An NPT for non-members

["Gerry Blackwood" <gpblackwood@HOTMAIL.COM>]

Hold your breath.......



http://64.4.48.250/cgi-bin/linkrd?_lang=EN&lah=32cd89f3ca0c7e9aecd0b9c9072fa1b7&lat=1082657323&hm___action=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2ethebulletin%2eorg%2fissues%2f2004%2fmj04%2fmj04cohen%2ehtml



An NPT for non-members

By Avner Cohen & Thomas Graham Jr.



A separate agreement for Israel, India, and Pakistan would bolster 

nonproliferation efforts from outside the NPT, but would require Israel to 

acknowledge its nuclear status.





By late 1966, as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was nearing 

completion, Israel had secretly concluded the research and development phase 

for its first nuclear explosive device. But it did not dare test the device. 

Israel had promised President Lyndon Johnson’s administration that “it 

[would] not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.” 

And it intended to keep its word. When Johnson was informed by CIA Director 

Richard Helms that Israel had reached nuclear capability, he ordered Helms 

“to keep [Israel’s nuclear progress] a secret and not share it even with 

[Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [Secretary of Defense Robert S.] 

McNamara.” A taboo was created.



This was the unique historical fabric with which Israel went nuclear in the 

1960s--with full technological vigor but with a great deal of political 

ambivalence. That and the hesitant American response gave rise to a 

bilateral taboo. Israel’s nuclear project was caught in the middle as 

nonproliferation norms were being built. While the United States, the Soviet 

Union, and Britain were working to address the threat of nuclear 

proliferation, Israel was concerned with being prepared to confront hostile 

neighbors. In 1968, with the completion of the NPT, American officials 

pressured Israel to join the nonproliferation effort, but to no avail. Given 

its security needs and U.S. unwillingness to provide security guarantees, it 

could not join the NPT and renounce its nuclear option.



By September 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and President Richard 

Nixon had reached a new secret understanding of the issue. Meir pledged that 

Israel would not declare its nuclear status, would not test its weapons, and 

would not use its nuclear capability for diplomatic gains. Rather, the 

Israeli bomb would be kept in the basement, for use only as a last resort. 

Israel would not join the NPT, but it would not defy it either.



What had begun as a taboo turned into a symbiotic policy. The United States 

stopped pressuring Israel and accepted a de facto policy of “don’t ask, 

don’t tell.” For more than three decades, Israel and the United States have 

perceived nuclear opacity as the only way to address both the uniqueness of 

Israel’s nuclear capabilities and the U.S. commitment to the nuclear 

nonproliferation regime. All Israeli governments have adhered to this 

understanding and all American administrations have looked the other way 

when it came to Israel’s nuclear capabilities. Today this policy is not 

merely anachronistic, it is counterproductive.





A weakened treaty



Much has changed in world politics since the NPT came into being in 1970, 

but it is remarkable that the grand bargain of the treaty has remained 

virtually intact. In exchange for renouncing nuclear weapons and accepting 

the new nonproliferation norms, the treaty’s nuclear weapon states agreed to 

share peaceful nuclear technology with the non-nuclear weapon states and 

committed themselves to pursuing nuclear disarmament measures aimed at the 

ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.



The number of nuclear weapon states has changed very little since 1970. 

Today, in fact, there are only two more nuclear weapon programs than existed 

in 1970, as Israel and India were far along toward a weapon capability at 

the time. Israel, India, and Pakistan are all NPT non-signatories and all 

are full-blown nuclear weapon states. North Korea, which pursued its nuclear 

ambitions from within the treaty, also claims to have crossed the nuclear 

threshold.



Then there is the case of Iran, a country that does not yet have nuclear 

weapons but, like North Korea, is widely believed to be developing a nuclear 

weapons program from within the NPT.



