diversion" -  is the unauthorized
transfer of a single gram of U-235 or Pu-239 an appropriate threshhold, or is
it a somewhat larger amount -- closer to the quantities required to assemble
a nuclear device?

I would submit that from a purely empiric point of view, the historic record
over the half-century since the development of these capabilities
demonstrates that the past and current "methods ",  as admittedly imperfect
as they are, have been "satisfactory" in terms of the current status --
nuclear weapons programs have not "proliferated": India does not possess
nuclear weapons it has tested to be effective - nor has Israel (although in
that case, the fear of such development may have contributed both to the
hesitation of some of her neighbors to attack her - as well as to the desire
to develop their own capabilities).    Iraq, Iran, Pakistan have no nuclear
weapon capabilities despite their apparent intense desires to develop them, a
condition again largely due to the "satisfactory" if imperfect methods
employed under existing international agreements and understandings.  

Similarly, diversion of nuclear weapons materials by subversive or terrorist
elements, while not an unfounded concern, has also been successfully
prevented until the recent political and economic collapse of the Soviet
Union.    The attempts to sell small quantities of material from laboratories
and plants in the former Soviet Union are of concern; although they have been
unsuccesful to date and involve insignificant quantities of materials, these
activities indicate the need for stability in "nuclear nation" governments or
the existence of an international agency with the authority and power to
ensure the security of these materials.   Yet having said that,  I would
submit that the pragmatic self-interest on the part of any government to
prevent the crossing into or out of  their national boundaries of these
materials has been effective in limiting any diversions to insignificant
quantities.

But, as common sense dictates, THERE AIN'T NO GUARANTEES IN THIS LIFE!

>2. The costs and problems associated with decommissioning nuclear power 	
>plants have not been properly analysed or accounted for in the costs of
nuclear 	
>power and governments are using taxpayers' money to subsidise nuclear power.

This is another broad-gauge assertion with widely varying answers possible:
 for example, which governments and which nuclear power plants are being
accused of these "crimes"?  Nuclear power plants in many nations were/are
built and operated by government-owned corporations or agencies (e.g., GB,
Canada, France, China, India, former Soviet Union, former Czechoslovakia,
etc.).   In these instances, to the extent that the costs of the nuclear
power plants are not covered by the charges for electricity (also set by
these governments) the deficits are funded by the taxpayers (who also are
paying the low electricity rates), or possibly by the developed nations asked
to contribute financially to improved nuclear safety in those nations.

In the US (and in most Western nations and Japan),  utilities operating
nuclear power plants are required by law to put aside funds for their
eventual decommissioning; the amounts required are defined in conjunction
with the regulatory agencies that have rate-setting authority (since they are
paid for by the electricity users as an element of their rates), and the
funds cannot be used by the utilities for other purposes.     There is fairly
substantial experience in the US and abroad with D&D of older (although
smaller) reactors; some 70 test, demonstration and power reactors have been
retired in the US alone.  Two demonstration plants have been successfully
decommissioned: Shippingport in 1989 and Pathfinder from 1990-1992;  Shoreham
and Ft. St. Vrain have also been successfully decommissioned - although the
former operated for only the
equivalent of two full-power days.

The adequacy of the required funds has not been seriously questioned by
responsible engineers - based on current experience and given the present
requirements for decontamination and decommissioning (D&D).   However, should
these requirements be made more stringent ("ratcheted" downward ) additional
funds might well be needed.   However, the imposition of overly-stringent
standards would be a reflection of the success of the "anti's" in their
battle to prove that, in respect to radiation, ALARA really should be
replaced by zero.   But it will be the public who will pay - one way or the
other - for nil benefits.

>3. No satisfactory method has been found to guarantee safe operation of 	
>nuclear power plants in the event of employee negligence or sabotage.

Again,  another "when-did-you-stop-beating-your-wife" assertion with no
SUBSTANTIVE
response possible:  what constitutes an acceptable "guarantee of safe
operation"?  Is there ANY industrial facility using or producing hazardous or
toxic materials (including a large municipal water supply and purification
plant) that can provide such assurances given the specified employee
behaviors?  I have been around long enough to remember Seveso and Bhopal
accidents as well as a relatively large number of  chemical/ petrochemical
plant accidents which have produced significant numbers of victims among both
employees and the public -- and whose cause had been attributed to various
combinations of faulty employee actions and facility designs.   I have yet to
hear of a ground-swell movement to close those facilities, or to institute
more than quite modest improvements in employee training and facility
designs.

In the instance of NPPs,  one must refer to the requirements for design,
construction and operation of NPPs - which have demonstrably varied between
most nations and a few others (i.e. the former SU) -  AND to the historic
record.     Employee (and management) negligence and incompetence combined
with poor design and arguably substandard construction all contributed to the
events and consequences of the Chernobyl accident.  Could sabotage have done
more damage? I doubt it!

Conversely, the design redundancies and operator training requirements at the
Three Mile Island plant, while obviously less than perfect, were more than
adequate to ensure that, even given the errors of operators and deficiencies
of design features, the radiation consequences of that core-melt accident
were negligible-to-non-existent from a public (and worker) health
perspective.   Could sabotage have resulted in greater plant damage? --
probably not, since the plant had sufficient damage to keep it from operating
again..   Could sabotage have created a greater public health hazard?? --
probably yes, but it would have taken actions by a number of employees acting
in concert, and hence would be much less probable.

Is there an ability to provide a "guarantee safe operation" for NPPs that
cannot be made for any other hazardous industry? - no!   Should there be?  I
think not: the contributions that nuclear power makes as a clean alternative
source of energy (despite the emotional/political aspects of radiation and
waste disposal) - particularly in comparison to the fossil fuel alternatives
- should not be denied to the public, even though it may require the next
generation to reach the required intellectual and emotional maturity to
accept it as such .

Putting it in the vernacular, THERE AIN'T NO GUARANTEES IN THIS LIFE!

>I have my own ideas however I would like a broader perspective.

>Thanks

>Alex Zapantis
>Environmental Radiation Officer
>Office of the Supervising Scientist       Email: azapantis@dest.gov.au
>40 Blackall Street                                 Phone: (int+) 61 6 274
>1642
>Barton ACT 2600 AUSTRALIA                 Fax : (int+) 61 6 274 1519

>The Office of the Supervising Scientist is a Branch of the
>       Federal Environment	Protection Agency
>
>
>------------------------------

Morton I. Goldman, Sc.D., P.E.
North Bethesda, MD
Consulting Engineer (Retired)