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RE: Y2K problems at a Nuke Plant?
I too am nowhere close to being an SRO but as an interested observer, I'd
respectfully note that there was a reason why the NRC required the SPDS in
the first place -- because a contributing factor to the TMI accident was
operator confusion due to key instrumentation being spread all over the
control room.
That said, I reported on the tornado strike at Davis-Besse last year and
know they lost their SPDS as well as the main plant computer for a time,
and no safety-significant problems resulted. That was due largely to proper
operator response, which the operators themselves attributed to intensive
training in the simulator under scenarios including tornado strike and
station blackout. I'm curious to what extent Y2K-type problems are being
incorporated into training scenarios, in the event some bugs don't get
worked out in time?
Mike Mokrzycki
mmokrzycki@ap.org
My opinions only, not those of my employer,
The Associated Press
"Lavera, Ron" <Ron.Lavera@nypa.gov> on 03/03/99 02:20:07 PM
Please respond to radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu
To: Multiple recipients of list
<radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu>
cc: (bcc: Michael Mokrzycki/TheAP)
Subject: RE: Y2K problems at a Nuke Plant?
As a Senior Reactor Operator certified individual, I would like to note
that
while these systems are very useful in indicating the existence and
determination of the extent of a condition, all of the critical plant
parameter monitoring systems have other direct indications for the
operators. Radiation monitors, plant pressure and temperature and other
related parameters remain available to the Control Room Operators.
... Mine and Mine alone ...
Ron LaVera
lavera.r@nypa.gov
-----Original Message-----
From: Richards, David [mailto:david.richards@rfets.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 1999 2:04 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: RE: Y2K problems at a Nuke Plant?
Perhaps, but it is critical to understand that these systems represent the
bulk of the Operator's ability to recognize and evaluate unsafe or
emergency
conditions in plant systems. Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and Emergency
Operation Procedures (EOPs) are based in very large part on the indications
provided by these systems. They are, in essence, the Operator's eyes and
ears.
DJ Richards
Hazards Assessment Team Leader
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
David.Richards@rfets.gov
djrichards@earthlink.net
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Lavera, Ron [SMTP:Ron.Lavera%nypa.gov@inet.rfets.gov]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 1999 10:21 AM
> To: Multiple recipients of list
> Subject: RE: Y2K problems at a Nuke Plant?
>
> While this is not an optimal way to test for Y2K compliance, that is
> testing
> the backup and primary systems instead of just the backup, it is
important
> to note that these systems are data monitoring systems and not active
> control systems.
>
> ... mine and mine alone ...
>
> Ron LaVera
> lavera.r@nypa.gov
>
>
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