Re: Subject: Re: Security at U.S. Nuclear Labs Called Unacceptable

[William V Lipton <liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM>]

I'll try to respond:



1.  Chernobyl - Obviously, the operators had placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition.  This is the inherent weakness of administative controls - they can be defeated.  We not only have to assure that public that our safety culture does not permit such practices, but also provide engineered protection against credible screwups.  Being safe 99.99% of the time isn't good enough.



2.  force on force - I suggest you read the report more carefully.  One more excerpt (pages 12ff):  "...DOE found that during force-on-force exercises at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque NM and at the Savannah River Site 321-M facility in South Carolinea, security forces fired on "civilians" during the exercises."  i.e. the civilians were not just caught in the cross fire, they were fired upon.  While the DOE safety culture may consider this a minor concern, I doubt that most of

us "civilians" would agree.



3.  "'the Man' being behind good press":  I'll be the first to admit that I don't have a clue as to what you're talking about.  Please provide a few examples.



The opinions expressed are strictly mine.

It's not about dose, it's about trust.

Curies forever.



Bill Lipton

liptonw@dteenergy.com





Michael Ford wrote:



> Bill,

>

> First to reply to your earlier post about Chernobyl and the Soviet's hubris about containment buildings, would you care to comment on the operating configuration of the Chernobyl reactor at the time of the accident?  Had any of the designed safety features been defeated?  Had the operating procedures been violated?  I'd be interested to read your answers on those two questions.

>

> Regarding the injury/death of non-combatants during FOF exercises at federal nuclear installations, do you think that the reason for making non-combatant fatalities non-reportable is because there is a high possibility for that very thing during a real attack on a facility?  If a "bad guy" is making off with a nuke or bomb-making materials and has a few hostages in tow, do you really think the security force should withhold fire and let the nuke get away?  Or perhaps I've completely lost your point.

>

> While you espouse the view that the majority of RADSAFErs seem to think that any bad press is a "media conspiracy," your typical counterpoint of "the Man" being behind good press tends to push the pendulum pretty far in the opposite direction.

>

> v/r

> Michael

>

> ************************************************************************

> You are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To unsubscribe,

> send an e-mail to Majordomo@list.vanderbilt.edu  Put the text "unsubscribe

> radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail, with no subject line.

> You can view the Radsafe archives at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/





************************************************************************

You are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To unsubscribe,

send an e-mail to Majordomo@list.vanderbilt.edu  Put the text "unsubscribe

radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail, with no subject line.

You can view the Radsafe archives at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/