Contrary to those who alarmingly predicted that the end of the Cold War 

would lead to rapid proliferation--and ultimately nuclear anarchy--the NPT 

continues to stimulate positive nonproliferation developments. Russia alone 

succeeded the Soviet Union as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT, while 

the other former Soviet republics joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon 

states. South Africa destroyed the seven nuclear weapons it had built and 

joined the NPT in 1992, and Argentina and Brazil gave up their nuclear 

rivalry to join the treaty. Nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWZ) treaties have 

come into force in Latin America, Africa, the South Pacific, and Southeast 

Asia, and now cover a considerable portion of the world’s landmass.



Together with other multilateral and bilateral agreements, the NPT has grown 

to be the centerpiece in a much larger, more flexible, and dynamic 

nonproliferation regime. Included in what is now a large array of 

arrangements are: the informal nuclear supplier controls; the Lisbon 

Protocol of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty, which ensured 

the non-nuclear status of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the regional 

NWZs; the bilateral inspection arrangements between Argentina and Brazil, 

which permitted their accession to the NPT; the now-terminated Agreed 

Framework between the United States and North Korea; and, in 1997, the 

International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) expanded inspection protocol. 

All of these arrangements address specific nuclear proliferation problems 

that the NPT could not resolve alone. And they all support the idea of the 

nonproliferation norm from outside the NPT proper.



Despite its success, it is by no means certain that the nonproliferation 

regime, the cornerstone of world security, will survive in the long term. 

Its weakness can be traced to several factors.



The nuclear weapon states have not pursued their half of the bargain with 

sufficient vigor. While Britain, France, and Russia have ratified the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the U.S. Senate has rejected 

ratification, and China now hides behind the U.S. refusal. While the United 

States and Russia have agreed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on 

alert during the next 10 years, both countries still maintain stockpiles of 

thousands of nuclear weapons. And there is also the issue of negative 

security assurances, commitments by the nuclear weapon states not to attack 

non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons. In order to achieve the 

permanent extension of the NPT in 1995, all five NPT weapon states made 

technically nonbinding, highly formal negative security assurances to all 

non-nuclear weapon states. But the United States, Britain, France, and 

Russia all have national policies and military doctrines that conflict with 

those declarations.



The nuclear weapon states have also failed to make the NPT universal and 

improve compliance mechanisms. The perceived credibility and effectiveness 

of the NPT is a measure of the strength of the entire nonproliferation 

regime and rests on the treaty being applied universally. Non-nuclear weapon 

states have questioned the wisdom of adhering to the NPT when India, 

Pakistan, and Israel all operate outside the treaty and leave the regime 

incomplete.



Noncompliance and illegal nuclear weapon programs are the most serious 

problems for the nonproliferation regime. The nuclear programs of North 

Korea and Iran are examples of how nations may abuse rights granted them 

under the NPT. If not effectively addressed, their violations will undermine 

the viability and integrity of the treaty and cause states to contemplate 

other means of preserving order and security in an increasingly dangerous 

world.



The issues of universality and compliance are closely related. Only a 

universal, action-oriented nonproliferation regime will command the respect 

of the world community and best address the noncompliance question.





Israel stands alone



The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were perceived as a serious 

blow to the nonproliferation regime, highlighting the fear of nuclear 

confrontation in South Asia. But within months policies started to change. 

Once it became apparent that India and Pakistan were determined to maintain 

their nuclear status, public discussion turned to how best to reduce the 

risk of nuclear war in the region and limit the damage the two programs 

caused to world security and the nonproliferation regime. This discussion, 

and progress toward a resolution of the situation, is only possible because 

both countries’ programs are somewhat transparent.



