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response to Dirty Bomb
Froom another list, but permisssion was granted to post here. Thought you;d be
interested in Greg's opinions.
norm
Greg Wingard wrote:
> Dear friends of all things nuke:
>
> Usually in planning for disaster, you look at the worst case scenario. For a
> radiological "dirty" bomb terrorist attack, a 100 millicuries source is not
> it. Indeed it is amusing to see anyone say that is a credible example.
>
> Let's try again with something a little more realistic than a high school
> stunt, which is essentially what the previous post described.
>
> Terrorist hijack, or incapacitate a truckload of high level nuclear waste on
> its way from a nuke plant or weapon facility to say Nevada. They have a van
> with drums full of fertilizer mixed into a sludge with diesel. After
> incapacitating the truck, and any armed security traveling with the truck
> (assuming all nuke shipments will have armed escorts), a couple people place
> shaped charges on the nuke waste containers. Others place the drums under the
> trailer the waste is on. The drums are set to go off a fraction of a second
> after the shaped charges. Timing devices with the degree of precision to do
> this are not that hard to come by. As long as the people pulling off the
> attack don't care that they aren't going to make it out of the scene, other
> than in the form of non identifiable component parts, the logistics are
> probable. Let's say the truck was on the way from a nuke plant just up river
> from New York.
>
> Want to run your numbers again?
>
> Also, just from scanning reports around the globe, it seems that more cobalt
> sources are stolen and opened, usually by people out to sell the shielding for
> its scrap metal value. These non terrorist incidents have exposed large
> numbers of people to hazardous levels of radiation, including lethal, with no
> explosive to spread the radiation around.
>
> Having looked through a lot of shipping manifests, it also seems that there is
> a large amount of radioactive cobalt shipped around the world, in the
> commercial market, making it a target as well. Maybe you should run your
> numbers based on things Americans could relate to. Given X pounds of various
> radioactive substances (run the numbers for all the ones that are accessible
> due to transport, as well as storage), and a credible explosive force (say the
> Timothy McVeigh bombing), what would the result be?
>
> That would be a credible way to approach the topic. To put the previous post's
> chosen scenario in perspective, it is like saying that you don't have to worry
> about terrorist using mercury, because if a terrorist blew up a thermometer in
> a shopping mall the resulting exposure would not be significant. Like the 100
> millicuries example given in the previous post, the only thing remarkable about
> such an attack would be that there are any terrorists stupid enough to waste
> their time, and most likely their lives on pulling such an ineffectual stunt.
>
> I think that such posts are a good measure of how desperate the minions of
> nukes are to push their golden calf, their modern Molak (sorry for the
> misspelling, I did not have a bible handy for the reference to the primitive
> god that mid eastern cultures sacrificed their children to by immolation) on
> society.
>
> There are a number of ways that the industry seeks to lull the populace into
> compliance.
>
> Deny that there are any radiation or chemical releases from the plant. I had
> the opportunity to catch the Trojan nuke plant operators at this red handed.
> They were on a TV show where they took people, including a camera crew on a
> tour of the plant. Pointing at the steam coming out of the cooling tower the
> spokes dude said that is absolutely pure H2O. As it worked out, I was
> interviewed for a program that aired immediately after the one with the tour.
> On that show I held up the results for the camera, which the plant operator had
> signed under threat of perjury, on the concentration of isotopes coming out of
> the cooling tower. Needles to say it was'nt "pure H2O". When the owner of the
> nuke plant found out that the shows were going to air consecutively, they tried
> to force the station to cancel the show(s). Seems that they had some objection
> to their official spokes person being caught out as a liar.
>
> Deny that security is faulty. This one is obvious. Look at how many plants
> have failed the infiltration exercises they used to hold. I understand that
> there is pressure to stop such excersizes, or at least the public reporting of
> them.
>
> Deny that the plants are getting old, and that their original predicted life
> expectancy failed to even consider a number of problems that have come to light
> since the safety, and life time predictions were made for the plants. Prior to
> its closing, the Trojan nuke plant had an increasing number of its heat
> exchange system, steam tubes, plugged with stainless steel corks, because of
> corrosion cracking, and stress cracking. The company tried to claim that this
> was no problem, but were unable to get around the fact that heat exchange
> efficiency is a key component of reactor safety. Each tube you plug reduces
> the efficiency of heat exchange, thus decreasing safety. This is only one
> example of wear and tear failures experianced by nuke plants. The fall back
> claim, of course, is that we have multiple, redundant systems. They of course
> fail to mention that the original safety projections were based on all of the
> multiple redundant systems working at optimum conditions, or at least design
> specifications.
>
> Deny that radiation in the environment is a problem. This takes two main
> paths. The first is revisionist. A great example is Chernobyl, where the
> minions of nukes claim that it is paranoia that killed people around the plant,
> and that the release and resulting exposure has caused no lasting harm. The
> second tact is the so called sun shine unit approach. Everyone is exposed to
> "background" radiation, which is "natural". Any additional exposure is
> minimized, (many times by fraud, like the replaced "clean" milk samples
> downwind of NTS during testing), and then compared to "background" as if the
> exposure, if it is less than background must be safe. This is a kind of suck
> it up and take your dose argument. Since the people in Denver are getting much
> more radiation at their elevation, it must be OK to make sure that people at
> Hanford get just as much. Complain and you are a nuke wimp, and idiot that
> just doesn't understand that radiation is everywhere.
