Re: DOE Emergency Preparedness Plans

["Alan R. Marchand" <radarm@accessnv.com>]

If radioactive material was released in the explosion, why wasn't FRMAC
called out?

Just a thought.
radarm@accessnv.com

At 10:36 PM 7/26/97 -0500, you wrote:
>There was a detailed article in today's LA Times, entitled, "Nuclear 
>Plant Blast Sparked Chaos, U.S. Says". The article quotes many 
>sources within the DOE as well as Fluor Daniel Hanford Inc. It was a 
>detailed accounting of the May 14 storage tank explosion that 
>released some plutonium as well as other chemicals. The article 
>lists a litany of problems. I would be interested in those who have 
>more indepth knowledge of what actually occurred, and what emergency 
>plans were actually implemented, to state their opinions. Coming from 
>the nuclear power world, after TMI, a significant number of changes 
>in the industry were brought about via regulatory changes precipitated 
>in the NUREG on Lessons Learned. The manner in which power plants 
>prepared for emergencies was changed for ever. Having lived through 
>that evolution, I believe that the nation is better prepared today to 
>not only mitigate an incident, but better prepared to communicate 
>effectively to the public, with the assistance of regulatory and 
>political bodies. Emergency plans have been tested and when one of 
>the NRC 4 classifications have been initiated due to real occurences, 
>the plans worked. Does not the DOE have plans similar to those 
>required by the NRC? If not, why not? How can the public gain any 
>semblance of confidence in "our" ability to manage a nuclear program 
>effectively, IF, what the LA Times and these managers say, is valid? 
>There was a long discussion recently, regarding safety culture. I 
>guess the question in the case of DOE emergency preparedness is, WHO 
>is responsible. WHO should be held accountable, and WHO is going to 
>make certain that there are adequate safety plans in place to 
>minimize detriment to the public, as well as those who work within 
>these facilities.
>
>For those who have NOT seen the entire article, as published in many 
>newspapers across the country today, I will include just the list of 
>problems highlighted. These are right from the article, as printed. 
>They are not MY opinion, but that of the article. So, if you don't 
>agree, don't attack me, I am only providing this information as a 
>service so that WE all, health physicists, and individuals interested 
>in ensuring safety to the public and workers, are informed as to what 
>the public reads and sees, as to how we conduct ourselves. If we are 
>appalled, then we should do something about these issues, if they are 
>in fact, true and accurate statements of how the DOE is managed 
>today. Here is the list of the problems as stated in the article:
>
>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0The Government Accountability Project, which has pushed for=
> an
>independent investigation of the accident, said the Energy
>Department's admissions of failure are inadequate when there is no
>assurance that anyone will be punished and no certainty that the same
>mistakes will not be repeated in the future. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0"What we've se=
>en is
>just a comedy of errors with tragic consequences," said Tom Carpenter
>of the Accountability Project, which has represented whistle-blowers
>at the plant. "What if this were a huge release of radiation? They
>wouldn't have known it. They were simply lucky here. They were
>terribly unprepared, and I'm not sure that next year they're going to
>be any more prepared." =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0The key concern of many probing the
>accident was the presence of eight construction workers on a break in
>a trailer outside the main plant when the explosion occurred.
>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0According to the watchdog group that interviewed the worker=
>s, the
>explosion was followed by a notification on the public address system
>that all employees were to report to the main plant. When the workers
>in the trailer phoned in for instructions, they say they were told to
>go to the main plant. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0They exited the trailer and walked th=
>rough
>what the department now says was a yellow-orange plume of oxides of
>nitrogen and potential aerosols of nitric acid. Watchdog groups say
>the plume also could have contained plutonium, but the Energy
>Department says there is no evidence of that. * * * =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0The wor=
>kers
>were turned back by a security guard and ordered to return to the
>trailer, only to be told by the shift manager, once again, to report
>to the main plant. They attempted to walk upwind of the plume, but the
>security guard ordered them back, forcing them to backtrack through
>the plume. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0Once inside, the workers, who were complaining o=
>f
>lightheadedness and a metallic taste in their mouths, demanded nasal
>smears to measure radiological exposure. But the correct swabs were
>not available, and makeshift gauze swabs were used instead. In
>addition, another worker without protection gear was sent up the
>smokestack to test whether any plutonium had been released. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
>The
>workers realized that they would have to drive themselves to the
>hospital, and two of them had to walk unprotected back to the trailer
>to get their keys; one of them was assigned to help security guards
>put up perimeter tape, and while the guards were wearing breathing
>apparatus, neither of the other two workers were offered any
>protection. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0When they drove to the hospital, all demanded b=
>lood
>and urine tests but were refused. No fecal tests for heavy-metals
>contamination were administered. Later, it was learned that their
>original nose smears weren't examined until a month after the
>incident. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0The Energy Department report does not contradict =
>most
>of these details, and in fact outlines these failures in the emergency
>response, among others: =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0* Plant managers were unable to loc=
>ate
>criteria for notification of outside agencies in the event of an
>emergency and did not declare an alert until two hours after the
>explosion. Though procedures require immediate off-site notification
>of accidents, that notification did not occur for the 10:15 p.m.
>accident until well after midnight. Other off-site agencies weren't
>notified until three or four hours after the explosion. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0* T=
>he
>orders for a complete lock-down and for all personnel to be accounted
>for were essentially conflicting orders that resulted in the mishap
>with the construction workers. Moreover, the lock-down was not
>properly implemented, and personnel reporting to work from home were
>able to gain access to the facility with no knowledge that an
>emergency was underway. Some crossed through as many as four security
>checkpoints with no warning that a take-cover order was in effect.
>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0* The worker sent to check the smokestack should have been
>wearing protective gear, as should all workers who went outside.
>Protective breathing equipment was in some cases uncertified, and 28
>of 36 breathing devices had not been subject to required biennial
>testing. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0* Potentially exposed workers were not given acces=
>s to
>emergency medical technicians, and even if they had been, there were
>no protocols in place to direct technicians about what to do after an
>explosion. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0* No off-site notification for monitoring or plu=
>me
>tracking was conducted because there was no adequate hazard assessment
>for the plant. "The plutonium finishing plant did not understand
>adequately the hazards they had," said Steve Veitenheimer, who headed
>the investigative team. "The plant was not prepared to monitor for
>outside contamination because they didn't understand what was in their
>facility." =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0Energy Department officials outlined an exhausti=
>ve set
>of new guidelines and safeguards designed to prevent future
>breakdowns. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0"We are safer today than before the explosion. =
>It
>reinforced the need for us to safely manage our chemicals, and we have
>taken immediate actions," Piper said. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0"We offer our apologi=
>es to
>those employees who were not cared for properly," Yates added. "We
>want no more surprises. . . . We will fix the ways that we do business
>that led to these failures." 
>
>------------------
>Sandy Perle
>Technical Director
>ICN Dosimetry Division
>Costa Mesa, CA 92626
>Office: (800) 548-5100 x2306 
>Fax:    (714) 668-3149
>  
>mailto:sandyfl@ix.netcom.com
>mailto:sperle@icnpharm.com
>
>Personal Homepage:
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>
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>http://www.dosimetry.com  (~July 27)
>
>
>"The object of opening the mind, as of opening 
>the mouth, is to close it again on something solid"
>              - G. K. Chesterton -
>
>