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My Answer to Many Posts on "Annual Attempt at Correction"



I have received many replies, public and private to my post "Annual Attempt at Correction" both positive and negative, some attacking my "simplicity for relying on one article." I have been involved with the Manhattan Project aftereffects for many years.
 
1960 - 1965 Student Trainee US Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, Hunters Point California. Worked on Effects of Nuclear Weapons under Dr. E. C. Freiling (worked on Air Burst and Fractionation chapters). Analyzed fallout radionuclides and participated as an acknowledged radiochemist in the discovery of Cd-121 in fission products. (We were analyzing samples collected by Francis Gary Powers and other U-2 pilots to follow Russian device chemistry, as well as samples from our own tests).
 
1960 - 1965 BS Chemistry UC-Berkeley Worked under I. Pearlman and J.O. Rasmussen.
 
1965 - 19770 ScD, MIT Mentors: Charles Coryell, Glen Gordon, R.D. Evans, Jack Irvine (all from Manhattan Project). Scientific Grandfathers who I met and knew through their students: Linus Pauling (Charles Coryell) and Glen Seaborg (Glen Gordon).
 
1970 - 1978 Group Leader Radioisotope Applications
1978 - 1980 Senior Scientist, Environmental Protection Unit, Rockwell Hanford Operations (spent many afternoons in the historical library)
1980 - 1986 Assoc. Prof. and Director Triga Reactor Facility, Reed College, Portland, OR
1986 - Present: Consultant (Licensed Health Physics Consultant, State of Oregon) and Adjunct Faculty Portland State University
 
1960 to today: Student of the Manhattan Project.
 
Perhaps I should have put all the materials I have studied as a list, but I have given two boxes of books and papers to a younger student who was interested in the history of the Manhattan project. He is to pass them on someday in-toto. I am one of the older generation, not the 30-somethings referred to in the article below.
 
Even one of the references sent to me:
 
"Why We Did It"; by Evan Thomas; Newsweek Magazine; July 24, 1995; Page 22 - A thorough analysis of the events that led to the decision to drop!  Web Master's Note: After poring over dozens and dozens of articles, this is by far the most objective treatment.
 
at
http://www.childrenofthemanhattanproject.org/ENOLA/enola_legacy.htm
 
notes that the decision was a problematic one.
That article points out that some of the top military leaders were on the side of the emperor in wanting to end the war.
 
The attacks on Japan prior to Hiroshima were acts of war, and had caused tremendous civilian casualties, as was pointed out to me. The difference here is that this loss was avoidable.
 
Records show that the US Navy leaders were in favor of a total blockade of Japan. This was rejected because of the desire for a quick solution.
 
The atmosphere of vengeance was involved in many of the decisions.
 
I referred specifically to the Technology Review because it has the copies of Truman's journal. The idea of a political solution was not satisfactory to the political leadership--they thought it would be political suicide. Unconditional surrender was the only result politically acceptable to the leaders involved.
 
I read the articles (and more) by the Japanese High Command, and note that there was a mixed determination to fight to the very end (Bushido), and the sanity of surrender. There was not unity to continue the war. The military knew Japan was defeated.
 
Secretary of War, Stimson, was one of the most vocal opponents, in addition to the scientists who wanted to demonstrate the weapon on an uninhabited island. Stimson's moral courage prevented the destruction of Kyoto--the religious and cultural center of Japan with NO use as a military target. It was untouched, and Groves and the other generals wanted a pristine target to see the effects, if the device went off. The attempted targeting of Kyoto is an indication to me of the mindset of the military at that time.
 
General Leslie Groves was determined to use the atomic bomb, and was quoted as saying  "Truman went along for the ride, 'Like a little boy on a toboggan'."
 
When all these factors are looked at, the decision to use the atomic bomb was a regrettable choice, based on the political and revenge climate in the US.
 
I can see that there is no way that this question is going to be resolved. I have had my annual say, and the rest is up to you. This is my last post on this topic this year.
 
Michael A. Kay, ScD, CHMM
makay@alum.mit.edu