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Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear
Those of you at the national labs and gov agencies
might be interested in this article. Transdniester is
well known to those of us in the weapons arena. Gerry
washingtonpost.com
Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear
Stocks of Soviet-Era Arms For Sale on Black Market
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, December 7, 2003; Page A01
TIRASPOL, Moldova -- In the ethnic conflicts that
surrounded the collapse of the Soviet Union, fighters
in several countries seized upon an unlikely new
weapon: a small, thin rocket known as the Alazan.
Originally built for weather experiments, the Alazan
rockets were packed with explosives and lobbed into
cities. Military records show that at least 38 Alazan
warheads were modified to carry radioactive material,
effectively creating the world's first
surface-to-surface dirty bomb.
The radioactive warheads are not known to have been
used. But now, according to experts and officials, they
have disappeared.
The last known repository was here, in a tiny
separatist enclave known as Transdniester, which broke
away from Moldova 12 years ago. The Transdniester
Moldovan Republic is a sliver of land no bigger than
Rhode Island located along Moldova's eastern border
with Ukraine. Its government is recognized by no other
nation. But its weapons stocks -- new, used and
modified -- have attracted the attention of
black-market arms dealers worldwide. And they're for
sale, according to U.S. and Moldovan officials and
weapons experts.
When the Soviet army withdrew from this corner of
Eastern Europe, the weapons were deposited into an
arsenal of stupefying proportions. In fortified bunkers
are stored 50,000 tons of aging artillery shells, mines
and rockets, enough to fill 2,500 boxcars.
Conventional arms originating in Transdniester have
been turning up for years in conflict zones from the
Caucasus to Central Africa, evidence of what U.S.
officials describe as an invisible pipeline for
smuggled goods that runs through Tiraspol to the Black
Sea and beyond. Now, governments and terrorism experts
fear the same pipeline is carrying nonconventional
weapons such as the radioactive Alazan, and that
terrorists are starting to tap in.
"For terrorists, this is the best market you could
imagine: cheap, efficient and forgotten by the whole
world," said Vladimir Orlov, founding director of the
Center for Policy Studies in Moscow, a group that
studies proliferation issues.
Why the Alazan warheads were made is unknown. The
urgent question -- where are they now? -- is a matter
of grave concern to terrorism and nonproliferation
experts who know the damage such devices could do. A
dirty bomb is not a nuclear device but a weapon that
uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive
materials, which could cause widespread disruption and
expose people to dangerous radiation. Unlike other
kinds of dirty bombs, this one would come with its own
delivery system, and an 8-mile range. A number of
terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, have sought to
build or buy one.
While it has no nuclear bombs of its own, Transdniester
is regarded by experts as a prime shopping ground for
outlaw groups looking for weapons of every type. It is
the embodiment of the gray zone, where failed states,
porous borders and weak law enforcement allow the
buying and selling of instruments of terror.
Transdniester possesses many of the trappings of
statehood, including an army and border guards who
demand visas and special entrance fees from visitors.
But according to Western diplomats based in the region,
these procedures are window dressing used to mask the
activities of a small clique that runs the country by
its own rules.
Much of the enclave's trade is controlled by a
consortium, Sheriff, controlled by the son of the
Transdniester's president, Igor Smirnov. Vladimir
Smirnov also heads the Transdniester Customs Service,
which oversees a river of goods flowing in and out of
the country. The cargoes move through the Tiraspol
airport; by truck overland to Ukraine or Moldova; and
on a rail-to-ship line that connects the capital to the
Black Sea port of Odessa. The Transdniester interior
minister, Maj. Gen. Vadim Shevtsov, is a former Soviet
KGB agent wanted in connection with a murderous attack
on pro-independence Latvians in 1991.
Organized crime figures and reputed terrorists flit in
and out of the region, according to law enforcement and
government officials in Moldova and U.S. officials.
Their cargoes are often disguised. "This is one of the
places where the buyers connect with the sellers," said
William C. Potter, director of the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for
International Studies. "It's one-stop shopping for
weapons and all kinds of other illicit goods. Very
possibly, that includes the materials for weapons of
mass destruction."
The enormous Soviet-style banners stretched across
intersections in downtown Tiraspol bid visitors welcome
to "The People's Pride: The Transdniester Moldovan
Republic." The city is locked in a Brezhnev-era time
warp. Nearly every corner bears a reminder of the
regime's stubborn embrace of old-school Soviet
communism: a statue of Lenin, a hammer-and-sickle
banner, a street named for Karl Marx.