>
> The truth is somewhat different. Radiation, in terms of natural background is
> most likely a large factor in aging and health problems experianced on a global
> level. Radiation doses are not discrete separate events. The impacts are
> cumulative, and anything over background is going to be harmful. Recent
> studies at Cheranobyl are a good example. Turns out that there are a large
> number of genetic anomolies showing up from radiation exposure. The leading
> spin is that such changes do not prove life threatening conditions. When you
> combine additional radiation exposure with constant chemical insult which most
> of us in the developed world are exposed to, the result is even worse.
> Radiation doses are also target specific, in other words, the dose you get from
> iodine, may be more harmful than radioactive xenon out of a cooling tower.
> Likewise if you are exposed to radon, and it all happens to be very "young" you
> will breathe most of it back out, thus a no harm, no foul situation. If,
> however, you breathe in radon, and its daughter products, and some portion of
> the radon turns into radioactive metal particles in your lungs, the scenario is
> a little bit more grim. Of course the powers that be assume that all radon
> breathed is only radon, no daughter products, and it is all "new", ie, not
> going to change to metal particles in the lung.
>
> There is a reason that atmospheric nuclear tests were stopped. It was because
> of the concern of setting off a world wide epidemic of radiation induced
> disease at a level that would make it obvious what the source of the problem
> was. World leaders, including Kennedy, figured out that people might become a
> little hard to handle if this information came out. Hence an agreement among
> parties who were not the best of friends. So we cut our losses, wrote off the
> down winders both civilians, and military, and buried the facts as much as
> possible. As more of the facts have come out, the goal has shifted to the same
> one employed with much success by the asbestos folks. Hold them off until they
> are all dead. The dead do not collect damage payments.
>
> The example given in the previous post provided data on the amount of source
> material, but provides no information on the size, type of dispersion, i.e.,
> how big a blast, or with what kind of explosive. The model provided thus lacks
> rigor, is not conservative, and fails to provide the necessary values for
> others to confirm, or replicate the results claimed, a basic tenant of
> scientific method.
>
> Nice try for a piece of propaganda, but does not cut it for science, which it
> pretends to be.
>
> Regards,
>
> Greg
>
> Jim Hoerner wrote:
>
> > [Fwd from RadSafe, not by JH who found it interesting.]
> >
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Reality Check - "dirty bombs"
> >
> > Comments continue to circulate about the possibility for terrorists to
> > explode a 'dirty bomb' or a radiological bomb'. Indeed, even Warren
> > Buffett, the 'Sage of Omaha' has the other day been reported as saying that
> > a radiological attack is not a question of 'if', but of 'when'.
> >
> > There is however very little written about just what the possible health
> > impact of such an action might be.
> >
> > It is not difficult to make some very general estimates of what the
> > radiation consequences might be, and the findings that I here present
> > indicate that the health effects would probably be very small, although the
> > disruption and the cleanup task might be a serious cost.
> >
> > Let us assume that a stolen source wrapped with explosives has been
> > detonated in a large office block or shopping mall. There would certainly
> > be serious damage from the explosive, and injuries resulting from flying
> > debris, building collapse and so forth.
> >
> > But I thought I might try to estimate potential radiation doses and hence
> > health risks from such a release...
> >
> > So, here's a little calculation of possible doses to emergency responders or
> > to members of the public who might remain trapped in the building:
> >
> > Example 1.
> >
> > Assume a stolen Cs-137 source of Activity 100 millicuries (= 3.7 GBq).
> >
> > Assume it is exploded and all the caesium disperses into a building of
> > volume 500,000 cubic metres as a fine respirable powder.
> >
> > This implies an in-air concentration of about 8000 Bq/m3.
> >
> > IAEA BSS (Safety Series 115) Tables II-III and II-VII indicate dose per
> > unit activity by inhalation for Cs-137 is in the order of 5 * 10-9 Sv/Bq.
> >
> > So a person breathing the contaminated air for 1 hour without respiratory
> > protection will incur about (1 m3 * 8000 * 5 * 10-9 ) Sv or 40
> > microsieverts.
> >
> > This amount is essentially trivial in this context.
> >
> > Example 2.
> > Assume that an Iridium-192 source of Activity 1 Terabecquerel (approx 30
> > Curies) is dispersed in the same building.
> > The airborne activity concentration will then be 2 * 106 Bq/m3 and the total
> > activity breathed in in one hour will be approx 2 * 106 Bq.
> > This will incur (using data from IAEA BSS as above) a dose of (2 * 106 * 5
> > * 10-9) = 10 mSv, which is about equivalent to a 'CAT scan'. In other
> > words, not that much.
> >
> > Please note that in actual fact, it will be quite difficult to get all of
> > the radioactive material into the air in respirable form: it will want to
> > plate out on its surroundings. So the above calculations are almost
> > certainly unduly pessimistic, and exaggerating the actual doses that would
> > be incurred.
> >
> > So we can say that any injuries or deaths will be from the explosive blast,
> > mechanical injury, or any resulting fire, or from the panic, eg in hasty and
> > ill-disciplined (not to mention ill-advised) evacuation traffic accidents)
> > rather than from the radiation dose.
> >
> > Responding emergency agencies should be informed beforehand, i.e., NOW, that
> > dose control requirements are thus NOT an overriding issue, but rather the
> > control of panic. Responders should be reassured, NOW, that 'moonsuits are
> > not required', but rather, that first aid and fire control are the essential
> > requirements.
> >
> > [MS]
> >
> > --
> > Hold the door for the stranger behind you. When the driver a
> > half-car-length in front of you signals to get over, slow down. Smile and
> > say "hi" to the folks you pass on the sidewalk. Give blood. Volunteer.
> >
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> >
> >
> >
> >
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