Re: Safety Culture -Reply

[CHARLES BLUE <BLUE.CHARLES@EPAMAIL.EPA.GOV>]

This discussion reminds me of a job interview I went on where there
were Ph.D. level experts in their respective fields (biology, chemistry,
and radiation physics).  Each was extremely confident about their ability
and knowledge of their own respective field, however, they knew
enough to be concerned about the other two fields.  As you can imagine,
this led to very lively discussions in the lunch room, where they all came
together.

>>> Bob Flood <bflood@SLAC.Stanford.EDU> 07/18/97 07:48pm >>>
At 06:23 PM 7/18/97 -0500, you wrote:
>Douglas Minnema said the following:
>
>>     Why does a worker violate a procedure rather than stop work
when
he/she 
>>     perceives a problem?  Often the answer is that the worker thought
that 
>>     he/she knew the work better than the procedure writer, and either
had no 
>>     confidence in the procedure or believed that his/her way was
better.
>
>This is a very real cause, and, has happened many times. Back in my 
>power reactor days, this has happened many times.

It's worse in the academic environment. It's a case of "familiarity breeds
arrogance." The person facing the hazard reaches a point where s/he
believes that s/he doesn't need to follow the procedure because 1) s/he
knows the system or activity so much better than anyone else, 2) s/he
knows
the situation better than those safety/HP guys, and 3) s/he can handle
this
hazard with no problems. It represents accumulation of knowledge and
experience until the person develops a complete disregard for standard
procedures, safety program requirements, and the hazard itself, all
based
on a feeling of superior knowledge. It's at that point that the PHD sticks
his finger in the socket.


Bob Flood
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
(415) 926-3793     bflood@slac.stanford.edu
Unless otherwise noted, all opinions are mine alone.