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Re[2]: Consequences of Chernobyl in Belaru -Reply
Okay,
I'm sorry I said it. I was trying to interject some very serious
sarcasm into the discussion of Chernobyl and the health effects
thereof. As an ex-E-Planner for several nuclear utilities, I have
always felt that the utilities and states do themselves a great
disservice by eliminating any major planning efforts at the ten mile
ring. Granted, the possibility of a Chernobyl type event happening at
a US power plant is in the E-6 risk category, however, I still feel
that as also an ex-utility person (I now work for a State Bureau of
Radiation Protection) we, the nuclear community, should be better
prepared for this type of disaster.
I will not cite any particular power facility, however, I have worked
at more then one where a terrorist, with a well placed missile (like
the TOW missile) or two could create a weakness or failure of a
containment. Add this to the chance of also causing failures of
safety systems, and Chernobyl could happen in any number of sites. (I
base the terrorist scenario on the number of plants built in a
depression such as a shallow valley with hills around, or on the
plains and flatlands such as the gulf coastal plains, the Atlantic or
PAcific tidewater plains or the plains of central US.
I am sorry that I said that the NRC and FEMA should consider enlarging
the EPZ. I am aware of NUREG 0396 and its requirements and 10CFR50
App E and its requirements, and I promise never to be sarcastic over
RADSAFE again. I did not realize that Melissa also had established a
rule about humor.
Regards,
R.R.Goodwin
Ronald_Goodwin@Health.Ohio.Gov
______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Re: Consequences of Chernobyl in Belaru -Reply
Author: radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu at Internet
Date: 2/12/96 5:01 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
This could mean that the NRC and FEMA should rethink
the current 10
mile EPZ for exposure around our nuclear power plants.
Or not, based
on our belief that our power plants have containments,
and Cernobyl
had a Butler Building.
Regards
R.R.Goodwin
______________________________ Reply Separator
_________________________________
Subject: Consequences of Chernobyl in Belaru
Author: radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu at Internet
Date: 2/9/96 9:27 AM
This was sent out yesturday from a Chernobyl email list.
Mike Baker ... baker@nucst11.neep.wisc.edu
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From: Chernobyl@globenet.gn.apc.org
Date: 07 Feb 96 17:35 GMT
Subject: Consequences of Chernobyl in Belaru
To: Recipients of conference "energy.chernob"
<energy.chernob@conf.gn.apc.org> Sender: Conference to
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Consequences of Chernobyl in Belarus
More than 220,000 Belarussians have suffered physical
ailments and almost a quarter of Belarus remains
contaminated as a result of the 1986 nuclear accident at
Chernobyl, according to a new government report.
Leukemia cases along Belarus' southern border with
Ukraine, an area with 1.8 million people, nearly doubled in
1995 from the previous year, following an upward trend that
began in the late 1980s, Interfax said. Many of the sick are
those who lived in an 18-mile zone around the plant.
Ukraine's Health Ministry said more than 125,000
people had died by 1994 as a result of the accident.
Information references
Country : Belarus
Origin : AP / Interfax
Author : Date : 11/12/95
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conference, please contact
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<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
With respect to the 10-mile planning zone in NRC
regulations, if you look at the rationale for the size of the
zone, you will see that it was NOT justified as being the
maximum distance at which protective actions may be
necessary (see NUREG-0396). It was acknowledged that in
some circumstances, actions might be needed beyond 10
miles. Rather the rationale was that actions would seldom
be necessary beyond 10 miles, that actions needed
beyond 10 miles would not be as critical as those at closer
distances, that there would be more time to take the
actions, and that the planning and preparations done for the
10-mile planning zone could be used as a basis for taking
actions beyond 10 miles.
Contrary to what one other person has said, the basis also
was NOT that a release the size of the Chernobyl one was
not possible. The 10-mile planning zone is based on core
melt, containment failure, and a large early release. The
postulated maximum release is not very differend from the
Chernobyl release. Can such a release occur from a US
plant? It is not possible to be certain, but it is prudent to
assume that the possibility does exist. Thus, such a
release was considered in developing the 10-mile planning
zone.