DOE Emergency Preparedness Plans

["Sandy Perle" <sandyfl@ix.netcom.com>]

There was a detailed article in today's LA Times, entitled, "Nuclear
Plant Blast Sparked Chaos, U.S. Says". The article quotes many
sources within the DOE as well as Fluor Daniel Hanford Inc. It was a
detailed accounting of the May 14 storage tank explosion that
released some plutonium as well as other chemicals. The article
lists a litany of problems. I would be interested in those who have
more indepth knowledge of what actually occurred, and what emergency
plans were actually implemented, to state their opinions. Coming from
the nuclear power world, after TMI, a significant number of changes
in the industry were brought about via regulatory changes precipitated
in the NUREG on Lessons Learned. The manner in which power plants
prepared for emergencies was changed for ever. Having lived through
that evolution, I believe that the nation is better prepared today to
not only mitigate an incident, but better prepared to communicate
effectively to the public, with the assistance of regulatory and
political bodies. Emergency plans have been tested and when one of
the NRC 4 classifications have been initiated due to real occurences,
the plans worked. Does not the DOE have plans similar to those
required by the NRC? If not, why not? How can the public gain any
semblance of confidence in "our" ability to manage a nuclear program
effectively, IF, what the LA Times and these managers say, is valid?
There was a long discussion recently, regarding safety culture. I
guess the question in the case of DOE emergency preparedness is, WHO
is responsible. WHO should be held accountable, and WHO is going to
make certain that there are adequate safety plans in place to
minimize detriment to the public, as well as those who work within
these facilities.

For those who have NOT seen the entire article, as published in many
newspapers across the country today, I will include just the list of
problems highlighted. These are right from the article, as printed.
They are not MY opinion, but that of the article. So, if you don't
agree, don't attack me, I am only providing this information as a
service so that WE all, health physicists, and individuals interested
in ensuring safety to the public and workers, are informed as to what
the public reads and sees, as to how we conduct ourselves. If we are
appalled, then we should do something about these issues, if they are
in fact, true and accurate statements of how the DOE is managed
today. Here is the list of the problems as stated in the article:

     The Government Accountability Project, which has pushed for an
independent investigation of the accident, said the Energy
Department's admissions of failure are inadequate when there is no
assurance that anyone will be punished and no certainty that the same
mistakes will not be repeated in the future.      "What we've seen is
just a comedy of errors with tragic consequences," said Tom Carpenter
of the Accountability Project, which has represented whistle-blowers
at the plant. "What if this were a huge release of radiation? They
wouldn't have known it. They were simply lucky here. They were
terribly unprepared, and I'm not sure that next year they're going to
be any more prepared."      The key concern of many probing the
accident was the presence of eight construction workers on a break in
a trailer outside the main plant when the explosion occurred.
     According to the watchdog group that interviewed the workers, the
explosion was followed by a notification on the public address system
that all employees were to report to the main plant. When the workers
in the trailer phoned in for instructions, they say they were told to
go to the main plant.      They exited the trailer and walked through
what the department now says was a yellow-orange plume of oxides of
nitrogen and potential aerosols of nitric acid. Watchdog groups say
the plume also could have contained plutonium, but the Energy
Department says there is no evidence of that. * * *      The workers
were turned back by a security guard and ordered to return to the
trailer, only to be told by the shift manager, once again, to report
to the main plant. They attempted to walk upwind of the plume, but the
security guard ordered them back, forcing them to backtrack through
the plume.      Once inside, the workers, who were complaining of
lightheadedness and a metallic taste in their mouths, demanded nasal
smears to measure radiological exposure. But the correct swabs were
not available, and makeshift gauze swabs were used instead. In
addition, another worker without protection gear was sent up the
smokestack to test whether any plutonium had been released.      The
workers realized that they would have to drive themselves to the
hospital, and two of them had to walk unprotected back to the trailer
to get their keys; one of them was assigned to help security guards
put up perimeter tape, and while the guards were wearing breathing
apparatus, neither of the other two workers were offered any
protection.      When they drove to the hospital, all demanded blood
and urine tests but were refused. No fecal tests for heavy-metals
contamination were administered. Later, it was learned that their
original nose smears weren't examined until a month after the
incident.      The Energy Department report does not contradict most
of these details, and in fact outlines these failures in the emergency
response, among others:      * Plant managers were unable to locate
criteria for notification of outside agencies in the event of an
emergency and did not declare an alert until two hours after the
explosion. Though procedures require immediate off-site notification
of accidents, that notification did not occur for the 10:15 p.m.
accident until well after midnight. Other off-site agencies weren't
notified until three or four hours after the explosion.      * The
orders for a complete lock-down and for all personnel to be accounted
for were essentially conflicting orders that resulted in the mishap
with the construction workers. Moreover, the lock-down was not
properly implemented, and personnel reporting to work from home were
able to gain access to the facility with no knowledge that an
emergency was underway. Some crossed through as many as four security
checkpoints with no warning that a take-cover order was in effect.
     * The worker sent to check the smokestack should have been
wearing protective gear, as should all workers who went outside.
Protective breathing equipment was in some cases uncertified, and 28
of 36 breathing devices had not been subject to required biennial
testing.      * Potentially exposed workers were not given access to
emergency medical technicians, and even if they had been, there were
no protocols in place to direct technicians about what to do after an
explosion.      * No off-site notification for monitoring or plume
tracking was conducted because there was no adequate hazard assessment
for the plant. "The plutonium finishing plant did not understand
adequately the hazards they had," said Steve Veitenheimer, who headed
the investigative team. "The plant was not prepared to monitor for
outside contamination because they didn't understand what was in their
facility."      Energy Department officials outlined an exhaustive set
of new guidelines and safeguards designed to prevent future
breakdowns.      "We are safer today than before the explosion. It
reinforced the need for us to safely manage our chemicals, and we have
taken immediate actions," Piper said.      "We offer our apologies to
those employees who were not cared for properly," Yates added. "We
want no more surprises. . . . We will fix the ways that we do business
that led to these failures."

------------------
Sandy Perle
Technical Director
ICN Dosimetry Division
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Office: (800) 548-5100 x2306
Fax:    (714) 668-3149

mailto:sandyfl@ix.netcom.com
mailto:sperle@icnpharm.com

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