[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: Realistic training (info) -Reply -Reply



Ken,  Good point.  We have exercised extensively with power plants as well as "Broken Arrow" exercises, but those exercises end following the containment of the release and typically don't involve a detailed approach towards addressing the post-emergency issues ie. the long-term consequences of the accident.  We respond very well to the accident.  We tend to conclude that the post-emergency issues will be handled and finish these exercises without fully developing those issues.  The consequences are not overlooked, but are not fully developed either.  Simply put, power plant exercises are graded events that just do not have the time to go into these issues with any depth.  Like you mentioned, they are discussed in an after-action critique session.  

I know, EPA supports these rad exercises with personnel from our laboratories, Regions and with the group I work with in DC.  However, in all of these exercises, power plants included, the aftermath is not fully addressed.  Questions are left unanswered, e.g. Who will pay for the aftermath?, What are appropriate criteria and standards for this situation?, How will the agriculture and land issues be addressed?, What about the people affected by this accident?, What about restoring the affected economy?, etc.  These are all good questions that are not exercised but left hanging.

My office hopes to explores these aftermath issues with the approaching conference.  It is not enough to assume that the recovery will happen.  Of course it will, how will it occur?  What mechanisms are in place to support the States in their efforts to address these recovery issues?  After all, the States are ultimately responsible for protecting their people, property, economy, and environment.  

This conference is attracting US experts and international persons with direct experience in addressing the aftermath of real events.  Hopefully we will have a good discourse on the issues and focus on the how and what works.  I invite you and any interested party to attend or offer papers to discuss the issues and share your experiences on this subject.

I do not work with the chemical issues involved in emergency responses.  I deal with radiation issues.  EPA has an extensive role with DOE in the FRMAC as well as our role in managing the FRMAC following the response for the long-term monitoring and assessment activities.  EPA also has a role with HHS, USDA and the States on the Advisory Team for Environment, Food and Health in supporting the affected States or Tribes in addressing the technical radiation issues.  My office is the Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Radiation Protection Division, Center for Risk Modeling and Emergency Response.

Charles Blue
Health Physicist/Co-Chair
blue.charles@epamail.epa.gov

PS.  I would like to underscore that accidents involving a large release of radioactive material are highly unlikely due to the competence of professional people who take great pride and care to assure that radioactive materials are used safely.

My opinions are strictly my own and not that of EPA or anyone else.

>>> Kenneth Prendergast <KMP@nrc.gov> 03/11/98 12:05pm >>>
Charles, I am not sure I can agree with your position.  From the commercial world the NRC requires Emergency Plans for necessary facilities and requires routine  EP exercises to test each licensees response.  These exercises usually test response to a rel
ease of material via plume or explosion, and  involve affected state, local, and federal agencies.  We attempted to test all aspects of emergency response.  The exercise include the response from state, local, and federal agencies and included communicati
ons, interfaces with state and local, facilities, dose assessment, command and control, coordination, and etc.  I do not specifically remember any psychological impact being tested, but such factors would be included and examined in the critiques followin
g the exercises. I also participated in FEMA exercises which attempted to involve a total response from EPA, FDA, Law Enforcement, NRC, and NRC.  These were week long exercises conducted in conjunction with the annual exercise!
 which are not biannual and these exercises included the areas below.  Are we ready for a major catastrophe?  I would say that from the nuclear power plant side we were and probably are.   I also know that some Emergency Operations Facilities, are routine
ly used to respond to actual emergencies such as forest fires and floods and that the capabilities for interagency communication and cooperation exist.  Are we ready for a chemical catastrophe and can state and local agencies handle the problem.  Based on
 a limited knowledge of emergency preparedness near refineries in the bay area.  I would state that I don't think so.  Has the oil and chemical industries expended adequate resources, I don't think so. Consequently, I think EPA exercises similar to NRC ex
ercises would be beneficial. .   

