[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: C.A. Beard (LANL) letter on MOX for Chalk
RADSAFERS:
Please
help me to clarify my understanding of Carl Beard's letter below.
(1)
The U.S. Government pays the Russian government cash (U.S. dollars) for
its excess weapons grade plutonium. (How much money did the U.S.
Taxpayers pay to Russia in this transaction?)
(2)
The U.S. DOE funds Los Alamos National Laboratory for develop a process
for the incorporation of the Russian weapons grade Pu into mixed oxide
fuel (MOX). (How many U.S. taxpayer dollars did DOE pay LANL to
accomplish this?)
(3)
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, at the time of this Russian
weapons grade Pu non-proliferation effort, did not have an approved MOX
fuel design for U.S. light-water power reactors; therefore, LANL's MOX
design focused on making MOX fuel rods for Canadian CANDU reactors.
(4)
Canada will be the ultimate benefactor of this Pu non-proliferation
effort because Canada will get MOX fuel for free from the United States,
be able to use it to produce electrical power for Canadians, and if
Canadian reactors sometimes sell electrical power to the U.S. power grid,
some American taxpaying electricity consumers will have the
"opportunity" to pay additional dollars back to Canada for
electrical power that was generated with "free" MOX that
originally came from the United States!
Doesn't it
strike you that there is something wrong with the above picture? It
seems that the U.S. taxpayers are doing all the "paying" and
the Canadians getting virtually all of the benefits at U.S. taxpayers
expense!
Weapons
grade Pu (>93% Pu-239) that both the United States and Russia have,
cost the taxpayers of both countries many dollars and rubles to
originally produce. Weapons-grade Pu is rather analogous to the
gold bars setting in Ft. Knox or in Swiss bank vaults--those gold bars
took much sweat and taxpayer dollars to mine, refine, and safeguard in a
safe repository. But rather than treat weapons grade Pu as a
similar national "treasure"/resource by placing this material
in a safe, secure repository, the U.S. government has only the idea of
either burying the stuff or diluting it into MOX fuel where after
burn-up, the Pu-239 will at best be in the form of only
"reactor-grade" Pu. I am, therefore, NOT one of those
"many people in the United States" who, as Beard alleges, favor
declaring a national treasure to be "waste" worthy only of a
pauper's burial.
I realize
that there is a major difference between Au and Pu--Au does not sustain a
nuclear chain reaction nor does it go critical or supercritical,
etc. But weapons grade Pu, in the form of a mere "pit,"
does not, by itself, make a mushroom. Even a "pit" must
be married up with very sophisticated, highly safeguarded and controlled
technology to be a "weapon" capable of making a mushroom.
Please
clarify my understanding if you think anything I have said above is
unfair or irrational.
Best
regards David
At 09:46 AM 01/21/2000 -0600, you wrote:
FYI,
> Friday, January 21, 2000
> How the plutonium lift helped the world
> Canada, working with the U.S. and Russia, solved an impasse
> Carl A. Beard
> National Post (CANADA)
> In the waning days of the Cold War, the United States and Russia
agreed to
> dramatic reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Missiles were
destroyed,
> but the plutonium inside them was not. Both countries have simply
put it
> in storage.
> This is not a problem in the United States, where plutonium stocks
are
> well guarded. But in Russia, which employs a tattered security
system, the
> situation is different. Many Russian plutonium storage facilities
adopted
> primitive security methods, such as placing wax seals on doors to
detect
> trespassing and theft. The possibility of terrorists or rogue
states
> stealing plutonium is very real.
> Canada, though not a nuclear power itself, is doing something about
the
> problem. The recent shipment of a small quantity of plutonium from
the
> United States is part of that effort. If the Canadian project
proceeds
> according to ambition, more than 100 tonnes of weapons-grade
plutonium
> from the United States and Russia may eventually be processed.
> Why is Canada's participation necessary? The answer lies with
the
> lingering distrust and disagreement between the U.S. and Russia.
> Many in the U.S. favour a plutonium disposal process whereby
plutonium is
> mixed with radioactive waste and buried. The Russians, on the other
hand,
> see their plutonium as an asset that should be converted into fuel
for
> energy-producing nuclear reactors. Every kilowatt of electricity
the
> Russians generate with nuclear power permits them to sell more
fossil fuel
> abroad. But the U.S. has opposed converting the plutonium to nuclear
fuel
> for security reasons. When plutonium is used in nuclear reactors, it
is
> degraded but not destroyed. It can still be recovered and used to
power
> crude weapons.
> And so, by 1996, the situation had become deadlocked.
> Then, scientists from Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., in conjunction
with
> partners at Ontario Hydro and Zircatec, developed a bold idea: The
U.S.
> and Russia could transform their plutonium into nuclear fuel and
ship it
> to Canada, where it would be used to produce electricity and
then
> disposed, without further recycling, under full International
Atomic
> Energy Agency safeguards. Canada would effectively become a
plutonium
> escrow agent under an arrangement that would make both countries
happy.
> The Russians would be paid for their plutonium, giving them cash for
a
> fuel they do not have the technology or resources to fully
exploit
> themselves. The U.S. would be assured the plutonium -- both its own
and
> Russia's -- would never be stolen.
> The plutonium transported into Canada by helicopter last Friday
--
> destined for a test reactor at Chalk River -- was part of this plan.
The
> shipment marked the largest elimination of weapons-grade plutonium
to
> date, and I am proud to say I was part of the group of scientists at
Los
> Alamos National Laboratory that fabricated that fuel from a
dismantled
> nuclear weapon. Working hand in hand with our colleagues from AECL
and in
> conjunction with scientists in Russia, we have been able to make the
world
> a little safer. Without Canadian involvement this would not have
happened.
>
> And what of the dangers associated with plutonium and its transport
from
> New Mexico to Canada?
> Plutonium is shipped under extraordinary safety measures. Release is
next
> to impossible. And even if plutonium were released, what would
happen?
> In the early part of this decade, a study was conducted at Los
Alamos
> National Laboratory on 26 workers who had been exposed to plutonium
during
> their work on the Manhattan Project in the 1940s. As of 1992, 19
were
> still living, 46 years after the exposure occurred. Moreover, this
group
> did not exhibit any diseases (including cancer) at rates higher than
the
> general public.
> These results are hardly consistent with the idea that the workers
had
> been exposed to "the most toxic substance known to man."
> But make no mistake, plutonium is dangerous ... not because of
the
> possibility that it might be accidentally released in transit, but
because
> of the possibility that it might be intentionally released in
the
> detonation of a nuclear weapon.
> Thanks to Canadian participation, that risk will be lessened
considerably.
>
> Dr. Carl A. Beard is an assistant professor at the University of
Texas at
> Austin. He has also worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory, where
he was
> Project Leader for Nuclear Fuels Research and Development
activities
>
>
************************************************************************
The RADSAFE Frequently Asked Questions list, archives and
subscription
information can be accessed at
http://www.ehs.uiuc.edu/~rad/radsafe.html
DAVID W. LEE
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Radiation Protection Services, ESH-12
X-Ray/Source Control Team Leader
ESH-12, MS K483
Los Alamos, NM 87545
PH: (505) 667-8085
FAX: (505) 667-9726
lee_david_w@lanl.gov