RE: C.A. Beard (LANL) letter on MOX for Chalk

["Eric Cowdrey" <ericc@cancercare.mb.ca>]

Regarding David Lee's comments:

The key to understanding the Canadian involvement appears to be the
statement concerning "...the lingering distrust and disagreement between the
US and Russia" in Dr. Beard's
letter.

It would, of course, be preferable to have the two nuclear weapon states
agree on a solution to reduce their stocks of nuclear weapons and associated
materials and then implement the agreed strategy themselves without the need
for third party involvement. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be
possible at the current time.

Canada is a non-nuclear weapon state that has the nuclear technology and
reputation to act as a responsible third party, acceptable to both the US
and Russia in this important matter. While some financial benefit for Canada
may result, I think the desire to make the world a safer place through the
elimination of nuclear weapons is the priority consideration.

**************************************************************

Eric Cowdrey
Radiation Protection Officer
Department of Medical Physics
CancerCare Manitoba
100 Olivia Street
Winnipeg, Manitoba    R3E 0V9
CANADA

Tel (204) 787-2166
Fax (204) 775-1684
e-mail ericc@cancercare.mb.ca


-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu
[mailto:radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu]On Behalf Of David W Lee
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2000 3:20 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: C.A. Beard (LANL) letter on MOX for Chalk


RADSAFERS:

         Please help me to clarify my understanding of Carl Beard's letter
below.

         (1)  The U.S. Government pays the Russian government cash (U.S.
dollars) for its excess weapons grade plutonium.  (How much money did the
U.S. Taxpayers pay to Russia in this transaction?)

         (2)  The U.S. DOE funds Los Alamos National Laboratory for develop
a process for the incorporation of the Russian weapons grade Pu into mixed
oxide fuel (MOX).  (How many U.S. taxpayer dollars did DOE pay LANL to
accomplish this?)

         (3)  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, at the time of this
Russian weapons grade Pu non-proliferation effort, did not have an approved
MOX fuel design for U.S. light-water power reactors; therefore, LANL's MOX
design focused on making MOX fuel rods for Canadian CANDU reactors.

         (4)  Canada will be the ultimate benefactor of this Pu
non-proliferation effort because Canada will get MOX fuel for free from the
United States, be able to use it to produce electrical power for Canadians,
and if Canadian reactors sometimes sell electrical power to the U.S. power
grid, some American taxpaying electricity consumers will have the
"opportunity" to pay additional dollars back to Canada for electrical power
that was generated with "free" MOX that originally came from the United
States!

         Doesn't it strike you that there is something wrong with the above
picture?  It seems that the U.S. taxpayers are doing all the "paying" and
the Canadians getting virtually all of the benefits at U.S. taxpayers
expense!

         Weapons grade Pu (>93% Pu-239) that both the United States and
Russia have, cost the taxpayers of both countries many dollars and rubles
to originally produce.  Weapons-grade Pu is rather analogous to the gold
bars setting in Ft. Knox or in Swiss bank vaults--those gold bars took much
sweat and taxpayer dollars to mine, refine, and safeguard in a safe
repository.  But rather than treat weapons grade Pu as a similar national
"treasure"/resource by placing this material in a safe, secure repository,
the U.S. government has only the idea of either burying the stuff or
diluting it into MOX fuel where after burn-up, the Pu-239 will at best be
in the form of only "reactor-grade" Pu.  I am, therefore, NOT one of those
"many people in the United States" who, as Beard alleges, favor declaring a
national treasure to be "waste" worthy only of a pauper's burial.

         I realize that there is a major difference between Au and Pu--Au
does not sustain a nuclear chain reaction nor does it go critical or
supercritical, etc.  But weapons grade Pu, in the form of a mere "pit,"
does not, by itself, make a mushroom.  Even a "pit" must be married up with
very sophisticated, highly safeguarded and controlled technology to be a
"weapon" capable of making a mushroom.

         Please clarify my understanding if you think anything I have said
above is unfair or irrational.