Father, Son and Sheriff
A large portion of the population is made up
Russian-speaking pensioners, many of them Soviet
military retirees who served in the area and chose to
stay because of the relatively mild climate. Like the
elderly elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the
retirees are nostalgic for a simpler, more predictable
time when the socialist state took care of all their
needs.
North of Tiraspol, an industrial center straddles the
main rail line into town. Steam blasts from a complex
of gray buildings housing the city's Elektromash works,
a leading factory that describes itself officially as a
producer of electrical engines. According to Moldovan
and Western intelligence officials, the factory's
product line includes assault rifles and machine
pistols, a centerpiece of Transdniester's most
profitable industry: weapons.
Once the industrial heartland of the Moldavian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Transdniester has a long history as
a production center for arms and weapons, including
machine guns and rockets. Today, the tradition
continues in at least six sprawling factories in the
capital and the cities of Tighina and Rybnitsa,
according to Ceslav Ciobanu, a former Moldovan
ambassador to the United States and now a senior
research scholar for James Madison University's William
R. Nelson Institute.
Among the weapons in production are Grad and Duga
multiple-rocket launchers, antitank mines,
rocket-propelled grenades and multiple lines of small
arms, Ciobanu said.
It's an impressive output for a country whose army, the
Dniester Republican Guard, numbers only 5,000. But
hardly any of the weapons are manufactured for local
use, according to Ciobanu, who described the arms trade
in a Nelson Institute paper released in June.
"Production of armaments and illegal weapons traffic
constitutes the most important factor of the economic
and military policy of the Tiraspol administration, and
the biggest source of revenues for its corrupt elites,"
Ciobanu said.
The same powerful troika that dominates Transdniester's
political and economic life controls the production of
weapons as well as exports abroad, Ciobanu said:
"Father, Son and Sheriff."
It's a view shared by Western officials based in the
region, as well as law-enforcement and weapons experts
abroad. Several Moldova-based diplomats, speaking on
the condition of anonymity, confirmed there is an
eastern flow of arms from Tiraspol to Odessa, the
Ukrainian port on the Black Sea. They also described
seizures of Transdniester-made weapons in conflicts
zones outside the enclave.
Last year, one such cache of pistols and other small
arms was seized in the basement of the home of one of
the leaders of the separatist Gagauz movement. The
Gagauz are a tiny Turkik-speaking minority in southern
Moldova. The weapons turned out to be poorly made
counterfeits of American weapons. "The guns were
stamped 'U.S. Army,' but the brand names were
misspelled," said one diplomatic source familiar with
the incident. Transdniester weapons exports also have
been traced to the breakaway Abkhazia region, in the
former Soviet republic of Georgia, and to war zones in
the Congo and Ivory Coast, according to Moldovan
officials and independent weapons experts.
But the largest weapons stockpile in Transdniester is
located at a massive arsenal near the northern town of
Kolbasna. Originally a supply depot for Red Army forces
in the Black Sea region, the Kolbasna arsenal swelled
in the early 1990s as troops departing newly
independent Eastern European states deposited weapons
and ammunition there. The arsenal currently holds an
estimated 50,000 tons of munitions of all kinds,
including large numbers of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft
missiles.
Moldova has pressed Russia to remove the munitions and
the 2,800 Russian troops who guard them. But over the
years, both Russia and Transdniester have used a
variety of excuses to block or delay their departure.
The arsenal, which is 600 miles from the Russian
border, is one of the main sticking points in ongoing
negotiations aimed at reconciling Moldova and its
former province, which fought a short, bloody civil war
that ended in 1992. Transdniester has opposed removing
the stockpile, partly because it hopes to receive
payment for the weapons, and also because the Russian
presence has helped guarantee Transdniester's survival
as an autonomous region.
Moldova does not formally recognize that an independent
Transdniester exists. Thus, the largest border between
them -- and the one most likely to be used for
weapons-trafficking -- is unprotected. On the Moldovan
side, it has no checkpoints, no detectors and no guards.
Hundreds of westbound trucks and cars cross into
Moldova each day along the main Tiraspol-Chisinau
highway, just as freely as the trains heading east
along the rails to Odessa. Moldovan officials fret
privately about the smuggled goods they don't catch.
"Transdniester is like a cancer, and there's nothing we
can do about it," said one senior Moldovan official who
declined to be identified for fear he would lose his
job. "We're battling our own corruption, and out there
is a 400-kilometer border over which we have no control.
"Trucks cross the border every day, slip into one of
the smaller roads and disappear," the official
continued. "And I'm 100 percent sure of this: Some of
those trucks are carrying weapons."
