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Re: Three "Oops" in the operational health physics





Parry...thrust...touche'...



Point taken here...



DJWhitfill





                                                                                                                             

                    "jenday1"                                                                                                

                    <jenday1@EMAIL.MSN.COM>        To:     "RADSAFE" <radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu>, <liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM>  

                    Sent by:                       cc:                                                                       

                    owner-radsafe@list.vand        Subject:     Three "Oops" in the operational health physics               

                    erbilt.edu                                                                                               

                                                                                                                             

                                                                                                                             

                    09/11/01 04:08 PM                                                                                        

                    Please respond to                                                                                        

                    "jenday1"                                                                                                

                                                                                                                             

                                                                                                                             









I noticed that these were missed last week.  I think we should be concerned

with the lack of regulatory oversight in operational and reactor heatlh

physics, because individuals are not adequately assessing the risks.  Am I

correct, Mr. Lipton?

-- John



John Jacobus, MS

Certified Health Physicist

3050 Traymore Lane

Bowie, MD 20715-2024

jenday1@email.msn.com (H)

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

                              Operations Center



                              Event Reports For

                           09/07/2001 - 09/10/2001



                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **



38268  38269  38270  38271



+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38268

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

| FACILITY: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATIREGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE:

09/07/2001|

|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  WA |NOTIFICATION TIME:

00:47[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-5                             |EVENT DATE:

09/06/2001|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:

17:38[PDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WILLIAM BAKER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:

09/07/2001|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES

+-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON

ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |LINDA SMITH          R4

|

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |

|

|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |

|

|                                                |

|

|                                                |

|

|                                                |

|

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+--------------



---+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX

MODE

|

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+--------------



---+

|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power

Operation  |

|                                                   |

|

|                                                   |

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

                                   EVENT TEXT

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM MADE INOPERABLE

|

|

|

| "Columbia Generating Station Reactor Core Isolation Cooing (RCIC) system

has |

| been isolated and made inoperable per Technical Specification 3.5.3 and

|

| unavailable due to manual closure of the RCIC turbine trip valve.  The

|

| manual closure of the RCIC turbine trip valve was required due to the

loss

|

| of automatic trip capability of the turbine trip valve [due to a solenoid

|

| failure].  This loss of automatic trip capability under postulated

|

| conditions could cause a water hammer event significant enough to

threaten

|

| primary containment.

|

|

|

| "The RCIC system is a single train system and is listed in plant

procedures  |

| as an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

|

|

|

| "The RCIC system will function automatically or manually to inject water

|

| into the RPV if manually returned to service."

|

|

|

| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+



+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38269

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE:

09/07/2001|

|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME:

03:30[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:

09/07/2001|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:

00:24[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL FITZPATRICK          |LAST UPDATE DATE:

09/07/2001|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES

+-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON

ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MARK RING            R3

|

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |

|

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|

|

|                                                |

|

|                                                |

|

|                                                |

|

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+--------------



---+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX

MODE

|

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+--------------



---+

|                                                   |

|

|2     M/R        Y       72       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown

|

|                                                   |

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

                                   EVENT TEXT

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO 2 LOW PRESSURE HEATER STRINGS ISOLATING

|

|

|

| The following is taken from a facsimile report:

|

|

|

| This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS actuation

(scram)  |

| (4 hour notification for U-2).

|

|

|

| At 12:24 AM CDT, Friday 9/7/01, U-2 was manually scrammed. The initiating

|

| event was a loss of 2 of 3 Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Strings. A high

|

| level condition was initially received in the 21A Low Pressure Heater,

which |

| caused the Condensate System inlet and outlet isolation valves to the 2A

Low |

| Pressure Heater String to close. Subsequently, a high level condition was

|

| also received in the 21C Low Pressure Heater, which caused the Condensate

|

| System inlet and outlet isolation valves to the 2C Low Pressure Heater

|

| String to close. With a second Low Pressure Heater String isolated, Unit

2

|

| was manually scrammed in accordance with LaSalle Procedure LOA-HD-201,

|

| "Heater Drain System Trouble".

|

|

|

| All systems operated as designed. There were no ECCS actuations or

Primary

|

| Containment isolations. The lowest Reactor level reached was minus 20

inches |

| (141 inches above the top of active fuel) and was recovered to normal

level  |

| using feedwater. Reactor pressure responded normally. No Safety Relief

|

| Valves actuated. All Control Rods fully inserted.

|

|

|

| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

|

|

|

| The cause of the Low Pressure Heater String loss is being investigated at

|

| this time.

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+





+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38271

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

| REP ORG:  NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM       |NOTIFICATION DATE:

09/07/2001|

|LICENSEE:  WESTERN TECHNOLOGIES                 |NOTIFICATION TIME:

18:31[EDT]|

|    CITY:  CUBA                     REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:

09/06/2001|

|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NM |EVENT TIME:

11:00[MDT]|

|LICENSE#:  DM 244-29             AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:

09/07/2001|

|  DOCKET:

|+----------------------------+

|                                                |PERSON

ORGANIZATION |

|                                                |LINDA SMITH          R4

|

|                                                |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS

|

+------------------------------------------------+

|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SHERRY MILLER                |

|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |

|

+------------------------------------------------+

|

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |

|

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |

|

|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |

|

|                                                |

|

|                                                |

|

|                                                |

|

|                                                |

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+



                                   EVENT TEXT

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+

| MISSING TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE.

|

|

|

|

|

| Western Technologies, out of Albuquerque, accidentally left a 3430

Troxler

|

| moisture density gauge at mile marker 49 on US highway 550.   The

moisture

|

| density gauge was out of its transport case laying on the side of the

|

| highway when the it was left behind. The driver immediately, within an

hour, |

| returned to the location and discovered that the gauge was missing.

State

|

| of New Mexico has recommended to the licensee that they offer a reward

for

|

| the missing gauge.

|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---+











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