No subject

Mon Mar 7 21:29:35 CST 2011

the end of nuclear weapons but has morphed into the elimination of all =
things nuclear and perhaps radioactive from life =E2=80=93 I do wonder =
how many of them have stopped eating bananas =E2=80=93  note the =
admiration for the infamous pseudoscientist Sternglass!




Reply from one member=20


I don't have a copy of The New Yorker article, but this from an upcoming =
article that includes info on TMI:

The President=E2=80=99s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island =
mandated the Public=E2=80=99s Right to Know Task Force to investigate =
the accident. The Task Force (1979) performed a content analysis of mass =
media coverage on the TMI accident, finding among other issues, the =
press misreported radiation releases. Moreover, the Task Force revealed =
the press secretary to the governor of Pennsylvania ordered the Bureau =
of Radiation Protection =E2=80=9Cto stop talking to the press about the =
accident=E2=80=9D (p. 215). The Task Force also found:=20

*	At the time of the accident, there no disaster plan was in place at =
TMI (p. 3).
*	The NRC and MetEd (who ran the plant) made no provision for getting =
information from the people who had it, to the people who needed it =
=E2=80=93 it was often mistaken for a cover-up (p. 4).
*	Certain kinds of information were not released as MetEd wanted to =
=E2=80=9Cconfirm=E2=80=9D information before it was released to both the =
public and regulators. The Task Force found there was a =E2=80=9Cmarked =
capacity for self deception=E2=80=9D (p. 7).
*	Due to MetEd=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Clack of forthrightness,=E2=80=9D the =
state of PA and the NRC =E2=80=9Cformed an alliance=E2=80=9D against the =
utility; there was no plan in place to provide information to concerned =
parties as the accident unfolded (p. 54).

I also have uploaded to my blog - via Dr. Judy Johnsrud - reports from =
Drs. Sternglass and MacLeod RE TMI and health risks. They are at my =
blog:  <> =

to this post by another -


Yesterday I posted to this list the observation that the "can't happen =
here" nonsense of the nuke-boosters partly rests on the exceptionalist =
(not to say racist) notion that the Japanese authorities have not been =
forthcoming with information (true enough, in the first week), which is =
needed by those same shameless snake-oil peddlers to make the case that =
lack of appropriate response and lack of openness are a product of =
Japanese government opacity if not mendacity, themselves symptoms of the =
larger Nippon culture, which puts a high premium on closet existence. My =
post was in response to the nearly-toxic-as-plutonium LA Times 3/24 =
article shared with us yesterday by BobRigg, for which thanks. I see =
that article as part of a larger campaign to lull us back into =
complacency, into our same old "can't happen here" comfort zone.

With the 32nd anniversary of Three Mile Island just 3 days away, and =
with the Fukushima crisis already becoming a northeastern Japan crisis, =
and soon perhaps to become a world crisis, now is the time to strike the =
iron by placing op ed pieces reminding the public that, whatever the =
nukesters may be saying, the truth of the matter is that what we are =
seeing today in Japan is actually much closer to full disclosure than =
what we're seeing from both Met Ed and the NRC immediately after the =
1979 "event" at TMI. And, what momentary gains in the direction of =
openness as were achieved under Carter were wiped out a few years later =
by the ascendancy of the GE hitman to the White House. By 1983 it was =
back to business as usual.

Right now all of us -- especially those of us in countries where the =
powers that be are promoting the delusional concept that Japan is =
"exceptional" -- should be putting it out there: must we learn all over =
again the hard lessons of Three Mile Island? How many more "anomalies" =
must occur before we are done with this cruel mendacity? Fukushima is =
not a one-in-a-million long shot, but rather a replay of TMI, perhaps =
with coming consequences on a Chernobyl scale.

I must preclude anyone's saying that my intent is to propose that the =
nuclear regime is quick with accurate information. No, there is still =
stonewalling on Monju, MOX suicide and many other items on their plate. =
I am only arguing that the Japanese authorities are doing no worse than =
the Obama regime (is the Yucca Mountain turn-around the only time Barack =
has made good on election promises?) when it comes to the incident that =
now holds the world's attention.

And, if anyone knows where the article I refer to below may be found, =
please share it with all of us ASAP. Many thanks.

On 2011/3/26 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=88 03:03, XXXX wrote:=20

Dear Dr. Miles,=20
I just wanted to thank you for pointing this out.=20
It had been difficult for a Japanese national to do it, fearing that =
people might see me as trying to excuse "our" government and the =
company.  To me, it's "us" only in the sense of bearing responsibility =
to criticize and rectify this "culture" in Japan.=20

Dear XXXX,

Thanks so much, for it is a great thing -- don't you agree? -- if we can =
overcome what we have been taught, each in our own way, to the effect =
that we are so "different", saying that what we are experiencing right =
now is a problem unique to a particular culture or country? You are a =
researcher of peace, judging by your title. Myself, I am teaching =
Chinese-to-English translation at a graduate school at Fu Jen Catholic =
University in Taiwan, where more and more I am learning (they call it =
"teaching" when in fact it is "learning") that in all things we are =
really not so different. "It can't happen here" seems to be a universal =
credo common to the nuke-boosting community at large, and now being =
propagated with a vengeance.

