Re: TMI root causes

["Michael C. Baker" <mcbaker@lanl.gov>]

>
>
>There are of course other problems that surfaced during the time we've had 
>to look back, but until you're the person who's trying to respond to a 
>myriad of alarms, and make the proper decision in VERY short time period, 
>it's difficult to really appreciate how fast (literally) hundreds of 
>considerations are made. Yes, that's what the operators are paid for, but 
>keep their  operating environment in mind along with the events.  I still 
>believe that it was the ($$$/"management") operating environment that lead 
>to some of the *faulty* decisions that were made (like turning off MCPs 
>because they were cavitating). 
>

I agree with your over all conclusions but would like to correct 
one point.  The severe problems at TMI didn't not develop in a 
"VERY" short amount of time.  The accident evolved over several 
minutes to hours and although it might not have been preventable 
with quick action there was ample opportunity to correct the 
situation and mitigate the impacts of the accident.

IMHO, the root causes of the accident were a poor safety philosophy 
(which starts with the management) and poor training and preparadness
as a result of that.  

Mike Baker

P.S. I worked for a few years as a civilian engineer in the Naval 
nuclear porgram and if the TMI opperators had been as familiar with 
their plant as the AVERAGE Navy operator I don't believe the 
consequences would have been as severe.
	
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Michael C. Baker, Ph.D.            Safeguards Science and Technology
					Nonproliferation and International 
                                            Security Division
email:  mcbaker@lanl.gov             Los Alamos National Laboratory
Phone:  (505) 667-7334               P.O. Box 1663, Mail Stop E540 	
Fax:    (505) 665-4433                    Los Alamos, NM 87545
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