Shortcomings In Energy Dept. Arms Testing

[Susan Gawarecki <loc@ICX.NET>]

From:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A54073-2002Jan2?language=printer



Report Finds Shortcomings In Energy Dept. Arms Testing Ability to Ensure

Weapons' Reliability at Issue, IG Says 



By Walter Pincus

Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, January 3, 2002; Page A15 



The Energy Department's inspector general has determined that the

growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the

nation's nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, have become a "most

serious challenge area" for the newly established National Nuclear

Security Agency that runs the weapons complex.



In a report sent to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham on Dec. 21 and made

public yesterday, Inspector General Gregory H. Friedman said one review

his office conducted last year turned up backlogs in flight and

laboratory test schedules for five of nine nuclear missile warheads and

bombs in the operational stockpile.



Another review, completed last month, showed backlogs of more than 18

months in correcting defects or malfunctions that were discovered in

testing of older weapons systems.



"Without a robust and complete surveillance testing program, the

department's ability to assess the reliability of some nuclear weapons

is at risk," Friedman wrote.



Each year, the Pentagon and the Energy Department must certify to the

president that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable and

that there is no need to resume tests involving the detonation of

nuclear warheads and bombs in underground caverns, as was done until

1992.



At a time when the Bush administration is contemplating sharp reductions

in offensive strategic nuclear missiles and bombs, some lawmakers and

senior officials inside the nuclear weapons complex and the Pentagon

have been talking about the need to resume underground testing, said

Sen. John W. Warner (Va.), ranking Republican on the Senate Armed

Services Committee.



"If the surveillance program can't do the job, we will have to resume

testing to make sure our [nuclear] weapons work," Warner said recently.



The government's process of certifying "high confidence" in the nuclear

stockpile involves randomly selecting for testing about 11 units from

each of the nine deployed nuclear warheads on land- and submarine-based

intercontinental missiles and bombs on aircraft. Nuclear warheads,

missiles and bombs are flight-tested by being launched or dropped to see

if the propellants and guidance systems work.



The IG's report showed that, over the past four years, there were delays

in five of 16 tests scheduled for the W-80 warhead used on cruise

missiles and in three of 12 tests scheduled for the W-88, which is

carried by the sub-launched Trident II missiles.



Laboratory tests to see whether handling, aging or manufacturing

problems have developed in components such as radars showed delays in

eight of 30 tests related to the B-61 nuclear bombs and in eight of 31

tests planned for the W-76 warhead used on sub-launched Trident I

missiles. Component tests -- which include looking at "pits," or nuclear

triggers and detonators -- are also running behind, with four pit tests

delayed out of 13 that were scheduled for the four-year period.



When successful testing over four years falls below 75 percent of

planned tests, "there is significant concern that anomalies or defects

in the stockpile might have been missed," the IG's report said.



Part of the problem, according to the IG, is that the facilities of the

nuclear weapons complex have been aging and need increased spending for

maintenance and replacement. Congress recently approved an extra $200

million for such work, but more is needed, Energy Department officials

say.



When testing shows a defect or malfunction, department procedures

require immediate notification of the nuclear weapons lab that developed

the weapon. Five days after notification, the lab is supposed to

determine whether the problem is significant. If so, the lab has 45 days

to determine through tests whether a major investigation should be

initiated since the reliability and performance of the weapon could be

involved.



About 10 percent of significant findings have resulted in "retrofits or

major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile," the IG reported.

Nevertheless, the IG recently found that the 45-day period for

determining the significance of problems had grown, in some instances,

to 300 days.



After the determination had been made, "over two-thirds of the 64 active

investigations remained unresolved beyond the department's one-year

benchmark for completion," according to the IG's report.



Only a small cadre of engineers and experts carry out these

investigations and they often are involved in other projects, a former

top Pentagon official said. The IG noted that, as of March 2001, 18 of

24 such investigations remained unresolved after 18 or more months at

Los Alamos National Laboratory, which spent the past two years adapting

to tighter security rules in the wake of allegations of Chinese

espionage.



"If these delays continue, the department may not be in a position to

unconditionally certify the aging nuclear weapons stockpile," Friedman

wrote.



The IG Report is available at:

http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0538.pdf

-- 

.....................................................

Susan L. Gawarecki, Ph.D., Executive Director

Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee

Please visit our Web site - http://www.local-oversight.org

.....................................................

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