Western and Moldovan officials point to numerous
incidents in which seized Russian weapons were traced
back to Transdniester. In one well-documented case in
1999, a truck halted by Moldovan police on the
Transdniester border was discovered to contain
Russian-made shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles,
along with plastic explosives and detonators. Driving
the truck were several members of Transdniester's army,
along with Lt. Col. Vladimir Nemkoff, a deputy
commander of Russian peacekeeping troops in the
enclave.
On the same day, Nemkoff's son, an officer in
Transdniester's Ministry of Security, was arrested
while driving a vehicle that contained three
Soviet-made Igla surface-to-air rockets, similar to the
U.S.-made Stinger missile.
Nemkoff was convicted of weapons-trafficking in a trial
in Moldova, but was later pardoned and allowed to
return to Transdniester. Within days, he regained his
old job as a Russian peacekeeper.
Such incidents suggest the Kolbasna arsenal is a "black
hole" where dangerous weapons can be obtained, if the
price is right, said Iurie Rosca, leader of the
Christian Democratic People's Party, a leading
pro-Western opposition faction in Moldova.
"It's well known to us: If you need a Stinger and you
have the money, you can get one," Rosca said. "If it's
a Kalashnikov you want, you can get one of those, too."
Radioactive Warheads
The most unusual weapon in Transdniester's arsenal was
never meant to be a weapon at all. The Alazan, a
slender, three-foot-long rocket, was part of a broader,
rather extravagant Soviet experiment in weather
control. Soviet scientists believed that hail could be
suppressed by firing rockets into approaching storm
clouds. The idea is vaguely similar to cloud-seeding as
practiced in the United States. American scientists
familiar with the anti-hail program say the results are
highly dubious, at best.
When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, scores of
batteries of tube-fired Alazans were left throughout
the Soviet bloc, including Eastern Europe. As ethnic
clashes erupted in the newly independent former Soviet
republics, the Alazan and a slightly larger rocket
called the Alan were reactivated for war.
Potter documented 50 cases in which the rockets were
used in clashes, by both guerrilla fighters and
government forces. In most incidents, Alazans were
fired indiscriminately at civilian targets, often
crowded urban centers. They were used by Azeri forces
in the war with Armenia over the disputed enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and used by separatists in South
Ossetia in clashes with Georgian troops.
"Some of the reports indicated that the Alazan, which
is notoriously inaccurate as a surface-to-surface
missile, was used as a psychological or terror weapon,"
Potter said.
Since Soviet times, at least three Alazan batteries
were known to exist in the Transdniester region, as
documented by military inventories of the time. In
1992, there was a confirmed case of attempted smuggling
of Alazans for use as weapons. On May 24 of that year,
two Moldovan police were killed when they tried to stop
delivery of Alazan rockets to ethnic Gagauz militants,
according to local press accounts of the incident.
Moldovan officials believe the source of the rockets
was Transdniester.
But the existence of "radiological warheads" for the
Alazan was unknown until two years ago, when military
documents describing them were obtained by the
Institute for Policy Studies, a research group in
Chisinau, the Moldovan capital.
The documents, which were provided to The Washington
Post, are a series of official letters written in 1994
by a Transdniester civil defense commander, Col. V.
Kireev, who apparently became concerned about radiation
given off by the rockets.
One document described an inventory of 38 "isotopic
radioactive warheads of missiles of the Alazan type,"
including 24 that were attached to rocket. In the two
other documents, the commander requested technical help
in dealing with radiation exposure related to storage
of the warheads. He complained that uniforms of
soldiers working with the warheads were so contaminated
that they had to be "destroyed by burning and burying."
"I propose to categorically ban all work with the
missile . . . and to label it as a radioactive danger,"
Kireev wrote on Oct. 24, 1994.
Several U.S. and Moldovan government officials
knowledgeable about Transdniester's weapons said in
interviews that they were familiar with the reports of
radioactive Alazans, but could neither verify or
dispute the existence of such devices.
Oazu Nantoi, a former Moldovan government official and
political analyst, sought in 2001 to trace the Alazans
with radiological warheads, using contacts in Moldova
and Transdniester. He said that the last known location
of the weapons was a military airfield north of
Tiraspol, but what happened to them after the 1990s
remains a mystery.
"They are not Scuds, but clearly, the only application
for these rockets is a military one," said Nantoi. "Our
fear is someone, somewhere, will turn these rockets
into dirty bombs."
© 2003 The Washington Post Company
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A41921-2003Dec6?language=printer
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