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Gov't Nears Nuke Material Decision
Index:
Gov't Nears Nuke Material Decision
Security fears, cost at issue in storing nuclear waste
Alternatives to fast breeder reactor emerging
=================================
Gov't Nears Nuke Material Decision
WASHINGTON (AP) - Pending a final environmental review, the Energy
Department is expected to move as much as several tons of plutonium
and weapons-grade uranium from a federal research laboratory in New
Mexico to Nevada because of security concerns, according to
documents.
In a department memo, John C. Browne, director of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, called the proposed move ``the best overall
decision to meet the post-September 11th challenges for the long-term
security of nuclear activities.''
An Energy Department spokesman, Bryan Wilkes, said that while no
final decision has been made, moving the material to the Nevada Test
Site is the preferred option being studied to increase security. The
environmental study is being reviewed, he said.
Several tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, which could be
used to make an atomic bomb, are kept at Technical Area-18 at the Los
Alamos lab in New Mexico where critics have said it cannot be
adequately protected.
``There is no doubt that that facility was at high risk. They simply
could not defend it,'' said Pete Stockton, an analyst for the Project
on Government Oversight, a private watchdog group that Sunday
released a copy of the Browne memo and other documents involving the
expected move.
Built in the 1940s, Technical Area-18 is located at the bottom of a
steep canyon, where the high ground and an adjacent highway makes the
site difficult to defend.
In repeated security exercises, troops have been unable to protect
the material. In a 1997 exercise, Army Special Forces posing as
attackers wheeled away a garden cart full of props representing the
nuclear material. In another test, attackers obtained access to the
facility where they could detonated an explosion, had they been
terrorists.
Had actual material been stolen it would have been enough to make
several weapons, said Stockton, who three years ago chaired a DOE
team that recommended to then-Energy Secretary Bill Richardson that
the material be moved. Richardson ordered the environmental studies
into moving the material.
Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., a frequent critic of security at federal
weapons facilities, urged the department to complete the move as
quickly as possible and safeguard the material from potential
terrorists.
POGO, which has criticized DOE security of nuclear weapons material,
obtained a draft press release from the National Nuclear Security
Administration, an agency within the DOE, that indicated that plans
are going forward to move the material to Nevada with a decision
anticipated next month.
Everett H. Beckner, deputy NNSA administrator, has given his approval
to begin design activities and other steps to implement the move,
according to a memo obtained by POGO.
The material is part of a research project in which scientists
examine how electronic components of nuclear weapons respond to
small, short-lived nuclear detonations.
On the Net:
Project on Government Oversight: http://www.pogo.org
National Nuclear Security Administration: http://www.nnsa.doe.gov
Los Alamos National Laboratory: http://www.lanl.gov
-----------------
Security fears, cost at issue in storing nuclear waste
SAN FRANCISCO Aug 11 (Reuters) - Even if a permanent site for storing
nuclear waste opens as planned in 2010, the spent radioactive fuel
that will pile up at U.S. reactors in the years to come raises grave
new security risks, safety issues, and costs to consumers.
Last month, after 12 years of protests and legal wrangling, President
Bush signed legislation to make Yucca Mountain in the Nevada desert
the permanent storage site for the nation's used nuclear fuel.
But even if Yucca Mountain opens on schedule in 2010, which some
doubt, 70 of the nation's 103 nuclear reactors will have already run
out of space in on-site water pools used for waste storage, the
Washington, D.C.-based industry group Nuclear Energy Institute said.
As a consequence, utilities have been scrambling to build special
large canisters, known as dry casks, at their reactor sites.
The problem is the dry casks present even a worse security risk than
the water pools, heightening security concerns during America's
declared "war on terrorism" in the wake of last September's attacks
on New York and Washington
"You still have the reactor as a hazard, you still have the spent
fuel in the pool as a hazard, and you're adding spent fuel in dry
casks as a third hazard that increases the headaches for plant
security," said David Lochbaum, a former nuclear plant engineer now
with the Union of Concerned Scientists.
"Because spent fuel storage was always viewed as an interim measure
in this country, we've never given it the same consideration from a
safety or security standpoint as the reactor. It's always taken a
back seat," he said.
The storage problem is not new. Every 18 to 24 months, about a third
of the radioactive fuel rods at U.S. nuclear plants are replaced with
new ones. So far, that has added up to about 45,000 metric tons of
spent fuel -- enough to bury a football field under 15 feet of waste
material. Some 2,000 metric tons are being produced every year.
When most of the nation's nuclear reactors were designed in the 1960s
and 1970s, it was assumed their waste would be shipped off to a
central repository or reprocessing facility.
But commercial reprocessing never fully developed in the United
States, and plans to open a permanent disposal site have been
delayed. The only option for nuclear plants has been to store the
waste on site.
COST, SECURITY CONCERNS
Water pools traditionally used for temporary storage of spent rods
are steel-lined, concrete vaults filled with water. The water cools
the fuel, which gives off heat and radiation for years after it is
removed from the reactor.
Dry cask storage is "a substantial expense" -- and an expense that
gets passed on to ratepayers, said NEI spokesman Steve Kerekes.