While much attention was given to the nuclear dangers on the Indian 

subcontinent following the 1998 nuclear tests, Israel’s aloofness from the 

NPT has historically received little attention, to the concern of some NPT 

member states. The taboo concerning Israel’s nuclear program creates a sort 

of paradox. While Israel’s nuclear weapon program is one of the world’s 

least-kept secrets--Israel is widely recognized as the world’s sixth ranking 

nuclear power, much closer, in quality and quantity, to France and Britain 

than to India and Pakistan--in Israel the nuclear program remains shrouded 

in secrecy. Israel’s policy of nuclear secrecy stands in profound tension 

with the basic values upon which the country’s democracy rests: the 

principles of accountability, oversight, and the public’s right to know. In 

the absence of public debate (and public debate requires some factual 

information) the taboo only reinforces and perpetuates itself.



In Israel, the most common argument for the policy of nuclear ambiguity 

points the finger at the United States. It is Israel’s commitment to the 

United States, the argument runs, that compels it to adhere to the posture 

of opacity. This is a false argument, based on assumptions known to be 

incorrect. There was a time when there would have been serious repercussions 

in the United States, particularly in Congress, if Israel had publicly 

disclosed its nuclear program, but this is no longer the case. It is 

inconceivable that the U.S. Congress would argue that Israel should abandon 

or even roll back its nuclear program, given its current security situation 

(including the emergence of the Iranian nuclear threat).



By becoming more transparent and by associating itself in some way with the 

nonproliferation regime--from which it indirectly benefits--Israel could 

gain an important element of legitimacy for its program and for its security 

posture. U.S. security and the global nonproliferation regime would also 

benefit from such a shift in policy. While ambiguity was a wise way to deal 

with a complex and uncomfortable reality 30 years ago, it is no longer 

justified.





Out of the nuclear closet



At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, member nations expressed 

concern about the nuclear situation in the Middle East. Egypt opposed the 

indefinite extension of the treaty on the grounds that, as long as key 

states (primarily Israel) remained outside the treaty, the regime was 

“incapable of safeguarding Egypt.” Senior Egyptian diplomats explained their 

position very simply. While it is understood that Israel will not use 

nuclear weapons at the present time, both political conditions and 

governments change. It is possible that a future Israeli government could 

behave differently, they argued, which is why disarmament negotiations have 

always emphasized capability rather than intent.



Unlike India, Israel understands that its regional conventional superiority 

would be effectively neutralized if any of its potential adversaries had 

nuclear weapons. As an uncommitted beneficiary of the NPT, Israel has chosen 

the precarious path of maintaining its own unsafeguarded nuclear program 

outside the treaty and relying on the majority of the world to support the 

health of the treaty’s regime. This unique status cannot last forever if 

widespread proliferation is to be averted. Israel is undeniably a part of 

the nonproliferation equation, regionally and globally.



Of course, each country has its own security concerns--Israelis often cite 

their country’s unique situation as a justification for nuclear 

exceptionalism--and the NPT is far from perfect. There are serious reasons 

to be concerned about the ability of IAEA safeguards inspections to verify 

nonproliferation. The U.N. Special Commission’s (UNSCOM) discoveries in Iraq 

raised grave questions about the system, and there is serious and justified 

concern about the situation in Iran as well. But these developments have 

also led to a strengthening of the safeguards approach and other 

nonproliferation efforts.



Even though it is unlikely that Israel will join the NPT, it recognizes that 

stemming nuclear proliferation is valuable to its security and could 

consider actions to support the nonproliferation norm, as far as it can, 

from outside the NPT. A number of Middle Eastern states have strong nuclear 

nonproliferation credentials, especially Egypt, which continues to play a 

leadership role in the NPT community and as part of the African 

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Given the complex circumstances of the 

Middle East, a regional solution to promoting nonproliferation might be 

useful.



Israel could relate to the nonproliferation regime as part of a regional  

discussion of the security problems associated with nuclear as well as 

chemical and biological weapons (as opposed to nuclear weapons only). This 

option would, however, require at least a reference to Israel as a nuclear 

weapon state.



This would present a problem as many NPT parties--most notably Japan, South 

Africa, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Algeria--joined the treaty based 

on the clear understanding that no other states would openly declare a 

nuclear weapon capability. The NPT allows temporarily for five, and no more 

than five, nuclear weapon states. The Indian and Pakistani tests already 

strained the NPT in this respect.



