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U.S.: Nuclear Plant Cheated During Drill
Its does not surprise me if true, though 90% of all
drills are known in advance and are more a PR stunt or
performed just to meet the code. Gerry
Today: January 27, 2004 at 6:50:12 PST
U.S.: Nuclear Plant Cheated During Drill
By DUNCAN MANSFIELD
ASSOCIATED PRESS
KNOXVILLE, Tenn. (AP) -
Security guards at the nuclear weapons plant in Oak
Ridge stunned inspectors in June by successfully
repelling four simulated terrorist attacks - a feat
computer programs predicted wouldn't be done.
That apparent success was tarnished, according to the
Energy Department: Employees of an outside security
contractor were tipped off about the impending
simulations, making the tests a costly waste of time.
A broader investigation uncovered more evidence of
cheating during mock attacks at the plant over the past
two decades, including barricades being set up before
the test to alter the outcome and guards deviating from
the established response plan to improve their
performance.
"There's no point in doing them if you have people who
are going to cheat," said Richard Clarke, a former
senior White House counterterrorism official. "That's
ridiculous. It kind of defeats the whole point of
having these tests."
The department's inspector general, Gregory H.
Friedman, issued a report concluding the June drills at
the Y-12 nuclear facility were "tainted and unreliable"
because two guard supervisors from Wackenhut Corp. were
allowed to see computer simulations one day before the
attacks.
Friedman's investigators also said they received
"compelling testimony" from more than 30 former and
current security officers at Oak Ridge that this was
part of "a pattern of actions ... going back to the
mid-1980s that may have negatively affected the
reliability of site performance testing." Each mock
attack cost as much as $85,000 to stage, Friedman said.
The plant paid Wackenhut award fees of $2.2 million and
rated its work "outstanding" for the period through
July 2003. The cheating reported by the inspector
general had taken place just weeks earlier.
A senior vice president for Wackenhut Services Inc.,
Jean Burleson, described details in the inspector
general's report as "old news," which he said "may or
may not have occurred." Burleson added: "There is no
impropriety right now going on. Security is better
today than it has ever been."
Burleson acknowledged that two guard supervisors saw
the exercise plans the day before the drills. But he
said they were filling in for two absentee supervisors
who had reviewed the same material with other
supervisors two weeks before. The reason for the
advance review, the company argues, is that that
particular drill was not intended to be a surprise
drill but rather an exercise designed to improve
computer simulations of security measures.
The National Nuclear Security Administration, an agency
within the Energy Department which protects nuclear
plants, said in a letter disclosed Monday that it
already has taken unspecified action.
The inspector general said guards in another mock
attack in late 2000 or early 2001 were improperly told
which building would be attacked, the exact number of
attackers and where a diversion was being staged.
Investigators also said managers substituted their best
security guards for others scheduled to work the day of
attacks, and standby guards would sometimes be armed
and used to bolster existing security guards on duty.
In other cases, security guards disabled laser sensors
they wore to determine whether they received a
simulated gunshot. Guards removed batteries,
deliberately installed batteries backward and covered
sensors with tape, mud or Vaseline so they wouldn't
operate properly.
Such cheating is "not uncommon at all," said Ronald
Timm, president of RETA Security Inc. of Lemont, Ill.,
a consulting company that has worked with the Energy
Department to analyze vulnerabilities at its plants.
"Most security forces don't like to lose; they go
through great lengths to cheat to win. A loss is
considered a negative mark against them."
Investigators said the claims they heard were based on
interviews with current and former guards, which they
described as "credible and compelling." But they
acknowledged they could find no documentary evidence to
support the claims of previous cheating.
The inspector general said having security supervisors
know about a pending mock attack would have revealed
important details that would tip off the guards about
what methods to help neutralize the assault.
"It's blatant cheating," said Peter Stockton of the
Project on Government Oversight, a Washington-based
watchdog group. "It doesn't say much for the integrity
of the guard forces and some managers who knew this
kind of thing was going on."
Computer models had predicted guards at the plant would
decisively lose at least two of the four simulated
attacks, all on June 26. Two other guards identified as
improperly looking at the plans in advance denied doing
so, the report said. A suspicious site manager began
investigating after the tests.
"I understand the perception, but the fact is there was
nothing wrong with what occurred," said Burleson, the
Wackenhut executive. "If we had lost the exercise, it
wouldn't have been an issue because they expected us to
lose the exercise."
Citing the federal Privacy Act, the inspector general's
report did not identify any of the Oak Ridge guards.
Security at the plant is handled by Wackenhut, the
largest supplier of guards for U.S. nuclear facilities,
including the Nevada Test Site, the Savannah River Site
in South Carolina, Colorado's Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site and the Nonproliferation and Nuclear
Security Institute in Albuquerque, N.M.
The Y-12 plant, about 20 miles west of Knoxville, makes
parts for every warhead in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and
is a major storehouse for bomb-grade uranium.
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