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RE: Terrorists with Nukes [ANOTHER New Scientist article]





New Scientist

1900 GMT, 30 May 2001

Rob Edwards

New Scientist Online News

http://www.newscientist.com/dailynews/news.jsp?id=ns9999811



WORST NIGHTMARE

Terrorists could easily make an atomic bomb from MOX fuel, says a

confidential report



Exclusive from New Scientist magazine



Terrorists could easily make a crude atomic bomb from MOX fuel produced at

British Nuclear 

Fuels' new plant in north-west England, according to a confidential report

submitted 

to the British government and seen by New Scientist.



The report comes as the state-owned company is trying to get the

government's go-ahead to make 

MOX, a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxide, for reactor operators in

Europe and Japan.



Although the MOX plant, at Sellafield in Cumbria, was completed in 1996, the

government has postponed authorising its start-up because of doubts over its

economic viability. Last week, as a fourth 

consultation exercise on the MOX plant ended, Friends of the Earth lodged

papers at the High Court 

in London calling for a judicial review of the consultation, accusing the

British government of 

skewing the process in favour of British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL).



The environmental group alleges that the £462 million invested in the plant

so far has been 

disregarded in calculating its financial prospects, and that the results of

an independent 

audit have been withheld from the public.



"Terrifying possibility"



But now the confidential report submitted to the government highlights

another potential problem 

for the plant. Written by Frank Barnaby, a physicist who worked at the

nuclear weapons 

laboratory at Aldermaston, Berkshire, in the 1950s and later headed the

Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute, it spells out exactly how easy it is to make MOX

fuel into a bomb.



Barnaby says that terrorists intent on mass destruction would need no more

technical know-how 

than that used to make the Lockerbie bomb. The expertise required is less

than the equivalent 

skill used in 1995 by the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, to prepare sarin

nerve gas for 

release into the Tokyo subway, he says.



It would be "sheer irresponsibility" for the government to allow the new

plant to open, 

Barnaby warns, as the theft of MOX fuel pellets would then become a

"terrifying possibility".



His report, which was commissioned by the Oxford Research Group, an

independent body of scientists 

studying nuclear issues, comes in the wake of mounting concern about the

poor security 

arrangements for radioactive materials worldwide (New Scientist, 26 May, p

10).



Barnaby reveals three ways of chemically separating the plutonium dioxide

from the uranium dioxide in 

MOX fuel. One, involving lanthanum nitrate as a carrier, was used in 1941 by

the atomic pioneer 

Glenn Seaborg at the University of Chicago.



The other two methods - one of which is currently used at the University of

Kiev in Ukraine - depend 

on reactions with resins. The chemistry is less sophisticated than that

required for the illegal 

manufacture of designer drugs, he says. All the details terrorists need are

in the published 

literature or on the Internet, says Barnaby.



A primitive bomb could be made with 35 kilograms of plutonium dioxide, or

terrorists could use 

hydrofluoric acid to precipitate out the pure metal, Barnaby says. Only 13

kilograms of pure metal would 

be needed to create an explosion with a yield of 100 tonnes of TNT - 50

times the size of the largest 

terrorist bomb to date, in Oklahoma City six years ago.



Hard to steal



BNFL points out, however, that MOX fuel would be difficult to steal because

it travels under armed 

guard. The security arrangements "are mature, comprehensive and robust",

says a company spokeswoman. "We are 100 per cent confident in the physical

protection measures we have."



The company points out that turning plutonium into MOX fuel and burning it

in reactors could reduce 

the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation by cutting plutonium stockpiles.

Some plutonium also 

has to be returned to foreign customers because they own it. The risk of MOX

fuel falling into the 

hands of terrorists is "minimal", BNFL insists.



An atomic explosion in a city centre is "everyone's worst nightmare", says

Frans Berkhout, a nuclear 

expert from SPRU (formerly the Science Policy Research Unit) at the

University of Sussex, Brighton. 

But although turning fresh MOX fuel into a bomb is "theoretically possible",

he thinks that in practice 

terrorists might find cheaper and easier ways of causing mass destruction.



Correspondence about this story should be directed to

letters@newscientist.com



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