It is important to understand that even though India, Pakistan, and Israel 

have different security situations with respect to the nonproliferation 

regime, their issues must be addressed together as none of them can be 

approached in isolation.





A separate protocol



The world is coming to a historically decisive moment in its effort to 

promote nuclear nonproliferation. The basic technology needed to create 

nuclear weapons is increasingly available. Capabilities once possessed only 

by a few governments can now be purchased in stores and marketplaces around 

the world. If nuclear weapon states are ever to achieve deep cuts in their 

nuclear stockpiles--an important part of the basic bargain of the NPT and 

essential to the long-term viability of the treaty--some account has to be 

taken of Israel, India, and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. They must be 

integrated into the nonproliferation regime.



To amend the NPT and admit the three as nuclear weapon states is a political 

impossibility. And none of these states can be expected to give up its 

program to become a non-nuclear weapon party to the treaty. One answer could 

be a form of associate membership under a separate, freestanding agreement 

or protocol.



Such a protocol might permit Israel, India, and Pakistan to retain their 

programs, but inhibit further development. The protocol could also require 

cooperation with international nuclear export controls, prohibit the 

explosive testing of nuclear devices, and call for the phased elimination of 

fissile material production. Israel, India, and Pakistan would sign the 

agreement along with the Depositary States (Russia, Britain, and the United 

States), which since the 1960s have been considered the general managers of 

the NPT. By becoming party to such a protocol, the three could acknowledge 

their nuclear status through association with the existing nonproliferation 

regime.



It should be clear that in proposing a separate protocol we are not 

advocating such a solution for member states that have violated or abused 

the treaty. Israel, India, and Pakistan never joined the NPT; Iran and North 

Korea did, and they must be held to their obligations. But a viable and 

effective nonproliferation regime will only be possible, in the long run, if 

the nuclear weapon states observe their half of the NPT bargain and work 

toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. The first steps would be 

to ratify the test ban treaty, negotiate deeper cuts in nuclear weapon 

stockpiles, establish legally binding negative security assurances, and 

create a fissile material cutoff treaty. Any state to sign the separate 

protocol would have to participate in these steps as well. We recognize that 

reductions and a cutoff treaty will only happen some time in the future as 

part of a mutual step by all nuclear weapon states. As indicated above, an 

endorsement of the CTBT and negative security assurances could be contained 

in the suggested protocol.



This proposal does not legitimize nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. 

But it would realistically recognize the nuclear status of Israel, India, 

and Pakistan while requiring that they commit to nonproliferation standards. 

If the nonproliferation regime becomes more universal, it will become more 

effective.



Almost 35 years after a worldwide nonproliferation regime was established, 

the question of how to prevent nuclear anarchy still haunts us. The large 

number of existing nuclear weapons and stockpiles of fissile material only 

fuel the risk of proliferation. As a nuclear weapon state, Israel is part of 

the problem; therefore, it must be part of the solution. The same is true 

for India and Pakistan. The answers are difficult to come by, but the 

security of states cannot continue to come at the cost of the security of 

human civilization.



Avner Cohen, a senior fellow at the Center for International and Security 

Studies at the University of Maryland, is the author of Israel and the Bomb 

(1998). Amb. Thomas Graham Jr. is special counsel at Morgan, Lewis & 

Bockius. He served as acting director of the U.S. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency and also as President Bill Clinton’s special 

representative for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament

Gerry Blackwood

New York, New York



"Insanity is defined as doing the same thing over and over, but continually 

expecting a different result."  -- Sigmund Freud



_________________________________________________________________

Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee® 

Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963



************************************************************************

You are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To

unsubscribe, send an e-mail to Majordomo@list.vanderbilt.edu  Put the

text "unsubscribe radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail,

with no subject line. You can view the Radsafe archives at

http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/