Submarine K-19

["Ted Rockwell" <tedrock@CPCUG.ORG>]

Friends:



Here's the attachment that didn't transmit, concerning the claim that

Russian nuclear submarine technology had outstripped ours.  It was printed

in the Naval Institute Procedings, April 1996.



Dr. Theodore Rockwell, author, The Rickover Effect (Naval Institute Press,

1994)-The Naval Institute recently issued Nautilus, a book by the British

Broadcasting Company writer Roy Davies, to accompany the BBC documentary on

submarines still showing worldwide. A generally good book to accompany an

excellent broadcast, it ended on a sour note with some petulant remarks

about how the Russians had scored "an incredible breakthrough," a liquid-

metal reactor "the principle that Rickover, ten years before, had refused to

reconsider ." The author had previously confided that "once Admiral [Hyman]

Rick- over had set his mind against something it was not his way to allow it

to be reconsidered." This "breakthrough" was deemed important "because it

made possible a smaller craft." The book bemoans "the finite constraints

imposed upon U.S. submarine designers by Admiral Rickover" which kept

America from matching Russian sub- marines as "the best in the world."

As Admiral Rickover's Technical Director during much of time in question,

I'd like to set the record straight. The conclusions cited cannot be drawn

from the broadcast itself, nor from the histories reported by Duncan,

Hewlett and others.

The Russians did develop some submarines of great speed and quietness. But

these characteristics resulted primarily from hull form, hull material,

jet-propulsion pumps, acoustic silencing, and other developments that were

wholly out of Rickover's sphere. He had no responsibility or authority in

those areas. Reducing the reactor to an infinitesimal point has little

impact on ship size; the reactor is small to begin with and requires the

same amount of radiation shielding regardless of size.

This is illustrated by the Seawolf (SSN-575) which was cooled by liquid

sodium. Although its reactor was thermally efficient, the additional

shielding required for the sodium system resulted in a power plant no

smaller than the equivalent pressurized water system in the Nautilus. The

ship was no smaller and no faster. When the sodium plant was replaced by a

water system, the ship was made no heavier by the change. So the crew was

burdened with sodium' s tremendous operational disadvantages and major

safety problems, with no compensating benefits. We were greatly relieved to

find that water did the job and we did not have to deal with sodium.

Rickover's long-range study group constantly evaluated various exotic

concepts, including the lead-bismuth system used by the Russians. We would

loved to have discovered a breakthrough that would lead to a reliable plant,

dramatically smaller in size and weight. But we did not, presumably for the

same thermodynamic and engineering reasons that power-plants ashore have not

found advantages in such systems, although they have tried for decades.

You don't have to take my word for this. Davies' book makes reference to

some of the troubles the Russian submariners encountered. A picture caption

describes the crew of the K-3 as "seemingly unaffected by continually

breathing radioactive air for months on end." The text notes that the

skipper Ossipenko "decided during the trials that they would carry on

sailing until the radioactivity equaled 100 permissible doses. That is 100

times the maximum permissible dose. ...the air in different compartments of

the submarine should be mixed up in order to reduce the effect of this

radiation. ...the hatches should be opened as soon as the submarine surfaced

to allow the boat to be ventilated. ...Vodka was to be used extensively for

medicinal purposes to counter the effects of radioactivity." By contrast,

crews on U.S. sub- marines all received less radiation than their families

ashore, and no radioactive air contamination ever occurred.

If this seems like a minor nuisance that sturdy sailors should cheerfully

bear, we now have The Atomic Submarine History: Successes, Failures &

Catastrophes by Rear Admiral Nicholas Mormul, Rear Admiral Lev Zviltsov, and

Rear Admiral Academician Leonid Ossipenko (Borges, Moscow 1994). This book

describes in technical detail some 15 major casualties involving Russian

submarine nuclear propulsion plants, concluding "there have been hundreds of

accidents on Soviet nu- clear submarines, hundreds of lives lost and

hundreds who have received significant doses of radiation."

The authors note that in the liquid metal system, "oxides and slimes develop

in the melt because of the inevitable leaks of the steam generators ...the

removal of heat stops and the temperature here will rise to 1,000° C. The

channel burns through, becoming a powerful source of radioactive radiation,

which, as it speeds throughout the primary, loop, degrades the radiation

conditions, in spite of bio- logical protection." They describe one accident

that occurred: ''as a result of leaks of the steam generator the reactor

over- heated and at least 20% of the fuel elements were destroyed. Gamma

radioactivity in the compartment increased sharply (more than 2000 rads in

the re- actor compartment and part of the central compartment) with ejection

of radioactive gases, which spread through the other compartments. The

dosimetry chemists sent to the reactor compartment reported 'The instrument

is off scale."' In this particular accident, all 124 crew members had been

overexposed. Twenty men received significant doses of radiation (600 to 1000

rads). Several members of the crew died on the spot. Despite the spectacular

speed runs, the authors report that, "because of deficiencies of weaponry,

high noise levels, lengthy construction schedule and obsolescence of

equipment, no more submarines of this series were built." I have never met

an American submariner who would rather serve on a Russian nuclear

submarine. Davies may wonder why Rickover became disenchanted with liquid

metal reactors, but the Russian submariners who wrote this book outlined the

problems inherent in liquid metal systems and concluded: "After a brief

operation of a [reactor] with liquid metal coolant on the Seawolf they

switched back to water. Unfortunately, we did not abandon the use of liquid

metal coolant fast enough.



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