Depleted Uranium (DU) Information

[LTC Robert Cherry 5-2303 <rcherry@aeha1.apgea.army.mil>]

Here's some DU information from my pal at The Army Surgeon General's
Office, Colonel Pete Myers.


Two papers may be of use:
  1.  "Briefing Card" used by DoD Spokesperson to brief the media.
  2.  Memo from Army Surgeon General updating Army Staff (Pentagon)

                 Depleted Uranium -- 14 June 93


                               NEWS

Is there any Chemical or Radiological Health Risks associated with
Depleted Uranium Exposures?

     - Careful analysis of various exposures to Depleted Uranium
suggests the exposures will produce no significant increase in
risk to health.  DoD is, however, actively evaluating and
following those soldiers who have been identified as having
received the highest unusual exposures to DU.


                            BACKGROUND

What is Depleted Uranium?

     - Depleted Uranium is the material that remains after the
more radioactive components of natural uranium are extracted for
use as radioactive fuels.  The DU is used by the Army as hardened
penetrators and hardened tank armor.  (It is also used
commercially as radiation shielding material, ballast in airplane
wings, and in counter-weights in large cranes and elevators.)

Why Use Depleted Uranium?

     - Depleted Uranium penetrators are more efficient in
penetrating enemy battlefield armor than penetrators made of other
materials.  This increased penetration efficiency translates into
an increased range from which the munitions can be fired
effectively against battlefield targets.  The greater range from
which an enemy target can be engaged increases the probability of
the success of the engagement and increases the probability of
survival for U.S. crewmembers firing at battlefield targets.  The
pyrophoricity of depleted uranium provides an additional benefit
in that secondary fires within targets are frequently generated.

What are the Hazards from Depleted Uranium?

     - For external exposure -- that is, the depleted uranium is
not taken into the body -- the hazards are extremely low.  Because
of the relatively low levels of radioactivity, an individual would
have to stand near stockpiles of DU munitions for hundreds of
hours in order to exceed the exposure limits of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for the general public.

     - For internal exposure -- that is, for cases in which
depleted uranium is taken into the body by way of inhalation,
ingestion, contamination of wounds or by a DU shrapnel wound --
there are two concerns.  First, uranium is a heavy metal and when
inhaled or ingested is about as chemically toxic as the more well
known metal, lead.  Second, the radiological hazards for internal
exposures are higher than for external exposures because of the
                 Depleted Uranium -- 14 June 93
                           (continued)


intimate contact of the DU with delicate tissues.  Because of the
very short range of the radiation emitted from DU, however, only
tissues in immediate contact with the DU are actually exposed.

     - Uncertainties in both the long-term health effects of DU
taken into the body (toxicologic and radiologic) are due to the
long-term exposure associated with internalized depleted uranium.

     - DoD has determined it will be prudent to conduct periodic
(perhaps annual) medical evaluations on the (less than 35)
soldiers determined to retain depleted uranium fragments imbedded
in tissue to:

         o be vigilant for unexpected biological responses;

         o provide the soldiers some degree of peace-of-mind; and

         o gain additional information which might be useful in
the management of similar injuries in future conflicts.

How Many Depleted Uranium Rounds Were Fired During ODS?

     - It is impossible to accurately estimate the tonnage or
actual number of depleted uranium penetrators that may still be
on the battlefield, since many were undoubtedly consumed in the
battle as they fulfilled their intended purpose.  Only the
"misses" would be found on the ground now.

         o When a penetrator hits a target, it is at least
partially oxidized as it punches through the target.  Heavily
armored vehicles may cause the penetrator to completely consume
itself in the destruction of the target, leaving a heavy metal
dust on, or fused to, exposed surfaces.

         o We, the U.S. Army, fired the following numbers of
depleted uranium anti-tank rounds during the war:

              * 120mm tank -- 3,669 -- each containing about 11.5
lbs. of depleted uranium.

              * 105mm tank --   600 -- each containing about 9.5
lbs. of depleted uranium.

         o The USMC fired the following numbers of depleted
uranium anti-tank rounds during the war:

              * 120mm tank --   385 -- each containing about 11.5
lbs. of depleted uranium.


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                 Depleted Uranium -- 14 June 93
                           (continued)


              * 105mm tank -- 1,636 -- each containing about 9.5
labs. of depleted uranium.

         o The USAF also fired depleted uranium rounds from 30mm
chain guns in their A-10 aircraft, but no unclassified estimate
of the number of rounds fired is available.

What is the Relationship of the Potential Health Risks from
Unusual DU Exposures to the "Desert Storm Syndrome?"

     - While the symptoms of some Desert Storm veterans cannot be
explained at the present time, it is highly unlikely that
depleted uranium exposures, either internal or external, are
related.

What is Happening to Answer the Questions Regarding the Health
and Environmental Effects of the Use of DU During ODS?

     - The Army has entered into an agreement with the Department
of Veterans Affairs to perform a long-term follow-up of
individuals who were injured by DU shrapnel.

     - The Army Environmental Policy Institute is preparing a
report to Congress on the health and environmental aspects of DU.


























