RE: RAM security -Reply -Reply

[Charles Willis <CAW@nrc.gov>]

Stephane,

In my opinion, the NRC cannot have great confidence that the security measures
will prevent  MIT and NIH type events.  This is true, in part, because we have not
been able to prevent the theft and misuse of  money, jewels, gold or a host of other
things we try to keep secure.  Another reason for lack of confidence is that we do
not know what happened in these two incidents: was the P-32 owned by NIH or
MIT?  Was the mischief done by an accredited user who would have full access to
the material under the present security system?  Was either of the "victims" also
the villain?  Without answers to such questions, designing a system to prevent
recurrence is a formidable problem.

The reasonable regulatory question is: "is the game worth the candle?"  Or, if you
prefer, what is the cost/benefit ratio?  Clearly, the costs are quite high both in
dollars and in lost efficiency in biomedical research.  The benefits are less obvious.
Such incidents have been so few, about two in many millions of uses of licensed
materials, that reducing the frequency of occurrence is open to question.  The
potential risk reduction also is questionable.  In both instances, the doses were
carefully (?)  chosen to approach or exceed a regulatory limit but to be well below a
level at which deleterious effects would be discernable.  In fact, if these events
were intended to harm the individuals involved, the individuals can be thankful that
radiation was selected as the means of inflicting harm; virtually every laboratory
and every home contains numerous substances that would have been far more
damaging.

As a citizen, my primary concern is about the impact on biomedical research. 
Multitudes are suffering and dieing from a wide range of afflictions for which  cures
are needed.  I do appreciate Merck's contributions to improving health care, but
NIH also is needed.  It seems inappropriate to impede important work for trivial
objectives.  

Charlie Willis
caw@nrc.gov