         Best regards  David



At 09:46 AM 01/21/2000 -0600, you wrote:

>FYI,
>
> > Friday, January 21, 2000
> > How the plutonium lift helped the world
> > Canada, working with the U.S. and Russia, solved an impasse
> > Carl A. Beard
> > National Post (CANADA)
> > In the waning days of the Cold War, the United States and Russia agreed
to
> > dramatic reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Missiles were destroyed,
> > but the plutonium inside them was not. Both countries have simply put it
> > in storage.
> > This is not a problem in the United States, where plutonium stocks are
> > well guarded. But in Russia, which employs a tattered security system,
the
> > situation is different. Many Russian plutonium storage facilities
adopted
> > primitive security methods, such as placing wax seals on doors to detect
> > trespassing and theft. The possibility of terrorists or rogue states
> > stealing plutonium is very real.
> > Canada, though not a nuclear power itself, is doing something about the
> > problem. The recent shipment of a small quantity of plutonium from the
> > United States is part of that effort. If the Canadian project proceeds
> > according to ambition, more than 100 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium
> > from the United States and Russia may eventually be processed.
> > Why is Canada's participation necessary? The answer lies with the
> > lingering distrust and disagreement between the U.S. and Russia.
> > Many in the U.S. favour a plutonium disposal process whereby plutonium
is
> > mixed with radioactive waste and buried. The Russians, on the other
hand,
> > see their plutonium as an asset that should be converted into fuel for
> > energy-producing nuclear reactors. Every kilowatt of electricity the
> > Russians generate with nuclear power permits them to sell more fossil
fuel
> > abroad. But the U.S. has opposed converting the plutonium to nuclear
fuel
> > for security reasons. When plutonium is used in nuclear reactors, it is
> > degraded but not destroyed. It can still be recovered and used to power
> > crude weapons.
> > And so, by 1996, the situation had become deadlocked.
> > Then, scientists from Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., in conjunction with
> > partners at Ontario Hydro and Zircatec, developed a bold idea: The U.S.
> > and Russia could transform their plutonium into nuclear fuel and ship it
> > to Canada, where it would be used to produce electricity and then
> > disposed, without further recycling, under full International Atomic
> > Energy Agency safeguards. Canada would effectively become a plutonium
> > escrow agent under an arrangement that would make both countries happy.
> > The Russians would be paid for their plutonium, giving them cash for a
> > fuel they do not have the technology or resources to fully exploit
> > themselves. The U.S. would be assured the plutonium -- both its own and
> > Russia's -- would never be stolen.
> > The plutonium transported into Canada by helicopter last Friday --
> > destined for a test reactor at Chalk River -- was part of this plan. The
> > shipment marked the largest elimination of weapons-grade plutonium to
> > date, and I am proud to say I was part of the group of scientists at Los
> > Alamos National Laboratory that fabricated that fuel from a dismantled
> > nuclear weapon. Working hand in hand with our colleagues from AECL and
in
> > conjunction with scientists in Russia, we have been able to make the
world
> > a little safer. Without Canadian involvement this would not have
happened.
> >
> > And what of the dangers associated with plutonium and its transport from
> > New Mexico to Canada?
> > Plutonium is shipped under extraordinary safety measures. Release is
next
> > to impossible. And even if plutonium were released, what would happen?
> > In the early part of this decade, a study was conducted at Los Alamos
> > National Laboratory on 26 workers who had been exposed to plutonium
during
> > their work on the Manhattan Project in the 1940s. As of 1992, 19 were
> > still living, 46 years after the exposure occurred. Moreover, this group
> > did not exhibit any diseases (including cancer) at rates higher than the
> > general public.
> > These results are hardly consistent with the idea that the workers had
> > been exposed to "the most toxic substance known to man."
> > But make no mistake, plutonium is dangerous ... not because of the
> > possibility that it might be accidentally released in transit, but
because
> > of the possibility that it might be intentionally released in the
> > detonation of a nuclear weapon.
> > Thanks to Canadian participation, that risk will be lessened
considerably.
> >
> > Dr. Carl A. Beard is an assistant professor at the University of Texas
at
> > Austin. He has also worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory, where he
was
> > Project Leader for Nuclear Fuels Research and Development activities


DAVID W. LEE
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Radiation Protection Services, ESH-12
X-Ray/Source Control Team Leader
ESH-12, MS K483
Los Alamos, NM  87545
PH:   (505) 667-8085
FAX:  (505) 667-9726
lee_david_w@lanl.gov



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