Building dry storage at a plant site requires an initial investment
of $10 million to $20 million. Once operational, it costs about $5
million to $7 million a year to maintain the facility and add
containers as storage needs grow.
Since 1983, utility customers have been paying a surcharge on their
monthly bills for the government's nuclear waste management program.
The fund has collected about $18 billion.
Because the government defaulted on its obligation to begin moving
used fuel from nuclear power plants when Yucca Mountain failed to
open in 1998 as planned, electricity consumers are paying millions of
dollars for additional on-site storage over and above the billions
already committed to the federal fund.
As a result of the government default, utility customers may have to
pay an additional $5 billion to $7 billion, assuming the repository
is available in 2010, the NEI said.
Massachusetts Rep. Edward Markey, a Democrat and longtime critic of
the nuclear industry, has warned that depleted radioactive fuel
stored at U.S. nuclear plants is "extremely vulnerable" to attack. He
has said an aircraft attack on spent fuel depots could release the
same amount of radiation as a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, more than half
the strength of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.
Reactors, housed in special containment vessels designed to contain
the equivalent of a small nuclear explosion should things go badly
wrong in the core, have more barriers protecting them, more backup
systems, and more safety systems.
Fuel dumps are outside the reactor containment structure.
Spent fuel pools are generally located below ground. Although their
concrete walls are 4 feet to 5 feet thick and lined with steel and
their roofs are typically made of standardized industrial material
like sheet metal.
The pools are housed in separate buildings adjacent to a reactor
containment structure and are therefore within the reactor's security
perimeter.
"Because the pools are kind of enveloped by the other security,
there's a greater likelihood that the spent fuel pools would be
protected than the dry casks, which are not part of the normal
security system," Lochbaum said.
Dry casks, made of steel or steel-reinforced concrete 18 inches or
more thick, are generally stored above ground in an open field on
concrete pads.
"Dry casks are more vulnerable because they're out in the open but
they contain less radioactive material than what's in the pools,"
Lochbaum said.
Like the reactor, the pools and casks were designed to withstand
earthquakes, tornadoes and other natural calamities, but were not
designed to withstand the impact from fully fueled commercial
airlines like those that struck the World Trade Center towers and the
Pentagon on Sept. 11.
-----------------
Alternatives to fast breeder reactor emerging
TOKYO, Aug. 10 (Kyodo) - To replace inefficient old nuclear reactors
expected to be decommissioned after 2010, Japan drew up
plans to develop a so-called fast breeder reactor (FBR), which is
supposed to generate more fuel than it consumes.
But the controversial project was shelved after a sodium leak was
discovered at the prototype Monju reactor in the city of Tsuruga,
Fukui Prefecture in 1995.
However, practical alternatives are emerging, according to power
industry sources. They include large light-water reactors and small
gas-cooling reactors.
Japanese nuclear power planners tried to put the FBR into practical
use. Plutonium extracted in the reprocessing of spent fuel at
light-water reactors, which are the current mainstay reactors, is
meant for the FBR program.
Nuclear power experts maintain the FBR is the principle next-
generation reactor. But practical use is distant, and it cannot
replace
old reactors immediately after decommissioning work begins.
The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, which developed the
Monju, and a group of FBR researchers from electric utilities
aim to refine their plans for FBR structures and reprocessing methods
by 2015.
Meanwhile, large light-water reactors being developed by utilities
and nuclear reactor manufacturers are expected to be put into
practical use before the FBR. The advanced light-water reactor will
be enlarged so it can produce 1.7 million kilowatts of power.
Construction costs can be lowered with an ''earthquake-resistant''
flexible structure. Additional safety facilities such as emergency
core cooling systems and emergency power generators are planned.
Developers want the reactor to be operable even during inspections,
and hope it can remain running from a year and a half to two
years at a time.
Its core will be designed to take in plutonium-uranium mixed oxide
(MOX) fuel and burn plutonium that will be in oversupply with the
shelving of FBR plans.
Attracting attention overseas is the small pebble bed module reactor
(PBMR), which uses a small gas-cooling system. Power
supplies can be severely interrupted if large reactors are off-line
for a long time, but there is no such worry with small reactors. The
initial investment in a PBMR is small because of its size, and large
output is possible with multiple PBMRs.
Experts said PBMR efficiency in converting core heat into electricity
is greater than 40%, topping the 35% of light-water reactors. Since
major parts of its core structure are made of heat-resistant carbon,
large accidents such as a core meltdown would be unlikely.
South Africa is to start building a PBMR next year, and Japanese
enterprises will take part in producing its fuel and developing its
turbine engine.
***************************************************************
Sandy Perle Tel:(714) 545-0100 / (800) 548-5100
Director, Technical Extension 2306
ICN Worldwide Dosimetry Service Fax:(714) 668-3149
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. E-Mail: sandyfl@earthlink.net
ICN Plaza, 3300 Hyland Avenue E-Mail: sperle@icnpharm.com
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Personal Website: http://sandy-travels.com/
ICN Worldwide Dosimetry Website: http://www.dosimetry.com
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