NRC Security Enforcement Policy

["Shawn Googins" <oeniphile@hotmail.com>]

I'd like to comment on this from the perspective of someone who actually 
attended one of the Security workshops (King of Prussia) and discussed 
the proposed security changes.  And I feel betrayed.  This enforcement 
policy is too little (or too much) to late.

1. I absolutely concur with Carol Marcus on this one.

2. At the workshops the overwhelming consensus was that materials below 
100 times Appendix C or about an ALI should not require security beyond 
the normal posting of laboratories (Caution Radioactive Materials, 
labelling of equipment and vials etc.) and doors (not locked doors !!!), 
etc.   And that materials above this quantity should be in locked 
storage.  We also got lots of  "good vibes" about the fact that the 
policy needed to be performance based and that absolute perfection was 
not possible.  Some percentage of error was allowable, etc. etc.  
Consideration was also given to the fact that nothing would deter a 
person who was looking for materials to misuse them, not even a locked 
door.

3.  What has happened with the change in policy is almost entirely 
negative and does nothing except clarify the hunting ground  for 
inspectors.

a) the Q and A's which clouded the issue for inspectors and the 
enforcement people are gone,  thus these quantities are now violations, 
yes "minor" violations but technical violations none the less.  NOT GOOD 
!  Please note that "The staff plans to withdraw this guidance 
(NUREG/CR-6204).  When the guidance is withdrawn, the EGM will be 
modified to include security issues involving quantities less than 
appendix C as minor violations."  Can you believe this!!?

b) it is no longer considered on a per vial basis (as was done by 
inspectors before in practice) but an aggregate quantity of many vials 
(no matter how small the individual activities are).  BAD BAD BAD.

c) the enforcement policy establishes a defacto requirement for a "staff 
awareness, detection (auditing), and corrective action (including 
disciplinary action to detect and deter security violations.  Such a 
program is not a specific regulatory requirement [Well my fellow 
licensees it is now !!], but rather..... Normally, security violations 
that occur despite such a program will be considered isolated. "  If you 
don't have a program to audit security than these minor violations will 
most likely be used to establish programmatic failure and escalated 
enforcement.  What this does is distract the licensee from real 
radiation safety issues and turn it into a police/security force.  This 
impact for a small radiation safety program could be devastating.  This 
says to the licensee that they should exspend time being police and in 
this day and age of dimishing resources, dilute the true intent of a 
radiation program

d)  Finally, the NRC said over and over about how a regulatory change, 
instead of an enforcment guidance or policy, would take years and years.  
Don't buy that one.  I want you all to remember how fast they developed 
and had out for comment the "P-32 Rule" or the 24-48 hour reporting rule 
for "intentional diversion" , however you remember it.  It took them 
about one year.  This was fast !!!  If they expended the same effort on 
changing the security policy we would have a draft rule done and 
comments finished by this time.  They are only interested in doing 
something that they want to do.  And obviously providing true risk based 
regulatory relief is not one of them.  Sorry Joe Ring, but I disagree 
entirely with you on this. While I consider you a gentleman and a great 
help in setting up these workshops with the NRC along with the Howard 
Huges Medical Insitute, In fact little if any good or relief was 
provided to the regulated community.

These opinions are entirely my own and do not represent my employer.


Shawn W. Googins, M.S., CHP



______________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com