[ RadSafe ] NNSA Marks 2-Year Anniversary of Global

Gerry Blackwood gpblackwood at yahoo.com
Thu May 25 07:02:28 CDT 2006


[ Well the NNSA Press shop is doing its thing! " Removing over 200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from facilities worldwide that could have been used to make an improvised nuclear device;" Not to shabby.... just another 905 metric tons either not secured or poorly secured to go! ]  Though at least soemone is doing something.... Keep up the good fight! Gerry
  
NNSA NEWS 
National Nuclear Security Administration 
U.S. Department of Energy 
For Immediate Release 
May 24, 2006 
Contact:  NNSA Public Affairs, (202) 586-7371 
NOTE: A detailed list of accomplishments is attached below.

** Tomorrow, May 25th, the head of GTRI will be available for interviews.  Please call NNSA Public Affairs to arrange. 
NNSA Marks 2-Year Anniversary of Global
Program to Reduce Nuclear Threats
GTRI has secured more than 400 radiological sites around the world
and removed enough material for eight nuclear weapons
        WASHINGTON, D.C. - In the past two years, a key nuclear nonproliferation program of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has removed more than eight nuclear weapons worth of highly enriched uranium, and secured more than 400 radiological sites around the world containing over 6 million curies - enough for approximately 6,000 "dirty bombs."  
NNSA marks the two-year anniversary of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, or GTRI, on Friday.  This program works with partners around the world to reduce the threat posed by high-risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials, which could be used by terrorists to make a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb.
"The Global Threat Reduction Initiative is an important part of the President's 2006 National Security Strategy to protect Americans," Linton F. Brooks, the head of NNSA, said.  "In just two years, GTRI has worked with our international allies to significantly step up international efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials.  The Bratislava agreement between Presidents Bush and Putin has accelerated our efforts to keep dangerous materials out of the hands of terrorists."
GTRI is part of NNSA's multi-layered strategy to decrease the risk of nuclear terrorism.  It is focused on identifying, securing, removing and/or disposing of high-risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials - as quickly and expeditiously as possible - that pose a potential threat to the United States and the international community.  
Highlights of GTRI's progress during the past two years include:  
Ø       Removing over 200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from facilities worldwide that could have been used to make an improvised nuclear device;
Ø       Recovering and securing more than 2,700 excess and unwanted radiological sources located within the United States;
Ø       Converting three research reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium, which can be used in a nuclear weapon, to the use of low enriched uranium; and
Ø       Installing and upgrading physical security at more than 400 sites around the world where vulnerable radiological sources are stored.
Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science.  NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad.    
### 
GTRI: Two Successful Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats
Significant Accomplishments from 2004 to 2006
On May 26, 2004, the National Nuclear Security Administration established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.  GTRI, as it is known, works to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of high risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world, as quickly as possible, that pose a threat to the United States and the international community.
In the past two years, GTRI has removed more than eight nuclear bombs worth of highly enriched uranium and secured more than 400 radiological sites around the world containing over 6 million curies, enough for approximately 6,000 dirty bombs.  
Since its inception two years ago, GTRI has accelerated its nuclear security efforts and made significant progress to reduce the risk posed by vulnerable civilian nuclear and radiological materials, which could be used by terrorists to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device ("dirty bomb").  
GTRI's specific accomplishments to reduce the threat from both nuclear and radiological materials since 2004 include: 
Nuclear Material Threat Reduction 
Accelerated conversion of research reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium 
·       Prior to the creation of GTRI, only two research reactors were converted during the four-year period from 2000 to 2004.  The last U.S. research reactor was converted in 2000 and the last international research reactor was converted in 2004.
·       In fiscal year 2006, alone, six research reactors will be converted to operate with low enriched uranium (LEU) instead of using highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used to make a nuclear weapon.  
o       In the past nine months, three research reactors have been converted to LEU.  The three research reactors are: 
§       The VR-1 Sparrow research reactor at the Czech Technical University in Prague.  (This conversion in October 2005 was the first time a Russian-supplied research reactor was converted to LEU);
§       The HFR Petten reactor in the Netherlands converted in October 2005; and 
§       The IRT critical assembly in Libya converted in January 2006. 
o       Over the next four months, three additional research reactors will be converted.  This includes two U.S. university reactors at the University of Florida and Texas A&M as well as the Russian-supplied IRT-1 research reactor at the Tajoura facility in Libya.  
Accelerated removal of Russian-origin HEU fresh and spent fuel 
·       In the two years prior to the creation of GTRI, only four shipments to remove Russian-origin research reactor fuel took place.
·       Since May 2004, GTRI has doubled the number of shipments to return Russian-origin research reactor fuel.  During the past two years, eight shipments have successfully taken place to remove and return to Russia more than 89 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU.
o       HEU Fresh Fuel:  Four shipments to remove and return 26 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel have taken place since 2004.  These shipments include the return of nuclear material to Russia from:
§       The Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan in September 2004; 
§       The Rez facility in the Czech Republic in December 2004; 
§       The Salaspils facility in Latvia in May 2005; and 
§       The Czech Technical University in the Czech Republic in September 2005.  
o       HEU Spent Fuel:  Four shipments to remove and return 63 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU spent fuel from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan took place from January to April 2006.  
·       As a result of the Bratislava Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation issued by Presidents Bush and Putin in February 2005, GTRI has developed an overall prioritized accelerated schedule of shipments:
o       By the end of 2006, all shipments to return eligible Russian-origin HEU fresh material will be completed; and 
o       By the end of 2010, all shipments to return eligible Russian-origin HEU spent fuel currently stored outside of reactor cores will be completed.
·       In accordance with this accelerated schedule, during the next five months, GTRI is planning to repatriate more than 200 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel from facilities worldwide.
Removal of U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel 
·       Since 2004, more than 78 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU in spent research reactor nuclear fuel was returned to the United States from Germany, Austria, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden.
Removal of "Gap" Material 
·       Significant progress has been made to secure nuclear material that was not covered by other pre-existing nuclear material threat reduction programs.  This material is referred to as "gap" material.
·       More than 35 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU fresh material was safely returned in two shipments from Canada and Belgium. 
·       In addition, in coordination with GTRI, and as a way to encourage collaboration with the private sector, AREVA recently signed contracts for the recovery of more than 85 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU from several facilities within Europe.


Radiological Threat Reduction 
·       Physical protection upgrades have been completed in over 40 countries at more than 400 radiological sites, including industrial, medical, and commercial facilities.  Specifically, during the past two years, GTRI secured 421 vulnerable radiological sites around the world containing over 6,000,000 curies - enough for approximately 6,000 dirty bombs.
·       In the United States, during the past two years, GTRI removed 2,700 at-risk radiological sources totaling 74,350 curies - enough for more than 74 dirty bombs.  
o       This work included recovering over 60,000 curies of Cobalt-60 from several U.S. university irradiators in December 2005, and removing 19 large gammators containing Cesium-137 from one hospital, six universities and five small colleges around the U.S. by October 2005.


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