>>> CHARLES BLUE <BLUE.CHARLES@EPAMAIL.EPA.GOV> 03/10/98 04:41pm >>>
Excellent point and a major reason that EPA wishes to discuss these types of accidents and the lessons learned from the consequences to develop an overall picture of the post-emergency issues involved from a major release of radioactive material that dire
ctly impacts the public health and the environment.  Such issues includes:

&phgr;	Post-Emergency Management
&phgr;	Regulatory Issues
&phgr;	Agriculture and Land Use Issues
&phgr;	Clean-up Levels
&phgr;	Protective Action Guidance
&phgr;	Political, Social, Psychological and Economic Impacts on Affected Communities
&phgr;	Financial Resources and Funding Mechanisms;
&phgr;	Public Outreach Issues
&phgr;	Technical Issues
&phgr;	Post-Emergency Responses to Actual Events/Exercises/Lessons Learned
&phgr;	Public Health Issues

The United States has a lot of policy, procedures, and plans in place to respond to major accidents/incidents, but we don't have the experience of dealing with these issues like our overseas counterparts unfortunately have.  Just review the plans (Federal
 Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Federal Response Plan, Stafford Act, Price-Anderson Act, National Contingency Plan) and you will see for yourself the depth of detail the US plans and policy goes into to address disaster emergency issues.  They just
 have not been applied to a real major radiological release, therefore; the US does not have the experience in dealing with the issues involved with a major release of radioactive material.  The only event that comes close is TMI.  TMI did not involve a "
real" release of radioactive material, but look at the impact it had on the Nation.  So, EPA is sponsoring an International Radiological Post-Emergency Issues Conference on September 9 - 11, 1998 in Washington, D.C. to generat!
!
!
e discussion on this topic.  Registration is free and it is open to the general public.  For more information, please review our web site at www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/confpage.html.

Charles Blue
Health Physicist/Co-Chair
blue.charles@epamail.epa.gov

the opinions expressed above are my own and not that of EPA or anyone else.


>>> "J. J. Rozental" <josrozen@netmedia.net.il> 03/10/98 02:10pm >>>
At 12:23 PM 3/9/98 -0600, you wrote:
>In my Emergency Preparedness inspections (back in the good old days) , I
recall >some licensees using coleman lantern mantles placed on simulated
patients to add >realism and test capabilities for surveys.  I think you can
still purchase >latern mantles that contain thorium.  I also recall some
facilities that >contracted with a hospital to provide
>99mto04 which is a routinely used short-lived radionuclide.  The technetium was
>diluted and used to simulate area contamination.

>The ususal disclaimers.  KMP@NRC.COM  
>
>

Dear Mr Prendergast and Radsafers, 

       When I sent my message emphasizing that the  training needs to have a
more realistic scenario, I was not considering only the lessons learned as
cause and consequences of the TMI accident, but also and more to the causes
and consequences of the two most serious  nuclear and radiological accidents
to have occurred  to date,  April 86 and September 87. The Chernobyl and
Goiania accidents have resulted in the reexamination of many emergencies
planning principles and practices. The training should not to be addressed
to simulate only a contaminated area, but the capacity to involve all
integrated planning conception that must be activated  in  the
Infrastructure and Functional elements of the Plan. Who among us, have been
trained before in the following legacies of both accidents:
The Legacy of Chernobyl: transboundary consequences; sarcophagus; conflict
of information; contradictory value of release; contradictory value of
consequences; high migration and contamination of soil and structures;
accident not previously predicted in any scenario; fire fighting not well
prepared; psychological impact; human impact.
The Legacy of Goiania: Singular accident that happened in the Center of a
City of more than one million inhabitant;  migration and contamination of
soil; 3,500 cubic meter of Waste, now in a Repository 20 Km from Goiania;
accident not previously predicted in any scenario; total ignorance on the
fundamental of radioactivity by the population; psychological impact, human
impact; 

Many common legacies, including the media misinform and lack of Safety Culture.

I do believe that in your Emergency Preparedness inspections (back in the
good old days), as you mentioned, training for Mitigation, Communication and
Psychological Impact was not  so complex.

J. J. Rozental <josrozen@netmedia.net.il>
Israel