Re: Criticality accident

[RuthWeiner@AOL.COM]

In a message dated 3/18/02 10:46:22 AM Mountain Standard Time, lavelyp@UCLINK4.BERKELEY.EDU writes:



> Based on the accident in Japan it seems that those responsible for 
>
> the safe handling/processing of these materials have not learned from 
>
> the past. That is, the accident in Japan was not only one that should 
>
> have been prevented, it was one that required the violation of 
>
> procedures to cause.
>
>
> This does not seem to be a problem that has been solved.


Tom discussed the details of several accidents in his talk.  Hos group is woirking hard to address these "lessons learned" type problems.   From what I remember of the talk, what had apparently happened at Tokaimura was the confluence of several factors, including but not limited to:


The approved procedure for dissolving the uranium and transferring the solution to the process vessel was not followed.  This approved procedure was difficult, slow, and cumbersome to follow.

The management may have agreed to an less cumbersome procedure that had not been approved by the regulators.

The workers apparently did not understand the consequences of a potential accident  or the possible consequences of not following the approved procedure -- they may not have been adequately informed.


Some of the managers are now apparently in jail.


I suggest anyone intrested get the report from LANL.

Ruth Weiner, Ph. D.

ruthweiner@aol.com