re: SOURCE DESTROYED ACCIDENTALLY... AT PARIS AIRPORT

[Peter Sandgren <peter.sandgren@PO.STATE.CT.US>]

I have a question regarding the following excerpt:

IRSN's Gourmelon said results of the latest

> batch of detailed chromosome readings of FedEx personnel,

> just completed, had "not changed the picture" regarding the

> radiological impact of the iridium package, i.e., no further

> unusually high dose had been detected. He added that the cost

> of reading the 2,000 blood cells required to detect such relatively

> low doses was prohibitive



Can anyone explain "chromosome readings" and give me the nutshell version 

of assessing radiation dose from the results?  I've read that changes in 

blood cells are one of the first things that can be detected in a person 

who has been subjected to an acute radiation dose.  I would like to 

reference this (in basic terminology) in my presentation on effects of 

radiation.  A brief paragraph is all I need, though I'm sure many on the 

list could explain in great detail.  Thank you!

Peter Sandgren

Training Division

Connecticut Office of Emergency Management



On Monday, August 26, 2002 10:21 AM, Franta, Jaroslav 

[SMTP:frantaj@AECL.CA] wrote:

> NUCLEONICS WEEK - August 22, 2002

> SOURCE DESTROYED ACCIDENTALLY

> DURING TRANSFER AT PARIS AIRPORT

> A medium-size iodine-131 source was dropped from a

> transfer dolly and crushed in Roissy Charles de Gaulle airport

> near Paris early this week, dispersing radioactive powder in a

> transit area between two terminals, French authorities said Aug. 20.

> Officials at regulatory agency DGSNR and the Institute of

> Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) said the

> Aug. 17 incident was "highly unusual" because the iodine

> package had been "completely destroyed."

> Patrick Gourmelon, head of IRSN's dosimetry and health

> protection department, said the 5-gigabecquerel source (about

> 100 millicuries) would have caused only "very low doses,"

> below the 1 milliSievert limit for public exposure, because the

> volatile iodine was dispersed over a wide area. But Jean-Luc

> Pasquier, head of IRSN's Le Vesinet site (the former rad

> protection office OPRI), said the incident is further demonstration

> that "there's a dysfunction in transfer of radioactive

> materials at Roissy." IRSN issued a report on the incident late

> Aug. 20 following an inspection at the airport Aug. 19

> (www.irsn.org).

> The capsule containing powdered sodium iodide, sent by

> CIS-Bio International in Saclay, was en route to a hospital in

> Zagreb, where it was to have been used to treat a cancer patient,

> Pasquier said. At the Paris airport, it was handled by a

> transit company and its subcontractors. The crushed package

> was found on the ground by gendarmes.

> The incident highlighted the problems of shipping small

> or medium-sized radioactive sources, which until recently

> have been essentially uncontrolled in France. The French

> nuclear safety authority only recently was given jurisdiction

> over radiation protection and radioactive sources, and although

> in principle DGSNR's predecessor agency, DSIN, had

> authority over nuclear materials transportation, in reality the

> agency hasn't had the resources to inspect and police the

> hundreds of thousands of "small nuclear" transports that occur

> in France every year.

> The way the iodine package was damaged-falling off a

> dolly in transit and believed being crushed by a truck-

> "shows that radioactive packages are handled like noodles or

> potatoes," commented one French expert. He said DGSNR is

> only just getting a handle on the problem, but there still appears

> to be confusion within the French bureaucracy over

> which agency or ministry is responsible for transport of small sources.

> The problem has taken on a higher profile since Sept. 11,

> 2001 in light of fears that terrorists might seize on a radioactive

> source to use as a threat or to incorporate in a so-called dirty bomb.

> More FedEx Analysis

> The dysfunction of the source shipment system was high-lighted

> in early January when an iridium-192 package en

> route at Roissy airport from Studsvik in Sweden to Memphis,

> Tenn. and New Orleans, La. was found to be leaking on arrival

> (NW, 10 Jan., 1). Because of its size, the source was enclosed

> in a Type B container, with more stringent requirements,

> but subsequent investigations showed the lids on two

> of three shipping tubes had not been properly screwed on.

> In May and June, DGSNR announced that two employees

> at Federal Express' Roissy hub had received doses estimated

> at about 15 and 100 milliSievert, respectively, showing the

> package was already leaking when it arrived in Paris.

> The doses are much higher than the limit for the general

> public, 1 mSv, but lower than the threshold for detection with

> traditional cell-count methods used in other countries, about

> 150 mSv. Only IRSN counts enough cells to find effects under

> that threshold, experts said. In the wake of the June finding,

> DGSNR asked FedEx to designate a further batch of

> employees who might have come into contact with the irradiating package.

> This week, IRSN's Gourmelon said results of the latest

> batch of detailed chromosome readings of FedEx personnel,

> just completed, had "not changed the picture" regarding the

> radiological impact of the iridium package, i.e., no further

> unusually high dose had been detected. He added that the cost

> of reading the 2,000 blood cells required to detect such relatively

> low doses was prohibitive, making it unlikely French

> authorities would order further investigations of the incident.

> Meanwhile, sources with the World Nuclear Transport

> Institute (WNTI) said the institute intended to "get more in-

> volved" in source transports. WNTI up to now has concentrated

> on the high-profile nuclear fuel cycle transport its members

> represent. Last month it published an issue brief outlining

> transport industry response to new regulations, known as ST-1,

> that since Jan. 1 require rad protection programs for all

> kinds of nuclear material transport. The issue brief said WNTI

> investigations, based on experience of actual transports,

> showed the expected maximum dose to handlers, crew and

> the public for shipment of all types of fuel cycle materials was

> "unlikely" to exceed 1,000 microSievert.

> That result contrasts with the 100 mSv received by the

> FedEx worker in Paris. "If a dose like that had been received

> in the nuclear fuel industry, there would have been public

> outcry," said a WNTI source. He said that partly because "the

> anti-nuclear power lobby would try to connect these incidents"

> to nuclear fuel transport, WNTI wants to "play a role"

> in helping make sure smaller transports are kept safe.

> He said that presently, WNTI "doesn't know very much"

> about the other part of the transport industry-that not dealing

> with fuel cycle materials-but "within a year we expect to be

> paying more attention" to that sector. He said WNTI "can do

> a lot to help the organizations involved" to set up rad protection

> programs based on its own experience and interface with

> regulators worldwide. He said the institute will be contacting

> those organizations with a view to collecting information and

> inviting them to join WNTI.-Ann MacLachlan, Paris





Peter Sandgren

Training Division

GIS Mapping Systems

Connecticut Office of Emergency Management



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