Do you know that, not too long after Three Mile Island, a couple of =
Japanese reporters went to the United States and looked at the =
epidemiological statistics for infant mortality in the eastern United =
States -- Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York -- county by county, =
then published their findings in a long report in The New Yorker =
magazine? The health demographics were clear enough, yet shortly =
thereafter the government wasted no time in pulling out all stops to =
ensure that the evidence would be erased forever. How? By making all =
such county-by-county hospital stats impossible to access. In other =
words, the evidence uncovered by the Japanese team was published using =
county-by-county hospital statistics on infant mortality, showing a =
significant increase in the fatality rate, only to have the government =
step in and change the rules such that county-by-county stats would no =
longer be available. (Presumably it was too soon after the accident to =
be able to come up with meaningful cancer stats.)

I went to The New Yorker website in search of the article but couldn't =
find it when I put "Three Mile Island" into their on-site search engine. =
Now I am wondering if I misremember. Could it have been The Atlantic? In =
any case, there definitely was such an article, quite long, quite =
detailed. I remember it because it so impressed me at the time that it =
came out that I cut the article out and pasted it onto A4 pages and made =
copies for distribution. This was while I was living in Osaka, and I =
distributed it around to people, because it marshaled the evidence in =
such comprehensive fashion, making it pretty much an irrefutable, =
slam-dunk presentation of the evidence for the idea that, contrary to =
what the mass media was saying (no practical health consequences for =
people living downwind from the site), the effect could be proven using =
hospital statistics. It would be really great if I could find that =
article today.=20

Anyway, what I DID find was another article, dated April 1981, in The =
New Yorker. Since I don't have a subscription I can only see the =
abstract. It makes the point, however, that the "can't happen here" =
mentality we are seeing today was very much a factor in 1979 in the USA, =
leading to a lack of preparedness on all fronts, both within the utility =
and within the NRC:

ABSTRACT: REPORTER AT LARGE about the inadequacy of safety precautions =
in nuclear power plants and the accident on 3/28/79 at Three Mile =
Island. The latter is one of nine electric-generating plants in the U.S. =
that use nuclear reactor equipment designed and manufactured by Babcock =
and Wilcox. Writer tells about data accumulated in the files of the =
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on these nine reactors. It suggests a =
pattern of safety problems seemingly inherent in Babcock and Wilcox =
designs. Tells about accidents at some of the plants using these =
reactors and how warnings about their performance were ignored. It's =
been tacit NRC policy not to aggressively pursue safety questions that =
could have adverse economic impact on the nuclear-power industry. The =
agency's tolerant attitude toward newly discovered safety problems has =
also been influenced by a general complacency after years of seeing such =
problems come and go, about the risk that one of them might grow into a =
serious accident. They believed that such accidents just "couldn't =
happen." The NRC's inaction is also the result of the philosophy of =
industry self-regulation. The accident at Three Mile Island brought =
together what had become familiar themes from years of experience in =
operating Babcock and Wilcox reactors. All that was unique was the =
combination of events: individual events that had happened repeatedly, =
but separately, happened together in one culminating debacle. Today the =
NRC has done "virtually nothing" to carry out recommendations to improve =
regulation of the American nuclear-power industry.


This article appeared two years after TMI -- too early to be able to =
make note of the fact that the new regulatory mechanisms put in place by =
President Carter in 1979~80 were undone by President Reagan in 1983. =
Things returned to "normal." Although a search on the string "Three Mile =
Island" did not turn up the article I was looking for (leading me to =
wonder if perhaps it was The Atlantic or Harpers, and not The New =
Yorker), I DID manage to turn up some other articles from the period =
1979~1981 which make the point abundantly clear that both the plant =
operators and the NRC were (1) confused about what was really happening =
in real time for the first few days, (2) as the situation became clear =
to them, they were very slow to share what little they DID know with the =
public, so all kinds of "alarmist" stories showed up in the media. You =
might want to do a search of The New Yorker on the string "Three Mile =
Island" and read the several abstracts from that time period (the full =
articles would be welcome; if you have access, could you share them with =

Readily available in the public domain is this Wikipedia article =
<> , also making =
the same points: slowness of the authorities to come to grips with the =
reality followed by slowness to share with the public what what little =
they did know. Just two excerpts:

The scope and complexity of the accident became clear over the course of =
five days, as employees of Met Ed, Pennsylvania state officials, and =
members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) tried to =
understand the problem, communicate the situation to the press and local =
community, decide whether the accident required an emergency evacuation, =
and ultimately end the crisis. The NRC's authorization of the release of =
40,000 gallons of radioactive waste water directly in the Susquehanna =
River led to a loss of credibility with the press and community.


Angry that Met Ed had not informed them before conducting a steam =
venting from the plant and convinced that the company was downplaying =
the severity of the accident, state officials turned to the NRC. After =
receiving word of the accident from Met Ed, the NRC had activated its =
emergency response headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland and sent staff =
members to Three Mile Island. NRC chairman Joseph Hendrie and =
commissioner Victor Gilinsky initially viewed the accident, in the words =
of NRC historian Samuel Walker, as a "cause for concern but not alarm". =
Gilinsky briefed reporters and members of Congress on the situation and =
informed White House staff, and at 10 a.m. met with two other =
commissioners. However, the NRC faced the same problems in obtaining =
accurate information as the state, and was further hampered by being =
organizationally ill-prepared to deal with emergencies, as it lacked a =
clear command structure and the authority to tell the utility what to =
do, or to order an evacuation of the local area.

All for now, thanks.

Peace, Lynn

+886 939 188828 / +886 3 4702473 Lynn Miles =E6=A2=85=E5=BF=83=E6=80=A1
"It is the Prince's bidding that twelve times the delightfulness of =
fluent streams should ripple throughout that glorious land." =E2=80=94 =
Bradley, The Phoenix=20






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