RE: Response to Ted Rockwell's article

[John Jacobus <crispy_bird@YAHOO.COM>]

Grant,

Thanks for reminding me.  However, to continue my

questioning, how would the first responders initially

know that a significant radiological hazard exists? 

Do all first responders have alarming dosimeters?  How

about if they are responding to an explosion or fire

in a building?  Would they be expected to have

alarming dosimeters?  



On another point, what if the first responders are

planning to use alarm levels one-tenth of the values

you quote?  Would this hamper rescue operations?



These are issue I think that need to be considered.



--- "NIXON, Grant (Kanata)" <GNIXON@MDS.Nordion.com>

wrote:

> 

> John,

> 

> This is similar to a previous post we had (Ken

> Smith, Tuesday, July 29, 2003

> 7:42 PM).

> 

> I think that this 50 rem level would apply only to

> first-responders that are

> "knowingly involved" in a life-saving/rescue

> activity, like occupational

> workers, directly saving people.

> 

> NCRP-138 recommends the following personal DRD alarm

> levels (see pp. 97-98,

> Sect, 8.4) for responders:

>  

> Initial alarm level: 0.1 mSv/h (10 mrem/h) - [to be

> used as an alert level]

> turn-around level: 0.1 Sv/h (10 rem/h) and a dose of

> 0.1 Sv (10 rem) [to be

> used as an alarm].

> 

> This seems to imply a 10 rem dose for

> first-responders who are not otherwise

> directly involved in the task of saving a human life

> (like non-occupational

> workers) but carrying-out emergency work

> nonetheless.

> 

> Grant

> 

> 

> -----Original Message-----

> From: John Jacobus [mailto:crispy_bird@YAHOO.COM]

> Sent: Monday, September 22, 2003 8:55 AM

> To: radsafe; know_nukes

> Subject: Re: Response to Ted Rockwell's article

> 

> 

> One question is what kind of information is being

> given to first responders?  NCRP 116, "Limitation of

> Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," recommends 0.5 Sv

> (50

> rad?) ED for occupational workers in life-saving

> situations.  NCRP 138, "Management of Terrorist

> Events

> Involving Radioactive Material," uses this same

> guidelines for first responders.  Are first

> responders

> occupational workers?  

> 

> P.S.  I really hate Sv being used for ED and DE.  

> 

> --- John Jacobus <crispy_bird@YAHOO.COM> wrote:

> > This letter appeared in today's Washington Post 

> > --------------

> > Radiation: The Real Deal

> >  

> >    Theodore Rockwell ["Radiation Chicken Little,"

> > op-ed, Sept. 16] recalls a recent National Academy

> > of

> > Engineering "dirty bomb" drill as yet another

> piece

> > of

> > evidence that our fears of radiation are

> overblown.

> > As

> > 

> > a technical adviser to the drill's designers, I

> > understand Rockwell's frustration. Radiation is

> not

> > as

> > dangerous as most people imagine.

> >  

> >  Yet Rockwell's own characterization of the dirty

> > bomb

> > threat is misleading. Most realistic assessments

> of

> > dirty bomb dangers emphasize that few if any will

> > die

> > from an attack. Instead, the danger is long-term

> > contamination, carrying with it social and

> economic

> > costs. Rockwell dismisses such concerns.

> >  

> >   First, he contends that we will insist upon "a

> > hypothetical, squeaky-clean condition, scrubbing

> the

> > ground and sidewalks down to far less than the

> > natural

> > radiation background of God's good green Earth," a

> 

> > constraint that he deems "inappropriate." He is

> > right

> > that imposing strict EPA cleanup standards after a

> > dirty bomb attack would, from a public health

> > standpoint, be excessive. But easily imaginable

> > dirty

> > bomb scenarios would contaminate substantial areas

> > to

> > several hundred times those strict thresholds --

> and

> > to 10 or more times the "natural radiation

> > background"

> > Rockwell cites.

> >  

> >   Imagine a crude, inefficient dirty bomb using

> the

> > amount of cesium found in an old Soviet radiation

> > source, such as one of those your paper has

> reported

> > are missing in Eastern Europe. If people did not

> > leave

> > the area permanently, and if the area surrounding

> > the

> > attack could not be cleaned up, one in 10

> residents

> > over an area of roughly 20 city blocks would die

> of

> > cancer as a result of the attack -- 50 percent

> more

> > than typically do. The radiation levels would be

> > roughly 1,000 times higher than the EPA's

> > "squeaky-clean  condition."

> >  

> >   Rockwell claims that "you would flush any

> residual

> > radioactivity down the drain with hoses and be

> done

> > with it." But cesium chemically attaches to glass,

> > concrete and asphalt -- and it does so quickly. If

> > done quickly, washing off sidewalks might remove

> > half

> > of the contamination, but removing the rest would

> > require special chemical procedures or abrasive

> > techniques, which would introduce major safety,

> > logistics and cost challenges.

> >  

> >   Nuclear power is also on Rockwell's radar, and

> he

> > is

> > right to be incensed by "public interest" group

> > claims

> > that terrorists could turn nuclear power plants

> into

> > "weapons of mass destruction" -- they could do 

> > nothing of the sort. But Rockwell goes further,

> > citing

> > a Science article (which he co-wrote) as evidence

> > that

> > "one can do nothing to an American-type nuclear

> > power

> > plant or its fuel that would create a serious

> public

> > health hazard." That study has been widely

> disputed,

> > including by Sandia National Laboratory, upon

> whose

> > experiments the Science article was based. And the

> > Science article never discusses attacks on stored

> > fuel, probably the greatest worry of those who

> study

> > power-plant vulnerability. It considers only

> attacks

> > on fuel during shipment, while that fuel is 

> > heavily protected.

> >  

> >   Rockwell is right that "if you tell people there

> > is

> > no danger, and they have no reason to disbelieve

> > you,

> > they will remain calm."

> >  

> >  But if you tell people there is no danger, and

> > instead there is only a small one, they will lose

> > faith, assume the worst and panic. The real

> dangers

> > of

> > dirty bombs and power-plant attacks are not nearly

> > as 

> > horrific as many imagine. We should be able to

> calm

> > people by simply telling them the truth.

> >  

> >     -- Michael A. Levi

> >   

> >  Washington

> >  

> >  The writer is science and technology fellow in

> > foreign policy studies at the Brookings

> Institution.

> >  

> > Would you like to send this article to a friend?

> Go

> > to

> > 

> >

>

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/admin/emailfriend?contentId=A37571-

> 2003Sep19&sent=no&referrer=emailarticle

> >  

> 

=== message truncated ===





=====

"Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law."

Louis D. Brandeis, Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. U.S., 1928



-- John

John Jacobus, MS

Certified Health Physicist

e-mail:  crispy_bird@yahoo.com



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