Pb Bricks and Audits

["Michael P. Grissom" <MIKEG%SLACVM.bitnet@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu>]

1.  This seems a perfect match (since lead bricks are often the source
of problems at audits!).  Regarding the lead brick issue at Colorado,
I think a source of "virgin" lead is highly desirable (especially if
the shielding application is for high sensitivity detector caves).  A
surprising amount of recycled lead has multiple detectable peaks (I've
seen cesium and cobalt) of sufficient magnitude to cause MDA problems.
Of course, depleted uranium is great "small TVL" material, but there
seem to be a lot of control questions about it!  The army might have
some nearby you if they have been holding artillery practice near Fort
Carson in the last few years (DU armor piercing ordnance).

2.  Regarding audits, I certainly agree that large programs must have
an ongoing lab audit program (the situations in research laboratories
would be a great source of consternation for most of the nuclear power
types!).  However, I tend to agree with the reg guides/rules in that
the RSC should wear at least a bit of a participatory (sic) hat in
the process.  My technique was as the RSO to schedule once a year
audits in key areas with a member of the RSC who was not a stake
holder in the area being audited.  Since the program I was RSO of
was a medical program, I divided up RIA laboratory, Clinical
Investigations, Radiology (Diagnostic), Radiology (Radiotherapy), and
Nuclear Medicine as the key areas.  My check lists contained the
10 CFR key points (radionuclide utilization logs and inventory
balancing were typical trouble points) and some medical physics type
activities too (after all, if the films were bad and the QA was
deficient, both patients and staff were getting larger dose per
unit relative benefit).  The RSO and the member of the RSC jointly
signed the consolidated final report checklist which was then
presented to the whole RSC for review/approval.  They were on file
for U.S. NRC I/E review (and in general were considered more than
adequate by 4 different inspectors over a 5.5 year period).  Of
course, inspector number 5 might of hated it (had there been one)!

3.  The second inspector did remind me that the RSO needed to do
occasional audits independently, however.  So I chose a particular
area for a higher intensity review than the radiation safety staff
normally did (large numbers of swipes and high sensitivity detector
surface scans, for example, using the "RSO" hardware).  I liked to
point out to workers thumbprints (e.g., I-125) on work surfaces
outside of controlled areas, as an example, to illustrate why it
was a good idea not to do activities with the gloves on outside of
the radionuclide utilitization area!
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The opions expressed above are those of the author alone and do not
not represent those of the Stanford University or the US Department
of Energy.
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