Re: Senate Bill 1043

[BLHamrick@AOL.COM]

In a message dated 7/11/2003 3:02:19 PM Pacific Standard Time, 

csmarcus@ucla.edu writes:



> The Commissioners of NRC decided to go for ARM for reasons that have 

> nothing to do with national security.  The reasons are power, control, and 

> increased User Fees, I expect.  The Agreement States asked them not to but 

> they ignored the Agreement States and went ahead anyway.  They certainly 

> aren't out to fix any problems; there aren't any of which I am aware.  But 

> they will certainly make plenty, I'll bet, judging by their performance 

> with byproduct material.





Not to be argumentative, but I'm not sure the "Agreement States" did take a 

recent position on this.  I would be interested in knowing when and where they 

did.  I also think that based on other NRC staff papers (i.e., the May 2003 

SECY paper on the control of source material) that the NRC is not actually 

looking to increase their control, but quite the converse, trying to decrease it.



> 

> As the security requirements of this bill are impossible to achieve, or at 

> least utterly impractical, the passage of this bill would mean that NRC 

> would be forced, by law, to go around shutting down its licensees and 

> losing all those User Fees as a result.  This is a little much, even for 

> the NRC.  This bill is bad law.  It should be defeated.

> 



These security requirements are applicable to "designated nuclear 

facilities," defined to be NPPs, fuel-processing facilities, or other facilities of 

similar significance as defined by the NRC.  They really already have many of the 

powers granted to define such facilities, and to require significantly more 

security than at routine materials facilities.  It is my opinion they have acted 

quite responsibly in identifying those facilities which may require increased 

security for national security reasons, as they since the inception of the 

AEC.





> The Atomic Energy Act, as written at present, gives the NRC the right to 

> make appropriate (or inappropriate) security requirements.  Just look at 

> what NRC does in terms of locking lab doors or refrigerators just because 

> there is a microcurie of C-14- or H-3-whatever inside.  Can you imagine how 

> NRC will behave with this new law?

> 



This law does not, on its face, apply to the facilities cited in your 

paragraph above.  In light of the powers the NRC already has to require enhanced 

security at NPPs (and certain other designated facilities), which is not required 

at routine radioactive materials facilities, there is no reason to believe 

they would apply this new law granting powers over NARM any differently.



Barbara