Re: Transportation of spent PWR and BWR fuels

[RuthWeiner@AOL.COM]

Thank you for your very prompt response.  I had hoped that you would go into more detail, so I will ask some follow-up questions, and please take whatever time you need to answer them.  I understand that you are an expert on the question of spent nuclear fuel, so I look forward to a more detailed discussion.


I also note that you did not address the "mobile chenobyl" question.  Does UCS use this phrase to describe SNF transportation?  If so, what evidence or backup information do you supply to justify its use? If not, does UCS repudiate the use of the phrase?


As a follow-up to your response:


In a message dated 11/20/01 8:16:03 AM Mountain Standard Time, dlochbaum@ucsusa.org writes:

> What kind of accident do you think they are not strong enough to withstand?  
>
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> Casks may not (as opposed to 'are not') be strong enough to withstand
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> a fire either involving higher temperatures than assumed and/or lasting
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> for a longer duration than assumed. The assumptions don't appear to
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> be bounding with respect to temperature and duration. The casks
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> may survive, but the analyses and tests to date don't support that
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> conclusion.
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> Could you be more specific about "strong enough"?  As you surely know, the entire cask doesn't split or crumble, even when hit with high explosives (Luna, Neuhauser, and Vigil, SAND-0963, Sandia National Laboratories, 1999).   In even a severe accident (as distinct from a deliberate attack, which is not an accident), the cask itself may deform, but would not rupture.  Leakage of any radioactivity would be around the seals (Fischer, et al, NUREG/CR4829, 1987, and Sprung, et al, NUREG/CR-6672, 2000, and supporting documentation cited in both of these studies).  
>
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> When you speak of "assumptions" not being "bounding"  are you referring to Fischer, et al, Sprung, et al, or 10 CFR Part 71 Subpart E?  In particular, with reference to Sprung, et al, if you do not consider a 120 mph impact combined with an engulfing fire of 1000 deg C for several hours -- long enough to heat the cask interior to produce burst rupture of the fuel rods -- "bounding," what would you consider "bounding?"
>
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> You write further:
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> Is there any accident that you think they ARE strong enough to withstand? 
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> Yes, accidents within the envelope of analyses/tests.


If the current analyses are not bounding, what analyses and tests are you referring to?


> Do you think 10 CFR Part 71 Subpart E is ... Inadequate?  
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> No.
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> This apparently contradicts your earlier statements.  If 10 CFR 71 E is adequate, then the tests it prescribes are by inference adequate, and conversely.


Non-scientist "anti-nukes" rather casually bruit about the unsafe character if SNF transportation.  Since they look to you as an expert, and since those of us in the SNF transportation analysis "business" have tried to present data and information supporting our contention that this transportation is quite safe (though we never claim there won't be accidents, and do not claim "zero leaks"), I look forward to your detailed response, or the response from any colleagues you might consult, whenever you have the time to provide it.






Ruth Weiner, Ph. D.

ruthweiner@aol.com