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RADSAFERs may be interetsed in the following
WHO Expert Team Winds Up Kosovo Visit on DU
Date:
Mon, 5 Feb 2001 15:26:09 -0500
Reply-To: International Justice Watch Discussion
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From:
"Joann
E. Kingsley" <joann_e_kingsley@HOTMAIL.COM>
Subject: WHO Findings on DU in Kosovo
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Looks like the WHO investigation results do not support the
contentions
about leukemia and other diseases among KFOR troops. Also,
they found no
traces of plutonium thus far.
The lead contamination in Mitrovica (see #8) seems to pose a more
immediate
and discernible threat.
Full report is due out within a week or so.
Joann
Kingsley
=====================================================================
1 February 2001
WHO Expert Team Winds Up Kosovo Visit on DU
PRISTINA---At the request of UNMIK, a four person team from WHO has been
in
Kosovo since 22 January, 2001, assessing any possible
health
consequences arising from the use of depleted uranium (DU) in the
shell tips
of bombs used by NATO during the war. The team was asked to
present their
conclusions and recommendations as quickly as possible so UNMIK
can take any
necessary action to deal with depleted uranium sites.
The team extensively reviewed all available information, visited
DU
sites, and met with a wide range of organizations including health units
and
hospitals, KFOR contingents, medical and environmental NGOS and
agencies,
and various UN and other organizations with a direct interest in
depleted
uranium. On 31 January they presented a draft report to Tom
Koenigs,
DSRSG-Civil Administration. The final report will be released from
WHO
Headquarters in a week. But the general
conclusions and
recommendations are listed below.
Conclusions of the WHO Experts Team:
1. Depleted uranium is only weakly
radioactive and emits about 40% less
radioactivity than a similar mass of
natural uranium.
2. Scientific and medical studies have not
proven a link between
exposure to depleted uranium and the onset of cancers,
congenital
abnormalities or serious toxic chemical effects on organs. Caution
has been
expressed by scientists who would like to see larger body of
independent
(i.e. non-military) funded studies to confirm the current
viewpoint.
3. Soldiers, particularly those at the site
of an attack, are the
most likely to have inhaled uranium metal and oxides in
dusts and smoke.
Except possibly in isolated instances, the general
population likely would
have not have encountered DU in this manner.
4. The presence of plutonium in the
depleted uranium used in Kosovo has
not been detected so far by laboratories
analysing samples from DU sites.
5. No firm medical evidence was found by
the team to link
individual medical cases in Kosovo to exposure to depleted
uranium.
6. The present health information system on
non-communicable
diseases in Kosovo is in a state of chaos in spite of the
best efforts
of many people.
7. There is a prevailing tendency, in the
absence of a functioning
health information system and reliable population
data, to speculate that
each individual medical case may indicate a rising
trend of illness.
8. The presence of high levels of lead in
people in the Mitrovica
region and the lack of means to implement a strategy
for the long-term
reduction of exposure to lead, together with the alarmingly
high rate of
traffic-related deaths, were both observed by the team to
require urgent
attention by UNMIK and other organisations. Depleted uranium
issues are
small in comparison to these involuntary causes of death or
incapacity.
9. For a typical type of attack site on
soft soil only a very small
fraction of the depleted uranium from the
penetrators is likely to exist in
the form of uranium oxides or metallic dust
on the surface. Even if
dispersed, it would likely become diluted to
background concentrations. It
is not very soluble. So, even if some were
ingested only a tiny percentage
is likely to be absorbed in the body and even
then, most what is absorbed
would be eliminated from the body through the
kidneys.
10. Over 70% of the depleted uranium penetrators at a typical
attack
site on soft soil are likely to still be in solid form and buried
at
depths of up to 3 m., isolated from human contact.
11. The corrosion and degradation of depleted uranium in solid
metallic
form occurs slowly over hundreds of years. For example, in soil
containing
1.4 t of natural uranium per square kilometre, the entire,
gradual
degradation of depleted uranium at the illustrative attack site would
only
add about 5% to the natural uranium.
12. The only sites where higher percentages of depleted uranium may
be at
the surface are those with hard ground surfaces. These should
be
regarded as the priority locations if or when any remedial measures
were
considered.
13. The most likely way civilians could come into contact with
depleted
uranium is through picking up objects from the ground. Consequently,
routine
measures to remove depleted uranium objects from the ground surface
would be
beneficial.
14. The likelihood of depleted uranium entering agricultural
products
is not known but can reasonably be expected to be small given that
most of
the depleted uranium is in a solid, very slow degrading metallic
form.
15. The likelihood of depleted uranium contaminating drinking
water
supplies is unlikely.
Recommendations:
1. Preparation of useful and realistic
information on depleted uranium
for distribution to the general
public.
2. Encouragement of the public understanding that
penetrators should be
treated with caution in the same way as any other type
of munitions. The
public should be advised that if a penetrator is
found, it be reported to
the authorities in the same manner as mines and
unexploded ordnance.
3.Reinforce the terms of reference of the
Department of Health and
Social Welfare Commission of Kosovar Experts to
ensure that it is a
focus of an emerging technical capacity within Kosovo to
advise UNMIK in the
future.
4.Utilise the Commission of
Experts to bring together the local,
regional and international bodies to
agree a common approach for an
improved medical data recording system
for Kosovo. This is urgently
required. A comprehensive health information
system should be operational as
soon as possible.
5. Mass
screening of the population is not recommended on the basis
of evidence found
in the literature, deductions made by the mission
team, and respected advice
that was received. The team is sensitive to the
strong beliefs held by some
members of the public. If these beliefs persist
then a more limited testing
regime could be considered based on a medical
referral by a local
doctor.
6. The creation of an immediate, separate, cleanup
programme at
depleted uranium sites is not recommended. Site surface cleanup
should,
whenever possible, be part of planned, routine de-mining
activities. The
buried penetrators are unlikely to decompose quickly
and hence, their
addition to the natural
environmental abundance of total
uranium in soil will be small.
7. Facilities should be made
available to include the measurement of
uranium in routine drinking water
quality samples taken by IPH for
public health monitoring purposes.
Longer-term Recommendations:
1.UNMIK should make a firm commitment to recording and
assessing all
forms of medical illness and prepare six-monthly public reports
on the
incidence of all forms of illness initiated by whatever cause.
2.Future environmental assessment and development planning
measures
initiated by UNMIK should ensure that potential developers near or
at
former attack sites are made aware of the possibility of buried
munitions.
They should be given clear instructions on who should be notified
if
ordnance is unearthed.
Fred
Dawson
_________________________________________________________________
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