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SGPS-PSP  (40-5)


MEMORANDUM FOR HQDA/ODCSLOG, ATTN:  DALO-SMT (LTC Fisher),
                 Washington, DC  20310-0500

SUBJECT:  Depleted Uranium Contamination


1.  Reference:

    a.  Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 8 June 93,
subject:  Depleted Uranium Contamination.

    b.  Memorandum, ODCSLOG/DALO-SMT, 22 Jun 93, subject:
Depleted Uranium Contamination.

    c.  Report, GAO, Jan 93, subject:  Army Not Adequately
Prepared to Deal with Depleted Uranium Contamination.

    d.  Report, AFRRI, Mar 93, Assessment of the Risks from
Imbedded Fragments of Depleted Uranium.

    e.  Report, AFRRI, Mar 93, Protocol for Monitoring Gulf War
Veterans with Imbedded Depleted Uranium Fragments.

2.  In response to references a and b, following is a description
of the Army Medical Department's plans and actions taken in the
process of completing medical testing of crew members who
received atypical exposures to depleted uranium during the
Persian Gulf War.

    a.  There were two types of atypical exposures:

        (1)  Inhalation or ingestion of depleted uranium dusts,
and

        (2)  Retention of depleted uranium fragments imbedded in
tissue.

    b.  Inhalation or ingestion of depleted uranium dusts could
have occurred under the following circumstances:

        (1)   While inside a battlefield vehicle, as it was
struck by a depleted uranium penetrator;

        (2)   While participating in damaged battlefield vehicle
recovery operations;


SGPS-PSP
SUBJECT:  Depleted Uranium Contamination


        (3)  While preparing damaged battlefield vehicles for
retrograde (depot operations);

        (4)  While fighting fires in which depleted uranium
munitions were involved.

    c.  An analysis of these various routes of exposure showed
that soldiers involved in the circumstances described in
paragraphs 2b(1) and 2b(3) would have had the greatest potential
for the uptake of depleted uranium dusts.  Soldiers who received
atypical exposures to depleted uranium under these circumstances
will undergo medical evaluation:

        (1)  Those soldiers within circumstance 2b(1) will
undergo medical evaluation in accordance with the medical
protocol (reference e) which has been developed in coordination
with the Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA) and the Army
Surgeon General's Office.  See more in paragraph 2d.

        (2)  A group of 27 members of the 144th Supply and
Service Company (Army National Guard) represent those who had the
greatest potential for receiving depleted uranium exposures
through the circumstance described in paragraph 2b(3).  In
accordance with reference c, if the results of these medical
evaluations are negative, it will be unnecessary to expand the
medical evaluation program to include other soldiers who received
less significant exposures to depleted uranium.

              (a)  Twelve of the twenty-seven have undergone
medical evaluation at the Boston VA Medical Center.  The results
of those evaluations show no elevated levels of uranium within
the soldiers bodies and no adverse health effects, which can be
related to uranium exposures, were identified.

              (b)  The medical evaluations for the remaining 15
have been delayed, due to a construction project at the Boston VA
Medical Center, but are now scheduled to be completed within the
next few months.

              (c)  In addition to the medical evaluations
conducted at the Boston VA Medical Center, urine samples from the
27 soldiers are being collected for analysis at the U.S. Army
Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA).  AEHA is developing a highly
sensitive technique for the analysis of uranium in urine; one
which they hope will be able to detect uranium in urine at
natural background levels.

    d.  Relative to the soldiers who received exposures under the
circumstances described in paragraph 2b(1), reference d

                                2
SGPS-PSP
SUBJECT:  Depleted Uranium Contamination


produced the conclusion that there was no compelling reason to
remove depleted uranium fragments from soldiers.  Also included
within the report, due to some scientific/medical uncertainties,
was the recommendation for periodic medical evaluation of the
soldiers who retain depleted uranium fragments, and for animal
research on the long-term effects of depleted uranium fragments
imbedded in tissue.

         (1)  The medical protocol for medically evaluating the
soldiers who retain depleted uranium fragments has been created
(reference e) and approved by OTSG and the VA.

         (2)  Addresses have been acquired for 33 of the 35
soldiers; the other 2 addresses can be identified through a
VA/IRS MOU which allows VA access to the IRS-address data base.

         (3)  Positive contact has been established with 30 of
the 35 soldiers.  They have been given information on the plan to
include them in the medical evaluations, an information paper on
depleted uranium, and a telephone number in the OTSG that they
can call (collect) should they have any questions.

         (4)  The VA has identified the Baltimore VA Medical
Center as the site at which the medical evaluations will be
performed.  They have on staff a group of professionals who have
been studying long-term health effects of imbedded lead fragments
and they are very interested in applying what they have learned
from their previous work to this project.

         (5)  We are still targeting Jul-Sep 93 as the time
during which the medical evaluations will be conducted, but
DoD/VA Sharing Agreement has yet to be established.  The Sharing
Agreement requires cost estimates for the medical tests which
each soldier will undergo and the Baltimore VA Medical Center is
in the process of developing those estimates.  DoD and VA
representatives are scheduled to meet early in July, 1993, to
discuss issues relating to finalizing the Sharing Agreement.

3.  POC is COL Peter H. Myers, Radiological Hygiene Consultant to
The Surgeon General, telephone 703-756-0132.




                                ROBERT G. CLAYPOOL
                                Colonel, MC
                                Director, Professional Services



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