Nonproliferation

[Philip Hypes <phypes@nis5.lanl.gov>]

I would like to respond to a few of the replies to my nonproliferation
posting.
Pardon the lenth of this posting, but these are important issues.

Franz Schoenhofer wrote "Can anybody define proliferation? Is it stealing
some pCi of 3% enriched uranium-235, 95% enriched uranium, reactor plutonium,
weapons grade plutonium, Pu-238 in smoke detectors and trying to sell it to
some fools? Is it trying to sell natural uranium ore to similar fools?"

As I understand it, the term 'proliferation' usually refers to the
dissimination of
nuclear weapons technology, materials and expertise.  Basically, helping or
allowing a new organization or nation to obtain a nuclear weapon.  When any
oppressive nation or terrorist group takes another step towards obtaining
nuclear weapons, I call that proliferation.  Even without asupercritical chain
reaction, Pu in the in the wrong hands can cause major HP problems, not to
mention large scale public panic (if the aforementioned hands are motivated by
sufficiently devious and intelligent minds).  I for one do not want to rely
on the
continuing absence of imaginative terrorists.

Herr Schoenhofer further writes that "If any state proliferates by selling
bomb
grade plutonium and the technology of making nuclear bombs, then I do not
think either that any health physicists can be involved, but it would be a
question
of politics to prevent this. ...it simply is not possible to produce
enriched uranium
and weapons grade plutonium which will be unaccounted for and not be detected
in countries which have signed this treaty."

I'm not saying that it's the HP's job to prevent a foreign government from
selling
special nuclear material.  I do believe that the HPS and ANS should do
everythingin their power to ensure that the politicians are aware of the
presence
of the danger, what can be done to prevent it, and what should be done if our
preventive measures fail.  It has long been a basic assumption of
nonproliferation
that weapons grade material cannot be produced undetected in any nation.  This
is a good assumption, but relying on that assumption overlooks the vast
quantities
of SNM that are sitting around in the former Soviet Union.  A starving
scientist,
technician, or gaurd who has easy access to unspecified, unaccounted-for
quantities of SNM probably won't spend much time consulting with international
law specialists.

I agree with Herr Schoenhofer that lost Co-60 and Cs-137 pose one of the
greatest radiological threats to public health.  But I cannot agree that we
should
ignore the possibility or terrorist use of non-SNM radioactive materials.
Imagine if
the Turkish scrap dealers had know what they were dealing with, and had a
motive
for using terrorism.  Imagine if they had hidden the source near a local
gathering
point (bus station, market, etc.),  waited for people to show us at local
medical
facilities, and then announced that they would repeat the "attack" at another
similar location if their demands were not met.  Take a moment to look at
it from
a public health/disaster response point of view.  What sort of experts
would you
want to advise you?  What public response would you expect?  What should be
done to stop the terrorists and prevent recurrence?  HPs will be part of
the answer
to all these questions.  This fact, in addition to a professional
obligation to protect
public health, obligates us to do everything we can to prevent both nuclear
proliferation and terrorist use of radioactive nuclides.

Bob Flood wrote "every nation that has attempted to build a nuclear weapon has
succeeded on the first try...I'm not so sure that inventories of
fissionable material
are all that accurate everywhere, and starvation can induce a person to
sell just
about anything."  Not only is he correct, it's safe to say that inventories
do not even
exist everywhere.  It has long been a tenet of nonproliferation that the
biggest hurdle
to building a bomb is obtaining the SNM.  With the availability of
stockpiles of 
uninventoried SNM in the hands of a starving staff, that hurdle becomes
more of a
speed bump.  Are you satisfied with your elected officials' awareness of
this threat
and plans to control it?  Position statements from the HPS and ANS
forwarded to
well chosen political leaders could go a long way towards keeping SNM and
dangerous radioactive materials out of the wrong hands.

Ruth Weiner accurately stated that "It's a long long way from knowing how
an atom
bomb is put together to actually building one that works when your want it
to and
not when you don't, or that works at all."  To quote the Philadelphia
Enquirer:  "At
least 3,000 unpaid and disillusioned Russian scientists with expertise in
weapons
of mass destruction have left the country in the last seven years,
according to U.S.
intelligence estimates. Some have gone to rogue nations trying to build
nuclear-
weapons programs..."  These people know how to build nuclear weapons, and do
it well.

A couple more quotes and then I'll shut up (for now).

"Turkish agents arrested eight men on charges of smuggling nuclear material
from
the former Soviet Union. Posing as buyers, the agents seized about 12
pounds of
uranium 235 and one-quarter ounce of plutonium powder. The material was being
peddled for $1 million by three men from Kazakstan, one from Azerbaijan,
and four
from Turkey."

"Hundreds of tons of nuclear material are stored at Kurchatov, according to
officials,
who admit they have no idea how much. ...Russian officials have acknowledged
keeping some material "off the books," a holdover from security-conscious Cold
War days. They also concede that they have not opened certain containers for
decades to see whether they still contain nuclear material that was previously
inventoried."

Purely my own opinions.

phypes@nis5.lanl.gov

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