Re: Dirty Bomb - Greg's scenario

["Vincent A King/KINGVA/CC01/INEEL/US" <KINGVA@INEL.GOV>]

I'm not trying to imply there is zero risk IF such a scenario occurred and

IF you were near enough.  But there aren't likely to be many people

standing around during a terrorist attack (if they are, they have more

immediate threats to their well-being than a release of noble gases and

volatiles).



My point is we need to scale our security measures based on accurate

information.  Would a few hundred million dollars be more responsibly spent

on redesigning transportation casks (because the anti-nukes say they aren't

safe enough) or on aviation security?  Which has the chance of saving more

lives in reality?



How we spend resources should be determined by analyses like the ones you

have been involved in, Ruth, rather than on "Atomic Train"-styled fictional

distortions.  And likelihood is also a factor: would a terrorist actually

go to the trouble to attempt an attack that has such a low chance of

succeeding, with the consequences not being significantly different than

from releases of other hazardous materials?



V. King







                                                                                            

                    RuthWeiner@aol                                                          

                    .com                 To:     KINGVA@inel.gov,                           

                                          radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu                       

                    05/21/2002           cc:                                                

                    11:11 AM             Fax to:                                            

                                         Subject:     Re: Dirty Bomb - Greg's scenario      

                                                                                            









In a message dated 5/21/02 9:22:24 AM Mountain Daylight Time,

KINGVA@INEL.GOV writes:





 So what happens if you punch a hole in the cask?  You have a hole in the

 cask and most of the radioactive material still inside.   If it is spent

 fuel shipment, you have essentially ALL the radioactive material still

 inside (ceramic pellets in steel rods, remember?  - these don't "spew" out



 the hole very well).





Spent fuel contains gas (e.g., Kr-85) and volatile substances (e.g.,

Cs-137, Ru-106).  Release fractions for these substances, from the rod and

from any breach at the cask seals, are orders of magnitude larger than

release fractions for solid particulate matter.  Moreover,  PWR spent fuel

is pressurized.  If a rod is damaged or burst-ruptures in a fire, the

overpressure can force material out of any hole or breach (this can happen

in ordinary accidents too).  I refer you to a very good discussion in

Chapter 7 of NUREG/CR-6672 (Sprung, et al, 2000).









Greg forgets to mention how disrupting the cask



 integrity gets a significant amount of material from the inside to the

 outside of the container.  I might not want to stand within a few dozen

 yards of the hole, but then who is standing around that close while this

 is

 going on?  I would suggest the intended victims are long gone by this

 time.





 Gases and particles fine enough to get out of the cask can be dispersed

 over quite a wide area.  Investigators in germany have done quite a bit of

 work on particle size distribution and dispersal of radioactive cask

 contents.



 Nothwithstanding the ridiculousness of Greg's scenario, let's not go

 overboard with denials.







Ruth Weiner, Ph. D.

ruthweiner@aol.com







************************************************************************

You are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To unsubscribe,

send an e-mail to Majordomo@list.vanderbilt.edu  Put the text "unsubscribe

radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail, with no subject line.

You can view the Radsafe archives at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/