[ RadSafe ] DHS Tests of Radiation Detectors Were Inconclusive, Report Says

Dan W McCarn hotgreenchile at gmail.com
Thu Mar 6 17:02:44 CST 2008

Dear RadSafers:

I remember an exercise that my senior geologist had me do back in the 1970s:
Perform a follow-up of airborne gamma-spectrometric readings on the ground
to check if any of the anomalies detected could be interpretatively
confirmed.  Thank the lord that I didn't have to go through the Washington
Post to "re-digest" my own findings.  I can only say that the airborne
gamma-spec results were "inconclusive" at identifying anomalies but somewhat
useful to distinguish primary geologic features although my eyeballs were
quite a bit better.  The airborne data were about as useful as interpreting
gamma data from a borehole to understand the geology. Sometimes it's quite
useful but usually far more useful when simultaneously collecting "other"
data as well.

One of the issues about interpreting the data was comparing the pre-flight
calibration factors with the post-flight data and then trying to understand
where a third set of calibration numbers came from that were used to present
the data.  I never did figure that out.

Happily for my senior geologist, I "found" uranium, but not by a gamma
signature 100 meters above the ground with flight lines 5 km apart with data
integrated every couple of seconds.

Dan ii

Dan W McCarn, Geologist
Houston & Albuquerque

-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl [mailto:radsafe-bounces at radlab.nl] On Behalf
Of Clayton J Bradt
Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 9:11 AM
To: radsafe at radlab.nl
Subject: [ RadSafe ] DHS Tests of Radiation Detectors Were Inconclusive,
Report Says

DHS Tests of Radiation Detectors Were Inconclusive, Report Says
By Robert O'Harrow Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, March 5, 2008; D01
Department of Homeland Security tests of new radiation detection machines
last year did not show whether the costly devices performed well enough to
be used as planned at ports and borders to protect the country against
nuclear attacks or dirty bombs, according to a new report about the
The performance tests were organized by the department's Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, which has been trying to deploy the machines along the
borders and at ports in a $1.2 billion project, despite allegations from
government auditors that the office misled Congress about their
effectiveness and later conducted flawed tests to show they worked well.
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff had said the development and
purchase of the machines was a "vital priority" for the department.
Officials from the nuclear detection office had asserted the tests --
mandated by Congress before the project was allowed to move forward --
showed they worked well.
But Chertoff called for an independent team to review the program last
summer after a Washington Post article spelled out questions about the
project. Last fall, Chertoff put the project on hold, conceding that the
machines were not ready for wide use.
In the new report, the review team concluded that the testing last year was
not able to show whether the machines, known as advanced spectroscopic
portal radiation monitors, or ASPs, could "detect and identify actual
objects that might be smuggled" into the country, according to portions of
the report released by Congress.
"Even after collecting all available test results, it was difficult to form
conclusions about operational effectiveness," the report said.
The House Committee on Homeland Security will hold a hearing today about
the report and other testing by the nuclear detection office. Among those
scheduled to testify is Vayl S. Oxford, director of the office.
"While I applaud the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office for its aggressive
pursuit of new detection technologies, I still remain deeply concerned that
the systems have not been properly tested and evaluated," said Rep. Jim
Langevin (D-R.I.), chairman of the Homeland Security Committee's
subcommittee on emerging threats, cyber-security and science and
At the same time, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce issued a news
release calling on the department to transfer testing responsibilities from
the nuclear detection office to an independent group.
"We should not spend a single penny to install these machines at our ports
and borders until valid testing is done to demonstrate that these costly
new machines work significantly better than the existing radiation
detectors," said Rep. John D. Dingell (D-Mich.), the committee chairman.
The project to buy as many as 1,400 ASPs, which cost about $377,000 each,
was announced in July 2006. A month later, Government Accountability Office
auditors said the nuclear detection office greatly exaggerated the
machine's capabilities in a report that spurred congressional approval of
the project.
In response to those allegations, Congress mandated that Chertoff take the
unusual step of personally certifying that the detectors represent a
significant advance over existing detection equipment.
With that certification in mind, the nuclear detection office conducted
tests in Nevada early last year. Those tests were called into question when
GAO auditors found that department officials had allowed contractors to
conduct "dress rehearsals" and calibrate their machines in anticipation of
the tests.
The review team's report discounted the auditor's findings that the tests
were biased. The team also said it found no evidence the test data were
No comment.

Clayton J. Bradt
dutchbradt at hughes.net

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